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ABSTRACT
Agricultural wastes are a possible resource for the establish¬
ment of rural industries in many, especially tropical, parts of the
world.
This thesis considers the critical problems of monoculture plan¬
tation economies, particularly on isolated islands, and analyses pos¬
sible strategies to use wastes beneficially. The concepts are ampli¬
fied, for sugarcane by-products, by a series of case studies of
attempts to produce higher value products from them. Detailed inves¬
tigations into the establishment, and subsequent performance, of a
bagasse particleboard factory and an active dried bakers yeast fac¬
tory, both in Mauritius, are given.
A comparative study is made of some existing 'Third World1 cane
spirit distilleries and alternative small and medium scale processes
for bagasse pulp and paper production.
From the detailed case studies broader conclusions are drawn on
the introduction of new technologies as a historical process; the
design process involved in investigating and implanting new technolo¬
gies and how, in its absence, completely inappropriate technologies
may be chosen; technology as not just the production machinery but
also the set of social relationships which enable the product to be
produced and used in a given society; the need to search for more
alternative technologies before starting the design process; and the
effects of conflicts of interest upon technological decision-making.
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This thesis is an attempt to analyse a potential solution to
some of the more pressing problems of underdevelopment. Such problems
include:
i. The effect of increasing prices of imported raw materials, espe¬
cially oil, upon the balance of trade, and upon local indus-
tries.
ii. Establishing new industries in areas without abundant, evenly
distributed, mineral resources.
iii. Rural unemployment and underemployment leading to migration to
the cities.
iv. Generating a sufficient agricultural surplus to improve the liv¬
ing standards of the rural people and provide for investment
throughout the economy.
v. Shortages of construction materials.
vi. Shortages of animal feed and food in areas where the land is
used for plantations of cash crops.
vii. The import dependence of industries in peripheral areas, espe¬
cially islands.
The particular solution proposed can be stated in its most gen¬
eral terms as "the use of agricultural and forestry wastes". These
are the one resource common to all underdeveloped countries (with the
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exception of countries which are completely desert). Whereas mineral
resources are unevenly distributed around the globe. For example, out
of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries* only four were oil exporters,
and only 9 had enough exploited mineral wealth to be able to provide
more than 15% in value of their total exports(1,p.150).
Agricultural and forestry wastes can be, and have been,
transformed to products to provide fuels, construction materials,
animal and human food, chemicals, fertilizers and fibrous products.
The great variety of potential products has long been appreciated by
farsighted foresters, farmers, chemists and engineers. In 1947 Egon
Glesinger wrote a book called "The Coming Age of Wood"(2), in which
he explained how wood was extensively used during World War II as a
source of producer gas, charcoal and activated carbon, methanol,
acetic acid, tars, sugars for fermentation to yeast and alcohol, fat
and protein, and how it can be converted to many more products, in
this way acting as the universal raw material for developing coun¬
tries. Hence the title. The age of wood did not come. Wood hydrolysis
plants in the United States were bought by oil companies and closed
down, so ensuring the dominance of petrochemicals.
As the cheaper resources, built up over centuries of photosyn¬
thesis are depleted (world oil production rates have been predicted
to start declining in the 1980s(3,p.177)), the present-day photosyn-
thetic energy income will have to be used as a resource. Development
strategies will have to consider the optimum use of biomass. Already
studies have been written on the use of biomass for developing coun-
* Excluding Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Seychelles. As usual
many of the countries ignored were islands.
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tries(4), although these have concentrated on energy production from
biomass to the exclusion of other, higher added value, uses.
What advantages are there in the utilization of biomass? In
rural areas the only production usually ,found is agricultural produc¬
tion. The fortunes of the local people depend on the surplus which
they can produce over their immediate needs. However, it is this
surplus which is taxed in most underdeveloped countries to provide
capital for investment in industry and services and infrastructure
for those who live in the cities. In few areas is the agricultural
surplus sufficiently hi gh to provide substantial tax revenue and a
rapid improvement in rural incomes. Furthermore, as the cost of bor¬
rowed money increases#, there is more pressure on governments to
raise capital internally; which means, in countries with no oil or
mineral wealth, and a very small manufacturing sector, increased tax¬
ation of agricultural production. If, however, the value of agricul¬
tural production can be increased by transforming the wastes or by¬
products into products with added value, the total surplus in an area
will be increased, allowing an increase in rural incomes.
In a number of underdeveloped countries, there is pressure on
land tenure, as a result of subdivision of plots upon inheritance
when the population is increasing, or of expropriation of land by
large landlords or governments or plantation projects, or of for¬
feiture of land to moneylenders. Under such circumstances, the
numbers of landless labourers and families with insufficient land to
provide for their own needs increases. In the absence of rural indus¬
tries these people drift to the towns to be unemployed there, and to
# Measured by the high interest rates charged at present in
commercial markets.
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increase the burden on municipal services.
What kinds of industries could be set up in rural areas? There
are many advantages to the industrialist of locations in cities. The
markets are either in the cities, or exported from port cities, as
rural incomes are too low to generate demand for anything except
basic consumer products.J Even for these consumer products, high
transport costs and low rural population densities favour production
in cities. Small scale industries, producing, consumer products in
rural areas, do not suffer high transport costs for their products,
but have to pay substantially higher prices for raw materials other
than those produced locally. Furthermore, shortages caused by irregu¬
lar deliveries of raw material and spare parts more frequently affect
industries away from major cities.$
Other factors which inhibit the introduction of rural industries
are a lack of rural convertible capitalf available for investment in
rural industries, while those with the money to start industries live
in towns and, therefore, tend to invest there; and that siting of
industry in rural areas requires more training of the workers and/or
redesign of the plant.
For these, and other, reasons, most industrialization continues
to be concentrated in the cities, and does not benefit the rural
population. However, there is a notable exception to this general
| From salt to bicycles.
9 The cashew processing factory in Angoche, Mogambique produces
at a lower percentage of its capacity than those in Maputo, for
this very reason.
} What accumulated wealth there is tends to be used for mar¬
riages and other ceremonies. For many people the only means of
raising convertible capital is by working as migratory labour
in mines or plantations.
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observation. These are industries based on the transformation of
agricultural by-products. As these are often dispersed and bulky, the
factories need to be sited near the raw materials, and it is usually
cheaper to transport the product than the raw material. Hence Egypt's
bagasse board and paper mills are in Upper Egypt alongside the sugar
factories, from where the paper and board are transported to Cairo.
Such industries provide income for the local people both through
factory wages and the purchase of by-products. Although prices paid
for the by-products are often fixed at lower levels than would be
paid if the factory was close enough to the capital for the growers
to exert political pressure on the factory managements, there is
still some money available to improve the local living standards.
So industries based on agricultural by-products could be one of
the rare cases where industrial development is possible at the peri¬
phery rather than at the centre. An extreme case of such peripheral
areas is an island. In terms of the world trade routes islands are
the ultimate periphery. Because of their low volumes of trade, they
tend to be served by minor shipping lines, and goods are often
transhipped before reaching them. For example, to send yeast from
Mauritius to Jordan, it was necessary to tranship in Marseilles (see
Chapter 4). As a consequence of the low freight volume, and the
absence of local shipping lines to compete with the shippers' confer¬
ences, freight rates are higher than the equivalent distances between
larger countries. The following quotation from the 1980-2 Mauritius
Plan(5,p. 161) shows how dependent an island can be when freight rates
are set.
§ For example, sugar cane prices in Brasil and India are well
below the 74% of the sugar revenue paid to Mauritian planters.
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There is no organisation in Mauritius responsible for
freight negotiations and consequently freight rates are
fixed by the Conference lines without any consultation
whatsoever with the local authorities. It should be pointed
out that any increase in freight rates is to the advantage
of local shipping agents since their fees are calculated on
a percentage basis.
In fact, the rates are so high that it was cheaper to supply
yeast to Mombassa from Montreal than from Mauritius. A particular
disadvantage of islands whose nearest neighbours are underdeveloped
countries is that shipping is well developed between larger coun¬
tries, and especially to and from Europe and North America; whereas
shipping between countries at the periphery has to depend on tramp
steamers or a few minor, non-conference, shipping lines.#
In short, such islands are effectively sea-1ocked, and suffer no
less from this isolation than do land-locked countries. Industry
suffers from difficulties in, and paying more for, the import of raw
materials and the export of finished goods. Only when the goods are
high-value and compact do these islands become favourable places for
the transformation of foreign raw materials to produce for export,
and even this is true only for as long as the islands can supply
relatively cheap skilled labour. As oil prices rise the cost of
freight will become ever more significant, making export processing
zones (EPZ) on remote islands less and less favoured by foreign
investors.
In view of these costs, it is not surprising that many islands
concentrate their exports in a few commodities, shipped to a few
countries. Knox(6) discussed the geographic concentration of exports
from small developing countries, and showed that the concentration
# e.g. Shipping Corporation of India, Besta Lines, DSR.
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index* for exports from small developing countries was 58.7 compared
with 29.1 for large developed countries. He showed that the
equivalent indices for commodity concentration were 46.2 and 21.4
respectively. Such concentration of exports allows the consolidation
of cargoes, and lower charges.
A common form of this commodity concentration is the export of
cash crops, especially plantation crops such as sugarcane, tea, and
bananas. For historical reasons a number of islands in the Caribbean,
the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are monoculture cash crop economies.
These are under more severe economic pressure than those which depend
on subsistence cropping or tourism, as the increases in oil prices
and imported food affect them more.f Also,they run greater risks from
changes in the price or the harvest of a single crop. Under such
conditions industrial development takes on a certain urgency. For the
prices of their cash crops are often limited by competition from tem¬
perate zone crops, and by increases in production in tropical coun¬
tries exceeding demand as new countries start to plant the crop. Yet
the costs of production (oil, fertilizers, labour, taxation, manage¬
ment perks, transport) continue to rise, together with the islanders'
expectations. So imports of consumer goods and food increase while
the income from the cash crop remains the same, thus squeezing the
economy and especially, as always, those at the margins of it, lead¬
ing to unemployment and a reduction in government services aimed at
* The concentration index is the square root of the sum of
squares of the percentage shares of exports for each country of
destination, or for each commodity. Complete concentration pro¬
duces an index of 100, complete dispersion (between 100 coun¬
tries or commodities) an index of 10.
f Oil prices because of the increased use of fertilizers and
somewhat increased mechanization, food because the land is tak¬
en up by cash crops, and sea-locked countries have no possibil¬
ity of occupying outlying land areas; it is sea, not land.
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the poor (if the usual IMF model is chosen to regulate the economy).
Since monoculture of cash crops implies the production of large
quantities of by-products, the idea of upgrading these by-products to
useful materials whose prices might not rise and fall in step with
the principle product has long been current in these island
economies. Indeed, not only have agricultural by-product based indus¬
tries been studied in these countries, but many of them have actually
tried setting up such industries. Examples may be given from many
countries including Taiwan, Cuba, Mauritius, Reunion, Jamaica, Sri
Lanka, and Madagascar. These attempts serve as examples (good and
bad) to the rural areas of larger countries where up to now such by¬
product use technologies have been scarce.^
Accordingly, it was decided that there is an urgent need to make
detailed analyses of cases of the introduction of by-product use
technologies into one of the several hundred square kilometre labora¬
tories, provided by island economies. This thesis is devoted to the
study of the technical, economic and social relationships of such
technical interventions. That a particular technology may work in a
developed country or on a laboratory bench, but not prove adaptable
to an underdeveloped country has long been recognised. An island has
several advantages for making such a study; it can be studied in com¬
parative isolation, as it is at the periphery of many centres§, and
so does not need to be analysed as the periphery of one centre. All
statistics are collected for the island, not agglomerated with other
} Probably as a result of lack of capital in the hands of the
rural people, and a lack of any sense of urgency on the part of
decision-makers in distant capitals.
§ Except for those islands which are still colonies or theoret¬
ically part of a European country, despite being in the Carib¬
bean or Indian or Pacific Oceans.
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areas, and are often more accurate than in countries where the popu¬
lation overwhelms the statisticians (e.g. Nigeria). The number of
people involved in any project or activity are limited, so it is
within the bounds of possibility to see everyone concerned.
Simultaneously with the decision to study by-product utilization
on an island, a decision had to made on what crop and its wastes
would be studied. There are, indeed, many tropical crops with a
potential for more intensive use of their by-products, for example:
i. The coconut palm. Although it is intensively used in countries
such as India and Sri Lanka, in many other places only the copra
is extracted, while the coir fibre and husks are thrown away.
The husks are used in some places to produce charcoal and active
carbon, producer gas or just as a fuel. The fibre has many uses,
in matting, ropes and upholstery to name just a few.
ii. Wood. Logging wastes (branches, stumps, thinnings and disused
and unsuitable wood) can amount to a third or more of the quan¬
tity of lumber removed, and sawmill wastes can reach half of the
timber processed(4). These sources of waste wood have been used
for their fibre content in particleboard and fibreboard plants,
and as a source of fuel (by direct combustion or pyrolysis to
charcoal and wood gas). Of their other uses, among the many
described in "The coming age of wood"(2), are hydrolysis to
sugars, followed by fermentation to produce yeast or alcohol or
citric acid.
iii. Cereal straw. Straw has traditionally been used in some areas as
a raw material for handmade paper and strawboard production(7),
and for thatch, animal feed and as a fuel. A factory at
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Sittingbourne is producing fruit boxes from resin bonded straw.
As a 1 ignocel 1 u 1 osic material, straw can, in principle, be con¬
verted to all the same products as wood. Rice straw is the prin¬
ciple fuel in many rural areas of China(8).
iv. Cassava. Although not a by-product, it can be grown on unused
land in quantities above those needed for food, as a source of
starch which can be transformed into ethanol (as in Brasil),
fungal protein for pig feed(9,10,ll,12), and forms of industrial
starch for various uses.
v. Sugarcane. There is a long history of the utilization of the
by-products of the production of sugar from cane. This involves
the separation of a solution of sugars from the 1ignocellulosic
fibres (the bagasse), the purification of this solution by pre¬
cipitation with lime (to produce the filter mud), concentration
of the sugar solution and crystallization of sucrose leaving
behind a concentrated solution of invert sugars and inorganic
chemicals (the molasses). In the field the cane is separated
from the cane tops and the leaves (the trash). Such a variety of
by-products can be transformed into correspondingly large number
of products.
Since sugarcane can be transformed into products based on
fibres, lignin, cellulose and sugars, it provides a model for the
transformation of most other agricultural wastes (except purely
starch-containing ones). As many of the by-products are produced at
the factory, there is no cost of collection (unlike straw) and,
therefore, there have been more commercial attempts to use the by¬
products of sugarcane. There is a long history of the use of sugar-
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cane by-products, starting from the production of rum from molasses
in the earliest days of sugar production.
For all these reasons, sugarcane was chosen as the crop for this
study. Figure 1.1 lists many, if not all, the products which,
according to the literature, can be produced from sugarcane by¬
products.
Figure 1.1 Checklist of uses of sugarcane by-products.
By-products: whi ch can be used for, or can be transformed
i nto:
Filter mud Cement, calcium carbonate, calcium oxide,
ferti1izer,animal feed, and wax.
Molasses Bacterial soil conditioners, food, phenol-
molasses-aldehyde resins, in metallurgical flux,
steel deoxidant, diffusion retarder in cement or
lime hardened pottery, briquetting of directly
reduced iron and ferrous metal fines, in refrac¬
tory linings, in tiles and sanitary ware, cul¬
tivation medium for producing bagasse storage
bio-liquor, in rice bran oil refining, in cements
and foundry moulds, as pesticide carrier, gly¬
cerol, 1-ephedrine hydrochloride, ethanol, rum,
gin, brandy, vodka, cane spirit, fodder yeast,
carbon dioxide, butanol, acetone, isopropanol,
2,3-butanediol, citric acid, vinegar, Chi ore!1 a,
Vertici11iurn, Rhizobiurn, potassium oxide, bakers
yeast, ammonia, acetic acid, glutamic acid and
mono-sodium glutamate, lysine, tryptophan,
arginine, valine, itaconic acid, lactic acid,
oxalic acid, ribonucleic acid, succinic acid,
acetoin, antibiotics, butadiene, ethylene, dex-
tran, enzymes, fusel oils, gibberel1 i ns, pro¬
pylene, lipids, tanning, corrosion inhibitor,
butyric acid, gluconic acid, aspartic acid, iso-
amyl alcohol, vitamin B.p, kojic acid, dihydroxy-
acetone, graphite binder in aluminium manufac¬
ture, pelleting carbon black, insulating varnish,
and carotenoids.
Molasses vinasse Fertilizer, fodder yeast, irrigation, animal
feed, biogas, mushrooms and potassium salts.
Bagasse Fuel, animal feed, dissolving pulp, protein, pulp
paper, particleboard, fibreboard, furfural, cor¬
rugated roofing boards, thermoplastic panels,
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electricity, fertilizer, mushrooms, oil absorp¬
tion, sugars, tobacco substitute, cork substi¬
tute, wound treatment, 1ignocellulose-poly(methyl
methacrylate) copolymer composites, insulating
materials, yeast recovery, ethanol, pyrolysis
oil, biogas, ammonia, active carbon, cellulose
acetate, carboxymethyl-cellulose, cellulose, cel-
lulases, lignin, methanol, xylitol, anti-tumour
polysaccharides, synthetic natural gas, bri¬
quettes, charcoal, producer gas, poultry litter,
bagasse concrete and cement, furfuryl alcohol,
explosives, formic acid, levulinic acid, dex¬
trose, acetylene, compost, and bagasse reinforced
resin.
Fly ash Fertilizer, filter medium for cane juice, and
glass.
Cane tops/trash Animal feed, leaf protein, compost, mushrooms and
mulch.
Note: These are suggested, patented or tried uses mentioned in the
literature. Few have reached commercial viability. For a diagram
showing the principle uses of sugarcane by-products, see the figure
in the literature survey that has been reproduced from Paturau(13).
Sources: Literature surveys by Kort(14).
Such a variety of products can be produced by making use of dif¬
ferent properties of the by-products. Molasses is a reasonably cheap
source of invert sugars, which can be fed to animals, or fermented to
chemicals and biomass. It is also viscous and sticky, so is used as a
binder for powders in industrial uses. The vinasse left after ethanol
distillation contains pentoses (which serves as a nutrient for the
growth of certain microorganisms) and the inorganic salts that were
in the original molasses, now concentrated. Filter mud contains cal¬
cium carbonate from the reactions of the added lime, and the wax
which originally was on the epidermis of the cane. Bagasse contains
cellulose fibres in a lignin matrix, which can be used together in
boards, or separated in pulp production. A partial hydrolysis can be
used to provide a low grade animal feed or a substrate for fungal
growth, or the cellulose can be fully hydrolysed (with difficulty) to
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provide a solution of sugars, or pyrolysed to produce pyrolysis or
producer gases, carbon and pyrolysis oil. Direct combustion of
bagasse provides the energy to run the sugar factory, and often a
surplus which can be converted to electricity for sale. Cane tops
are used as an animal feed, and^in principief could be a source of
leaf protein.
Despite this gamut of possibilities, only a few have been tried
on an industrial scale, and even fewer have succeeded. The developing
world is full of failed bagasse newsprint mills and particleboard
plants, of abandoned cane wax extraction plants and molasses
feedlots, of broken down bagasse briquetters and cane separators. How
is it that what should, at first sight, be eminently appropriate
technologies, by making use of local raw materials, reducing waste,
providing local income and employment under local control, and reduc¬
ing dependence of the area on outside supplies, can adapt so poorly
to local conditions that they fail?
Answers to such questions cannot be found in the laboratory. It
is necessary to study the industrial implementation of these techno¬
logies, in particular in underdeveloped countries. What method should
be used to study the industrial utilization of sugarcane by-products
in underdeveloped countries? Three approaches might be considered:
i. A state-of-the-art survey of the technology,
ii. using cost-benefit analysis to choose technologies, and
iii. studying the dynamics of the introduction and development of new
technologies into a particular society through particular case
studies.
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The first approach cannot provide answers to the questions
asked. For there have also been examples of successes in these same
technologies which have failed. Introducing the same technology into
different economic and social environments produces different
results. Although there have been technologies which failed because
of "purely technical" difficulties (e.g. some bagasse briquetters,
early cane separation equipment), these have been a minority of
cases. Furthermore, as the case study of the Mauritian particleboard
plant will show, the machine-embodied concept of technology favoured
in state-of-the-art studies* can lead to the thoughtless "parachut¬
ing" of industrial plant into underdeveloped countries and their
inevitable failure.
The second approach is typified by the studies produced at the
David Livingstone Institute of Overseas Development Studies(16). To
summarise very briefly their methodology, take a particular industry,
say the production of shoes or ships or sealing wax, split up the
production process into unit operations and processes, find out some
of the alternative technologies that already are in use, cost them in
terms of the labour employed, foreign and local capital and raw
materials used, and other costs, and perform a social cost-benefit
analysis on each operation or process (their "sub-technologies") to
identify which one makes optimum use of the factors of production
under a given set of labour and capital costs. Conclusions are then
drawn on which of an existing set of assemblies of these "sub-
technologies" makes best use of the factors or production, or what
* Such as the strictly limited consideration of economic and
energetic implications of the use of biomass for energy in the
UK in the studies prepared for the Energy Technology Support
Un i t(15).
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combination of "sub-technologies" would make an optimum use of the
factors of production.
Such approaches suffer from two basic defects. One is the
emphasis on costs and benefits which can be measured in money terms,
leading either to ignoring the non-financial factors altogether, or
attempts to assign a price to such things as beauty and national
unity. This is only a defect when the cost-benefit analysis is con¬
sidered as the be all and end all of project planning, where deci¬
sions are supposed to be taken purely on the basis of economic
analysis. Such attempts to impose a technician's analysis on the
decision-making process have been roundly condemned by a fellow
economist, Hirschman, who commented in this vein:
How could it be expected that it is possible to rank
development projects along a single scale by amalgamating
all their varied dimensions into a single index when far
simpler, everyday choices require the use of individual or
collective judgement in the weighing of alternative objec¬
tives and in the trade-off between them? There is much to
be said, it is true, for facilitating decision making by
reducing the many aspects of the project to a few crucial
characteristics, one of which would of course be the rate
of return. It is one thing to permit, in this way, the
decision maker to use informed judgement in making critical
choices and trade-offs; it is quite another, however, for
the technician to aim at dispensing with such judgement
altogether. This aim would be implicit in the submission of
a one-dimensional scale to a then obsolete "decision
maker". . . . the heavy price for this unique ranking is,
in fact, that, with many important considerations excluded
from the technicians' purview, the decision maker will in
the end make more rather than less use of his intuition and
"seat-of-the-pants" judgement than if the technicians has
set themselves the more modest goal of comparing projects
according to a limited number of criteria(17,pp.179-80).
When used merely as a technique to combine the different
economic factors involved, social cost-benefit analysis serves a pur¬
pose. For example, it is used in this thesis to assess if a particu¬
lar technology in one underdeveloped country could be economic in
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another, higher wage, country. But, taken alone, this does not imply
that this technology would be appropriate to that country.
The second problem in this approach of choice of technology
through cost benefit analysis is the static nature of this vision of
technology. There is no room for design of new or improved technolo¬
gies. And technical and social design improvements in projects can
have a great effect, as the following account of some World Bank
sponsored research into capital-1abour substitution in civil con¬
struction shows:
In the first phases of this research, labour-intensive
methods were found to be technically feasible for a wide
range of construction activities, for which they achieved
product standards equal to those of more capital-intensive
methods, but were also found not to be economically com¬
petitive even at extremely low wage rates. However, in sub¬
sequent phases of the research, which were carried out in
the context of operational projects, it was found that
traditional methods can be made economically competitive
even at modest wage rates by adapting them through intro¬
ducing improved tools, proper wage incentives, changed pro¬
ject organization, and more careful management of the
work(18).
Such possibilities are, however, ignored in -many "choice of
technology" studies. As Pickett(16,pp.32-3) says, "The fact that the
investment decision is thus rooted in the present and indeed the past
and has consequences for the future is, of course, elementary and
evident. It is, nevertheless, of great importance and leads directly
to significant features which must be recognized in the economic
evaluation of projects. . . . This point registered it is largely
ignored in what follows."
It is the third approach which has been used to study the indus¬
trial utilization of sugarcane by-products. Studies of appropriate
and inappropriate technologies have often taken a project (say a dam)
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at a particular time, and analysed the social and environmental
effects of the project upon the region and the local people as it was
at that stage in the history of the project. Others have taken a pro¬
posed project, and, by studying what is known about the technology
and the environment of the proposed project, attempted to foresee the
consequences of the implementation of the project. While these stu¬
dies are valuable, they are necessarily limited. For projects, tech¬
nologies and people change with time; e.g. the social effects of a
dam on displaced people during construction are different to those
when these people are living on the fish in the new lake. To study
the interaction of a technology with its economic and social environ¬
ment it is necessary to study the historical process of their effects
upon one another. These effects act in both directions, although not
equally. Technologies which are successful, in their own terms, have
more effect upon the environment than the reverse; whereas technolog¬
ical failures have often been affected more by the environment.
There have been few studies of the historical development of the
introduction of technologies new to a society: perhaps for practical
reasons, for few people have the time to study a project over a long
timescale. Nevertheless, projects can be visited some years after
they were set up, information gathered, and the history of the pro¬
ject, its problems and solutions, successes and failures, can be
reconstructed. Such studies have also been rare—one notable excep¬
tion being Hirschman's "Development projects observed"(17). Hirsch-
man studied the histories of 11 projects which had been funded by the
World Bank and had been in operation for several years. These pro¬
jects, typical of those funded by the World Bank in its early years,
were predominantly infrastructural. In his book he tried to systema-
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tise his observations on project behaviour, drawing out experiences
common to different projects.
His studies were carried out in 1964-5, and show a concern for
aspects of project behaviour which later were used by supporters of
appropriate technology in their critiques of the .standard economic
thinking, whereby the selection of only limited, quantifiable, cri¬
teria of project analysis had led to the creation of myths such as
"economies of scale". One of Hirschman's chapters was entitled "Pro¬
ject appraisal: the centrality of side effects". In it he shows how
these so-called side effects can be so important that they can become
essential requirements for the survival (let alone success) of the
project. His examples include the murder of the West Pakistan manager
of a paper mill in what was then East Pakistan as a result of the
mere side effect of racial tensions. Similarly, his discussion of
positive side effects shows an understanding of the reality of, the
constraints of, development. Discussing advice to "pre-take-off"
countries he wrote, "for to hand these countries the advice to
develop capital-intensive industries is rather like counseling a
young man from a poor family who is starting out in life to find him¬
self a wealthy grandfather."#
Hirschman makes a useful distinction between social aspects of
these projects. This is in the extent to which they accept existing
social behaviour as given (trait-taking), or require a change in
social behaviour for their success (trait-making). Certain technolo¬
gies require the existence of particular social behaviour in order to
# Some countries do manage to find themselves "wealthy grandfa¬
thers". All they need to do is kill peasants and call them com¬
munists.
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succeed. If these traits are neither present in a society, nor can be
created, the technology transfer is doomed to failure. As an example
of this, he shows how the Nigerian Railways suffered from inter¬
tribal conflicts, such that in many areas freight was sent by lorries
owned by people of the same ethnic group, rather than the "foreign"
railway. For the railways to have been successful would have required
a massive change in social values. However, when a project succeeds
in introducing a new trait (such as a reduction in corruption), this
can be socially beneficial, and permit further development which was
not possible given the previously existing trait. From this Hirschman
concludes that a project should set out to be neither completely
trait-making or trait-taking but set out to be trait-making in only a
limited number of ways and then consciously try to promote these
changes. He recommended an explicit analysis of this when designing
projects. By and large, this recommendation has been ignored.
In his studies of the project histories he came across many
examples of problems which had been unforeseen by the actors in the
projects, but when they arose the actors surprised themselves by
being able to solve them. He suggested that for projects to be
attempted, potential difficulties have to be hidden, or potential
benefits exaggerated, so that they may be approved by decision makers
who lack confidence in their own abilities. Then when the problems
arose, the same people find their abilities such that they can over¬
come these problems, making them more confident in their abilities
for the future. Hirschman calls this the "Principle of the Hiding
Hand". This is probably the weakest part of his book, since if the
project fails due to inadequate preparation for problems that have
been deliberately hidden, confidence will be reduced rather than
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increased. Blind faith in a promoter's promises is dangerous for
those attempting to introduce new technologies to underdeveloped
countries. It will be shown in the conclusions how this principle
does not apply to the case studies in this thesis, and appears to
rest on a mistaken conception of creativity and innovation.
These case studies are of the current usage, and attempts to
introduce new uses, of sugarcane by-products in Mauritius. As men¬
tioned previously, it was decided to investigate agricultural by¬
product utilization on an island; and Mauritius was chosen.
Mauritius is an island in the Indian Ocean (20° 15' S, 57° 31*
E), about 800 km to the east of Madagascar, and is approximately
60 km long by 40 km wide, with an area of some 1860 km^. some maps
of Mauritius are reproduced in an appendix.
The island, originally uninhabited, was first settled by the
Dutch in 1638 but abandoned in 1710. Five years later the French took
over, and remained in control until a British task force of 10 000
troops invaded the island in 1810 following a lengthy blockade. The
total population of the island was only 70 000 at the time. Under the
British the production of sugar, which had started under French rule,
was greatly extended, while the African slaves were replaced by
Indian "indentured 1abourers"(19). The subsequent history of the
struggle of these workers against exploitation is best outlined in
the Durand's book, "L'Tle Maurice, quelle independance?"(20). This
gives probably the best outline analysis of the Mauritian economy,
society and politics. Other more specific studies of the social
anthropology of the Hindu Mauritians have been written by
Benedict(21). A notable feature of Mauritian society is that it is
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divided not only on class lines, but also ethnically. This affects
the politics and extends into decision-making even in private com¬
panies. The economy is dominated by a Franco-Mauritian, sugar estate
owning, oligarchy, whereas the civil service is dominated by Mauri¬
tians of Indian descent. As social interaction between the groups
tends to be limited, this leads to a particularist style of
decision-making, as for example appointing people on the basis of
their connections with the family of the owner, rather than on their
ability. This can have serious effects on attempts to introduce new
technologies into Mauritius, as it is in exactly these attempts that
ability and creativity are most required of the management and work¬
ers in an enterprise.
Sugarcane is the predominant crop, occupying 92% of all the cul¬
tivated land. Sugar and molasses represent 85% of the exports of the
island, after deducting the costs of imported raw materials for every
export. In 1978, the added value in sugar production was 24.1% of
the total GNP(22). The island is, therefore, highly dependent on the
price paid for its sugar, most of which is sold to the EEC under the
the
terms of^Lome Convention. Since the 1974 sugar boom, the income from
sugar exports has declined, yet imports had continued at the high
level engendered by the money available during the boom. This has led
to balance of payments problems, and intervention by the Interna¬
tional Monetary Fund, which has twice required the Mauritian govern¬
ment to apply their usual solution to economic problems—
devaluation.
This economic situation has encouraged Mauritians to become more
concerned about who should suffer the austerity measures, than about
alternative development possibilities. The effects of the former may
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be seen in a few weeks time (in June, 1982) in the forthcoming Mauri¬
tian elections. The latter concern has led more Mauritians to con¬
sider diversification from sugar, either by planting other crops
(Mauritius imports nearly all its food, including the staple food,
rice), or by adding value to the by-products of sugarcane. Among the
latter suggestions are proposals by Lonrho to build a distillery to
produce ethanol for blending with petrol from molasses, thus saving
on imports. This has also been considered as a possibility in a UNIDO
sponsored study for the Mauritian Government on the utilization of
sugarcane by-products carried out by Booker Agriculture. Meanwhile
sugar factories are increasing their production of electricity from
bagasse for sale to the Central Electricity Board (CEB).
More general suggestions have been made by Paturau in an article
which studied the possibility of integrated development of all the
production in a sugar factory area(23), and by Baguant in a thesis on
energy strategies for less developed countries(24). Baguant con¬
sidered the energetic and economic implications of applying the
intensive cane cultivation (close-spaced rows) and energy production
strategies proposed in the Battelle studies for the USA(25) to Mauri¬
tius and Nicaragua. This offers possibilities of reducing the area
under sugarcane cultivation while increasing the energy production
from the sugarcane. In the simplified model he used, however, he did
not allow for the lower sugar contents found in cane grown at closer
spacings, or in the trash and tops he proposed would be crushed
together with the cane, thus invalidating his calculations of sugar
and molasses production. Nevertheless, provided that the long-term
soil fertility could be maintained under intensive cultivation, this
suggestion might provide a means for Mauritius to have their cake and
eat it (at an increased risk).
* I he combined Mouvement Militant Mauricien and Partie Social-
iste Mauricien opposition won 60 out of 62 seats in these elec¬
tions.
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These suggestions, and the previous attempts to utilise sugar¬
cane by-products, in Mauritius, must be seen in the context of
development in a market economy. The Mauritian economy is relatively
open, and only recently have exchange control regulations been
tightened, following the previously mentioned devaluations. Most
industry and commerce is in private hands, as government intervention
in industry has, historically, been concerned with the establishment
of infrastructure (in the port, airport, water and electricity
development), and with incentives for the establishment of new,
employment-creating, industries.
Furthermore, the Mauritian economy is a dependent market econ¬
omy. In market economies power is in the hands of those with the
greatest purchasing capacity; in capitalist economies it is in the
hands of those with most capital; in monopolist economies power is in
the hands of those who control production. In the international
market economy, Mauritius is powerless under all three counts.
What is appropriate in such an economy is different from what
would be appropriate in a larger, centrally planned economy (such as
Egypt). The small size of the island forces it to depend more on
international trade than do larger countries, which can produce most
of their needs locally. This puts extra constraints on the choice of
techniques to be used.
Firstly, consider an exporting industry. It has to sell at
international prices (in the absence of a regional market, or special
trade agreements), at quality levels set by international competi¬
tors. Any search for an appropriate technology for an export indus¬
try* is constrained by these requirements. Designs can be developed
* Or one which produces inputs for an export industry.
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which maximise employment creation, and the use of local resources,
only to these limits. Technologies used in export industries may be
inappropriate in two ways. Either the product of this technology is
internationally uncompetitive (in which case, the enterprise fails),
or, in order to compete internationally, it requires too great an
exploitation of Mauritian resources (the workers, the physical
environment, foreign exchange) to be socially acceptable.# Sometimes,
local conditions and external constraints may combine to leave no
possibility of designing a technology which could overcome them, in
which case the industry is inappropriate. An example of this is the
production of bakers yeast for export, studied in chapter 4.
On the other hand, industries producing for the local market are
also constrained by world market conditions, as, given the import
dependence of the Mauritian economy, they will be substituting for
imports. In the absence of government intervention, they have to be
competitive with imported productsf, and the above comments apply.
An appropriate technology for development, in such cir¬
cumstances, will have to accept the constraints of the world market
economy, but attempt to reduce economic and technological dependence,
and the underdevelopment resulting from past and present exploitation
of such peripheral economies, by making better use of Mauritian
resources. These resources may be "factors of production" or "social
traits". The local market economy, on the other hand, need not always
be taken as an absolute limitation on the selection and design of
technology. Some aspects have to be accepted, others can be fought
against through government or private action.
# When compared with alternative technologies,
f Although now the high freight costs will be in the favour of
the Mauritian producers.
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For instance, historically the Mauritian Government has inter¬
vened to support new industries, in furtherance of its policies of
employment creation, establishing new manufacturing industries, and
improving the income distribution(26). This it has done by providing
incentives in the form of tax relief and, sometimes, import controls,
for Development Certificate and Export Processing Zone companies. To
this end, they have applied social cost-benefit analysis to govern¬
ment projects, taking into account the benefits to the national econ¬
omy of employing previously unemployed people and saving on foreign
exchange(27). These methods have been applied to the Indian techno¬
logies of paper production in mini-mills and handmade paper plants,
to see if they might be economically appropriate under Mauritian con¬
ditions. This is necessary, but not sufficient, however, to determine
the appropriateness of these technologies in Mauritius, because of
the limitations of social cost-benefit analysis mentioned previously,
especially as regards those resources which are better described as
social traits rather than factors of production.
Such traits of Mauritian society are described in the work of
Benedict(21) and Durand(20), and in the cases studied here. Some of
these arise from the power relationships inherent in a small, mono¬
culture, import dependent, market economy. For example, consider the
effects of purchasing power upon marketing. Those who purchase large
quantities of a product have more influence upon a producer than many
small, dispersed, consumers. Predicatable consequences are:
i. A dispersed group of consumers, each purchasing a small propor¬
tion of the output of a factory will have less influence on the
type and quality of goods produced than a few, large consumers,
ii. and a few wholesalers may be more visible to a producer than
many small consumers, and, therefore, have more influence over
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the producers decision-making, despite the producers long-term
interest in satisfying the consumer.
These, and other, traits of Mauritian society have to be taken
into account in the design of appropriate technologies—some as
design constraints (trait-taking), some to be changed (trait-making).
But which should be accepted, which changed? To understand this, it
is necessary to study the history of interaction between the technol¬
ogy and its social environment (including the market economy). This
is done in chapters three, four and five, where a bagasse-based par-
ticleboard factory, an active dried bakers yeast factory, and cane
spirit production are analysed.
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CHAPTER TWO
Survey of technical 1iterature
The purpose of this section is to survey of the appropriate and
inappropriate technologies which have been used to upgrade sugarcane
by-products at a factory scale. Much of the extensive literature on
sugarcane by-product use describes laboratory experiments which have
not been tested on an industrial scale. The difference between
laboratory possibilities and practical realization are such that many
suggested techniques fail. Such untried techniques cannot, at
present, form the basis of a development policy of upgrading agricul¬
tural wastes to provide added value in rural areas. Rather they can
be considered as starting points for long term research programmes in
institutions such as local universities. For such research work there
already exist excellent bibliographies on the subject.
Indeed, each year the Sugar Milling Research Institute at the
University of Natal produces a definitive bibliography on "The indus¬
trial utilisation of sugar and mill by-products", prepared by Maurice
J. Kortf(l). Apart from the by-products themselves, this literature
survey also covers the related topics of livestock feeding, indus¬
trial uses of refined sugar, developments in sucrochemistry, nutri-
1" Available from the Sugar Milling Research Institute, Univ. of
Natal, Durban 4001, South Africa.
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tion and toxicology, and other sweeteners. Its references are taken
from the scientific and trade journals, patents, conferences and sym¬
posia on sugar technology and related fields, and from books. In the
May 1980 edition, 58 pages were devoted to by-products from sugar
manufacture and another 32 to livestock feeding with 688 and 340
references respectively. Kort gives the following summary of the sub¬
jects covered in the literature for that year:
Predictably, much attention is being paid to the very topi¬
cal fermentation of cane and its by-products to fuel
alcohol. From the references given in this and previous
reports in this series, it can be seen that the technology
is known but that it still revolves around economics and
politics. Indeed, the Government of South Africa is urged
to clarify its thinking on the production of fuel alcohol
from cane (Refs. 475 to 477 and 479 to 481, Chapter 1).
Besides alcohol, various other compounds can be obtained
from cane by-products by fermentation, for example yeast,
protein, acetic, citric, glutamic and other acids, acetone,
butanol, antibiotics, methane and many more. In addition,
furfural, cellulose and monosaccharides can be obtained
from bagasse. A look at the Index to Chapter 1 (page 2)
will show that factory and distillery waste water, filter
mud, molasses and bagasse find many other applications in
addition to their use as substrates for chemicals and in
livestock feeding. Other by-products used in livestock
feeding and detailed in Chapter 2 are cane, cane tops and
juice, yeasts and sucrochemicals as well as beet and beet
pulp. These by-products can, therefore, contribute substan¬
tially to the economics of sugar milling.
This "Index to Chapter 1", together with the same for Chapter 2,
is reproduced in figure 2.1. These indicate the comprehensive nature
of this literature survey. This survey of technology in no way
attempts to duplicate Kort's excellent bibliography. The reader is
advised to consult Kort if he wishes to explore the comprehensive
literature on the use of specific by-products.
As no bibliography or review can be complete (although that of
Kort very nearly is), other reviews, literature surveys and
bibliographies will be mentioned . Furthermore, the bibliography to
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Figure 2.1 Indexes to chapters 1 and 2 of Kort(l)
Page
(1) General 3
(2) Factory and Distillery Waste Water 3
(a) Introduction 3
(b) Fertil iser 3
(c) Industrial uses 4
(3) Filter Mud 4
(a) General 5
(b) Calcium carbonate and lime recovery 5
(c) Ferti 1 iser 5








(c) Food uses 7
(d) Industrial uses 7










(g) Miscellaneous uses 14
(h) Toxicity 14
(7) Chemicals from Cane By-ProJucts .13
(a) Introduction 15
(b) Alcohol 15




(a) Using Molasses 50
(b) Using Molasses and Beet Pulp 56
(c) Using Beet 5o •
(d) Using Sugar '2
(e) Using Sugarcane and Care Tops 73
(f! Using Cane Juice 75
(g 1 Using Sagasse 75
(h)- Using Yeasts 75
(i) Using Vinasse and Waste Water 77
(j) Using Filter Cake 77
(k) Using Sucrccnemicals 73
(1) -oxicity , 7S
References />'
- 29 -
this thesis is available in computer readable form from the author
and the Department of Electrical Engineering of the University of
Edinburgh, and in a version which is already indexed for use on com¬
puters running the the UNIX* operating system . In this form searches
may be based on multiple keywords.# A more extensive on-line database
on sugar and energy can be consulted at Tate & Lyle Group Research
and Development's library at Reading.
For a description of, and introduction to, the technology of the
utilization of sugarcane by-products, the reader is referred to the
now standard text on the subject, "By-products of the cane sugar
industry", by J. Maurice Paturau(2). This gives the state-of-the-art
in 1969 on all the uses of sugarcane by-products. The range of the
uses described is shown in figure 2.2, taken from Paturau's book. The
processes used to convert the by-products into these products are
described, together with the technical advantages and disadvantages
of each process and the production economics when known.
No attempt has been made here to describe technologies already
described in Paturau, and it shall be assumed that any reader unfami¬
liar with such technologies will consult Paturau's book. From this
starting point, in 1969, the present survey will concentrate on
developments which have been tried on an industrial scale, since
1969. Particular attention has been paid to the range of alternative
technologies available; a point often ignored in reviews on the sub¬
ject, which often consider only the largest scale technologies for
any given end. Particular stress has been placed on articles which
*UNIX is a Trademark of Bell Laboratories.
# And so rendering technologically obsolete the references in
literature surveys which merely list straightforward, unimpor¬
tant, articles that are not worth discussing.























































provide information which may be used to assess the appropriateness
of a technology to specific material conditions. A particularly
important subset of these are case studies of existing plants (or,
failing these, project proposals). Whenever sufficiently detailed
case studies have been publicly available, they have been critically
discussed in the appropriate chapters of this thesis. Therefore, much
of the discussion of the literature on the production of particle-
boar.d, pulp and paper, y£ast and cane spirits will be found in the
chapters on these subjects.
1. General use of sugarcane by-products.
In this section are described works which consider the use of
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more than one by-product, or the production of several different pro¬
ducts. Some of these are summary papers published at conferences,
some are studies of the existing or potential industries relevant to
a particular country, others integrate a variety of processes under a
common theme such as energy.
First should be mentioned the Mauritius Sugar Industry Research
Institute (MSIRI) Technical Circular No. 18, "By-Products of the
Sugar Industry of Mauritius"(3), which Paturau later developed into
his book on the subject. Apart from a substantial review of the tech¬
nology and the data on Mauritian availability of bagasse, molasses,
filter mud, and cane tops, it includes the history of the use or
attempted use of each by-product in Mauritius. The histories of the
production of rum and alcohol and of attempts to produce paper are
described in later chapters of this thesis.
Another early study was one prepared by Freeland(4) for the Pak¬
istan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation. This was on a US
Agency for International Development contract to advise what use
might be made of by-products in Pakistan at that time, based on
Freeland's experience in Taiwan. He gave estimates for the surplus
bagasse at each mill (very low except at the largest mills), molasses
production and use. In the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), most
of the molasses was used in tobacco curing for its flavour. In West
Pakistan only a few mills produced alcohol, always for potable spir¬
its. He recommend that some proposals by factories in West Pakistan
to set up industrial ethanol distilleries be supported, at least one
of which, at Crescent Sugar Mills, Lyallpur, was built. He described
the Taiwanese processes to produce acetic acid by submerged fermenta¬
tion, Torula yeast, monosodium glutamate, bagasse pulp, hardboard and
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insulation board, and particleboard, giving 1962 Taiwanese prices
where available. It is interesting to note that the technologies for
these processes were developed in Taiwan, not imported. So when
present-day reviewers on the use of sugarcane by-products claim that
certain processes are secret or patented and too complicated to
develop in a Third World country without buying a turnkey plant or at
least licensing a process, it is not strictly true, as the Taiwan
example showed. Indeed, the latest advances in any technology are not
easily rediscovered independently, but for countries with an advance
educational level self-design is possible, if not in the original
plant, then in designing improvements. For example, the Egyptian
staff at the Hawamdieh acetone-butanol distillery had improved the
original Russian fermentation process to reduce the number of fermen¬
tations lost through infection and adapt the process to their
feedstock of molasses (the Russians used potatoes).]"
Tedjowahjono(5) described the present uses of sugarcane by¬
products in Indonesia and prospects for developing this industry.
Four of the 61 sugar factories have distilleries, three produce cane
spirit and industrial ethanol (at Palimanan, Comal and Madukismo),
the other only produces cane spirit (at Jatiroto). The PT Madubaru
also raises cattle using molasses and cane tops as fodder. Four com¬
panies outside the sugar industry also make alcohol from molasses, PT
Asen Pabuaran, PT Madu Sari, PT Air Matu Ibu and PT Padaharja. PT
Sasa Inti, PT Ajinomoto Indonesia and PT Miwan produce monosodium
glutamate (MSG) from molasses. PT Sumbar Protein produces fodder
yeast from molasses, and, finally, PN Kertas Letjes had launched an
]" Personal communication by laboratory staff to the author dur¬
ing a visit in June 1976.
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expansion of its paper factory in order to use bagasse as a raw
material.
•
The typical yield of ethanol in Indonesia was 250 1 (at 95%)/t
molasses. A new distillery imported from Australia would have cost
Rp 2G including installation for a 15 000 1/day plant. Molasses at
Java cost Rs 30 950/t (US$49.36/t), while the alcohol produced sold
for Rp 232/1 (US$0.37/1) at the factory (fixed 3 May 1979), which
after the addition of taxes, storage, transport and other charges
raised the price to Rp 481.75/1 ethanol or Rp 326.72/1 cane spirit,
f.o.b. at a port city.
The fodder yeast factory produced 4-6 t/day and planned to
increase the capacity to 8t/day by the end of 1980. The company had
built its own fermenters and bought a molasses clarifier, yeast
separator, yeast drier, boiler, and diesel generator. They were sel¬
ling this fodder yeast in May 1979 for Rp 220/kg (US$0.35/kg).
Of the three factories producing MSG, one produced 240 t of glu¬
tamic acid and 160 t of MSG monthly (PT Sasa Inti), PT Miwon
Indonesia produced 120-150 t/month glutamic acid and PT Ajinomoto
Indonesia was capable of producing 400 t/month MSG, at a yield of 1 t
MSG from 6-7 t molasses. (cf. theoretical maximum of 1 t MSG from
4 t molasses). The retail price of MSG in Indonesia was Rp 2000/kg
(US$3.2/kg).
Indonesia had exported paper to India at the end of 1979 for the
first time, and had received enquiries from Malaysia, Hong Kong and
Singapore. So the PN Kertas Letjes pulp and paper factory was plan¬
ning to start construction of a 180 t/day bagasse pulp line in 1980,
planned to enter production in 1983. The article did not mention
- 34 -
which pulping process would be used, only that the yield would be 1 t
pulp from 3.64 t dry wt. bagasse. The bagasse would be blended with
other pulp to produce 260 t/day paper.
Tedjowahjono also reported on the possibilities of producing
pellets from dried cane tops. Indonesian research at BP3G had meas¬
ured cane top production at 4-20 t/ha (at 70% moisture). Each tonne
of tops could produce 0.325 t pellets (at 10% moisture), which could
be sold for animal feed. Elephant grass pellets were selling in
Lamorgan for Rp 40/kg (US$0.06/kg).
An account of the existing by-product industries in Cuba was
given by Noa Silverio in the 15th anniversary issue of the ICIDCA
journal(6). He gave a summary of the development of historical
development of the by-product industries in Cuba, and listed the
existing plants in 1980. This table is reproduced as figure 2.3.
Note that no wax has been produced since 1964. Before the revolution
crude wax used to be exported to Louisiana where it was refined.
Pilot production of semirefined wax based on studies at ICIDCA
(Instituto Cubano de Industrialisation de Derivados de Cana de Azu-
car) will begin at the Jesus Menendez sugar factory.
Andrews has given an overview of the by-products industry in
South Africa(7). Figure 2.4 gives his list of the South African
sugar mills with their by-product production. Many by-product using
factories in South Africa are away from the mills, and closer to the
markets, with the exception of those that use bagasse.
Andrews outlined the difficulties of producing paper from
bagasse in South Africa and competing with locally produced wood
based paper. As a result, there are no independent bagasse pulp
Figure 2.3 By-product utilization plants in Cuba, 1980
Tlpo da plants Nombra da la pianta Capacldad tm/aAo
Tableros de particulas Pro-Cuba 16000
•• „ „ Madaras Tdcnicas 9000
„ fibras Primadera 10 000
te •» „ Henetex 3000
Pulpa y Papel Pulpa Cuba 18000 (pulpa)
30 000 (papel)
•a .. Tdcnlca Cubana 13 500 (pulpa)
27 000 (papal)
Papelera Damuji 13 500 (pulpa)
21 000 (papel)
Levadura torula Plants de Pina, Mordn 8 000
„ „ Antonio Sinchei. Clenf. 12 000
Levadura sacharomyces Hdctor Molina 1 120
Josi A. Echevarria 2 520
•a .. Melanio Herndndez 1 120
• a »
Enrique Varona 1 120
•• ••
Amanclo Rodriguez 1 680
TOTAL 7560
Dextrana Pianta del Central EspaAa 350
Alcohol etilico Abraham Lincoln 1S6 800 HI
..
Hdctor Molina 156 800 ..
.. Santa Cruz 168000 „
..
Jos* A. Echevarria 280 000 „
•a Melanio Hernindez 156 800 „
•a .*
Enrique Varona 156 800 _
•a aa
Amancio Rodriguez 156 800 ..
TOTAL 1 123 000 "
Plantas miel-urea-bagacillo 195 000
Bagacillo Predigerido 23 000
Cera Cruda Brasil 1 200"
A. Guiteras 2 000'
Cera cruda y refinada Jesus Mendndez 2 000* (300 tm
semlreflnada)
Tableros = board. Levadura = yeast. Mi el = molasses. Predigerido =
pre-digested. Cera = wax. Source: Noa Silverio(6).
plants, all the factories produce high value grades of paper from
their bagasse, taking advantage of the specific properties of bagasse
pulp. There are mills with capacities to produce 200 t/d fluting





its very own failed bagasse particleboard
which entered production in 1972 and was
Designed to produce 120 t/d of 9 mm to 50 mm
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«
Figure 2.4 South African sugar mills and their attached by-product
uses.
Mill Company Sugar Group Crushing Rate* By-Product
Maletunc Transvaalse Suiker Korporasie Hpk 261 Particle board *
Pongola Pongola Sugar Milling Co. Ltd C.G. Smith Sugar 196 —
Umfotor.i Umfolozi Co-Op Sugar Planters lid — 255 —
Kmp;ingcni Huletts Corporation Ud Huletts 220 —
Felixton HuletU Corporation Ltd Huletts ItZ Fluting paper
Enlumcni Entumeni Sugar Milling Co (Pty) Lid — 54 —
Amatikulu Huletts Corporation Ltd Huletts 370 Particle board
Glcndalc Glendale Stigar Millers (Pty) Lid Lonrho 50 —
Darnall Huletts Corporation Lida Huletts 263 —
G ledhow Gicdhow Stigar Co. Lid C.G. Smith Sugar 26S Coated paper *
Melville Melville Stigar Estates — SO Molasses feeds
Jaagbaan Noodsberg Sugar Co. Lid Tate 6c Lyle 224 —
Dalton The Union Co-Op Bark tc Sugar Co. Lid — 106 —
Tongaat Tongaat Sugar (Pty) lid — 310 Molasses feeds
Mount Edgecombe Huletts Corporation Ltd Huletts 212 —
Hlovo lltovo Sugar Estates Ltd Tate 6c Lyle 145 —
?ezela Reynolds Bros Lid C.G. Smith Sugar 340 Furfural *
Um/imkulu The Umzimkulu Sugar Co Lid C.G. Smith Sugar 202 -
• ToiW'hour; * Refineries.
Soarce: South African Sugar Association.
Source: Andrews(7).
board it had difficulties competing with wopd-based particleboard in
a 120 kt/a market. However, in 1974 another bagasse particleboard
plant was set up by a large furniture organisation. This produced
continuous particleboard of 3 mm to 9 mm thickness.
A 5000 t/d furfural plant was set up at Sezela by Smithchem
(Pty.) Ltd., and has since been expanded. Most of the fur¬
fural is exported.
Molasses is fermented by two companies: to industrial ethanol,
carbon dioxide and furfural by Natal Cane By-Products at Merebank,
Durban; and to these products and also acetic acid, acetone and
butanol by National Chemical Products Ltd. at Germiston and Umgeni.
They have faced increasingly severe problems of scaling in the stills
and competition from synthetic ethanol and wine spirit. One factory
evaporates its vinasse to make an animal feed supplement, the other
uses part of its vinasse for fodder yeast production.
- 37 -
Wet bakers yeast is produced by four companies, and dried yeast
by two, all of them in urban areas. 4000 t/a food yeast is produced
by the Food Yeast Co. Ltd. (a subsidiary of Natal Cane By-Products
Ltd.).
Molasses is used by feed compounders at 5% to 7.5% of the feed,
and is used as the basis of liquid concentrate feeds, and a small
quantity of dry molasses feeds (spray dried or incorporated in
meals).
Other country-based studies have concentrated on only certain
use of sugarcane by-products. Proenza et al. have produced a study for
Jamaica, funded by the Organization of American States (0AS)(8).
They were commissioned specifically to report on the potential for
the production of pulp and paper from bagasse, animal feed and
ethanol. The pulp and paper case study is analysed in depth, and con¬
trasted with mini-paper mills in India, in a later chapter. After a
gloomy survey of the Jamaican economy (unemployment rate about 21.5%,
27% of the income received by 5% of the population and 20% of the
population received only 5% of the income, growing balance of pay¬
ments deficit of US$313.9 M in 1976), they study the sugar industry.
The only use of by-products in Jamaica with a large added value was
rum production. Their conclusions on all the by-products they studied
were negative. In the case of the pulp and paper study they concluded
that the market was too small to support a chemical pulp mill,
dismissing Indian successes at this out of hand. Their proposed chem-
imechanical pulp mill could not produce high value printing and writ¬
ing paper grades, and turned out to be uneconomic unless a 20% import
duty were placed on paper. Their proposed feed compounding mill simi¬
larly suffered from being defined a priori as a central unit, rather
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than using the small, simple, molasses blender designed by Lim Fat in
Mauritius.
Several authors have written more general surveys of by-product
utilization. Almazan del 01mo(9) and Duguid and Alpine(lO) presented
papers at the Joint UNEP/UNIDO seminar on the implication of technol¬
ogy choice in the African sugar industry. Almazan del Olmo gave a
brief resume of the uses of by-products, based on Cuban experience.
The paper includes tables on the relative production of the different
by-products, cane top composition, the composition of a typical Cuban
cane top meal, amino acid anlalyses of the cane tops sugarcane juice
and and filter mud proteins, Cuban bagasse, molasses and filter mud
compositions, and the composition of pith/molasses feed mixtures. As
Cuba has been recently investing in by-product industries, the
economic data that he gives may be of some interest. All prices are
1977 ones. A plant to produce 45 kt of writing and printing papers
plus 15 kt of tissue papers annually would have cost US$75-80 M. The
production cost would have been US$350/t to produce paper worth
US$600/t. A particleboard plant of 120 t/d capacity cost approxi¬
mately US$13.5 M with a production cost of US$180/m^ of board. A
Torula yeast plant of 12 kt/a capacity cost about US$9 M, with a pro¬
duction cost of US$170/t with molasses costed at the low Cuban price
of US$5/t. Cuba was planning to build ten new plants for food yeast
production from molasses to produce 150 kt/a by 1979. For a citric
acid plant of 5000 t/a the production cost would have been between
US$450-500/t for a chemical whose maximum world price reached
US$1200. This plant would have cost US$9 M. L-lysine production at
5000 t/a would have cost US$24M and US$1800/t, and sold for US$8000/t
in the main consuming countries of Japan, the USA, France and the UK.
Duguid and Alpine(lO) merely recalculate Paturau's economic
data(2), bringing them up to 1977 prices. They consider only the pro¬
duction of fibreboard, alcohol, and molasses based cattle feed.
More informed and detailed overviews of the field have been pub¬
lished by Paturau(ll,12). He has estimated the added value upon
upgrading sugarcane by-products (see figure 2.5) and the possibili¬
ties of integrated use of all the cane in a sugar factory area (see
figure 2.6).
Figure 2.5 Approximate value upgrading of cane sugar by-products.
Source: Paturau(ll).
He added a cautionary note, hovever, to his estimates of the added
value potential:
Similarly, one can simply export molasses and earn some $30
to $35 per ton of molasses. But transforming the molasses
into citric acid (worth say $1 330 per metric ton) one
would obtain from one ton of molasses about 330 kg of
citric acid worth $439. We must point out, however, that it




Figure 2.6 Example of thorough utilization of cane sugar by¬
products.
SALES {%,)
$ 7 400 000 H.4SURPLUS BAGASSE PARTICLE BOARD
FIELDS CANES
OUO MM OCT V IO»*41 . | ,uO/t
-1 RAW SUCAR~ $34 500 000 67.2
II COO IMA, IJOC't
L MOLASSES » 3<10
X 000 ICHK4
-| CITRIC AC10 | $4500 000 SB
UREA. MINERALS. ETC.
J 000 K3MO • | HA.' I
MC HtiTAatl
CANE TOPS | ^CATTU FEED I- jHBEEE CATTLE MEAT |
jl "l-JfOQ C*lIU J ,
lMMIICH CATTLE}—| [ MILK |
_____ ')°"1 'OHMt f
-j INTERLINES [ ^ GROUNDNUTS | '
[WHEAT BRAN}-
$ 2100 000 4.1
$ 2250 000 4 4
FEEDLOTS
EXCRETA
| to COO JJM_j
i yrwti m $0 IV'l
]—-| METHANE | S 350 000 07
| i .-co - . t qi.m!'
FERTILIZER I $ 210 000 0.4
S 51310 000 100 Ot
Source: Paturau(12).
30 000 tons of molasses (worth $1.05 million) than it is to
find a buyer for 10 000 tons of citric acid (worth $13.3
million)(12).
In his considerations of the uses of surplus bagasse, and the
production of energy from sugar factories he has studied the possi¬
bilities of economising on steam usage by boiling house rearrangement
and bagasse drying by the flue gases (see figure 2.7). He pointed
out also that surplus bagasse is not a myth in a well run sugar fac¬
tory, giving the example of Taiwan where 40% of the total bagasse is
saved and made available for the paper and board industries.
Only in his assumptions on minimum economic scales for each pro¬
cess can he be criticised, for no minimum applies everywhere, as the
success of small scale alcohol plants in the USA and a microdistil-
lery in Brasil(13) show. Nevertheless, his cost estimates for the
different industries using bagasse or molasses (see figure 2.8) are
useful for parts of the world where there are large sugar factories
or a close grouping of medium size factories.
- 41 - !
Figure 2.7 Possible fuel economising measures in sugar factories,
leading to bagasse saving or electricity production possibilities.
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The final group of references to be considered in this general
section are on the use of sugarcane as a source of various fuels.
Notable among these for their detail are the series of studies car¬
ried out at Battelle Laboratories(14,15,16). These consider the
potential of sugarcane, sugar beet and sweet sorghum as sources of
fuels and chemicals for the USA. The principal products considered
were ethanol, acetic acid, butanol, furfural, methane, synthesis gas,
methanol and ammonia. The conversion methods studied were ethanolic
fermentation, anaerobic digestion, acetone-butanol fermentation,
hydrolysis, and several pyrolytic or controlled oxidation processes
for producing synthesis gas, including the Purox, Pullman Kellogg
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Figure 2.8 Paturau's cost estimates.






molten salt, Bailie, CO2 acceptor, Syngas Recycling Corp. and
Fischer-Tropsch processes. They concluded that ethanol from fermenta¬
tion" would cost about the same as ethanol from petrochemicals by
1980, i.e. they would compete in the industrial chemicals market but
the ethanol would not be cheap enough to use as a fuel. They thought
ammonia could be produced at US$210-57/t which was not competitive
with ammonia produced from natural gas, but which they thought might
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be competitive with ammonia produced from coal. As they explain,
these synthesis gas processes had been developed for use with coal or
municipal solid waste, so there would be development problems caused
by the high moisture content and physical form of the bagasse.
Another problem not mentioned is that none of these synthesis
processes have yet succeeded in producing a gas from agricultural
wastes that is clean enough to be used in a methanol shift reac-
tor(17). These processes were all costed at scales of 1000-2000 t/d
of dry bagasse feed, which is the total bagasse production of a 330-
660 t cane/h sugar factory. Hence they are of dubious application to
those areas in developing countries where the factories are smaller
and not concentrated in certain areas. Only in areas where sugar
plantations are carved out of virgin lands or in a few islands which
suffer from sugar monoculture might such quantities of bagasse be
obtainable.
One interesting feature of these reports is that Lipinsky et al
brought out the effects of applying changes to the agronomic prac¬
tices on the energy yields. Close row cultivation trials had
increased annual yields of cane from 130.5 t/ha to 250 t/ha in
Hawaii, and doubled yields in Louisiana. This was achieved by reduc¬
ing normal cane interline spacings from 1.5 m to 1 m or even 1/3 m,
and increasing the irrigation and fertilization accordingly. Sugar
contents tended to decrease, but if the cane is being grown as a
source of fibre for energy this is less important.
These issues will be discussed further in the conclusions, as
Baguant has calculated some of the effects of applying these techno¬
logies in different countries(18). In his thesis he developed an
aggregate energy demand model to apply it to the USA, West Germany,
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Brasil, Nicaragua and Mauritius, and then checks to see how well the
predicted shortfalls in energy can be met by applying the ethanol,
electricity and ammonia production systems proposed by the Battelle
team.
2. Molasses utilization
Apart from Paturau's book, there are two other general surveys
of molasses utilization. One is a handbook produced by the United
Molasses Company(19), on the "Composition, properties and uses of
molasses and related products". This provides data on the composi¬
tions of different molasses, on their physical properties and their
energy values, and a general overview of molasses use in animal feed¬
ing and fermentation. This overview does not, in general, provide
specific process information, nor does it provide any economic infor-
mation.
The other survey, "Molasses Utilization" by P. Ruter, (20) was
prepared for "... policy-makers, planners, development corpora¬
tions and potential investors, to help them decide on the most
appropriate use of this valuable byproduct." This review of the
literature covers the composition of molasses, its use in animal
feeding, desugarization of molasses, and its use in fermentation to:
baker's yeast, food and feed yeast, fat yeast, ethanol and its
derivatives and by-products, rum, acetic, citric, lactic, glutamic,
itaconic, aconitic, fumaric, malic, butyric, propionic, gluconic and
oxalic acids, butanol, acetone, 2.3-butylene glycol, and glycerol.
The products and by-products of a molasses distillery are shown in
figure 2.9, taken from Ruter.
In a country-related study, Wahab(22) wrote a survey of actual
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Figure 2.9 Principal products and by-products of a molasses based
ethanol distillery.
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Source: Ruter(20) taken from 01brich(21).
and potential molasses utilization in Pakistan. In Pakistan molasses
was used for manufacturing acetate rayon yarn, polyethylene granules,
alcohol, tobacco curing, and very small quantities for animal feed.
In 1968-9, out of 181 t of molasses produced in Pakistan, 33.7% was
used.in rayon and polyethylene production, 26.3% in alcohol produc¬
tion, 0.5% as animal feed, 14.4% in tobacco curing, and 15.8%
exported. The rayon was produced at Kohinoor Rayon Ltd., Lahore.
They produced ethanol from molasses, and then converted the ethanol
to acetone, acetaldehyde, acetic acid and acetic anhydride, which
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were used in the rayon production.
2.1. Ethanol from molasses.
This has undoubtedly become the most fashionable sugarcane by¬
product use, as more and more countries around the world are per¬
suaded to set up alcohol distilleries for use as a motor fuel. An
article in "la Industria Azucarera"(23) gave a summary of the then
known alcohol distillery projects around the world. These were to be
built in Fiji, Brasil, the Philippines, Kenya, Yugoslavia, Hawaii,
South Africa, and Colombia. Studies were being carried out in Aus¬
tralia, Greece, the USA, and New Zealand.
A bibliography with 831 references has been produced on the sub¬
ject, Gongalves, "Bibliographia: A1cool"(24) .* A more specialised
bibliography, on the production of alcohol from cassava has been pro¬
duced by CEDIMO in Mogambique(25)#
There have been several reviews of, and conferences on, this
subject, three of which will be mentioned here as they are particu¬
larly concerned with ethanol production in developing countries. The
World Bank has published a report entitled "Alcohol Production from
Biomass in the Developing Countries"(26). This is primarily an
economic evaluation of the costs of alcohol production from sugar¬
cane, cassava, molasses and maize, based on Brasilian data. Little
attention is paid to more energy efficient processes, or continuous
fermentation, which are now commercially available in Europe, but
less well known on the other side of the Atlantic. Figure 2.10 shows
* Available from Instituto de Agucar e do Alcool, CP 420, Rio
de Janeiro, Brasi1.
# Available from Centro de Documentagao e Informagao do Banco
de Mozambique, CP 423, Maputo, Mozambique.
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their guide to the capital costs of ethanol plants at late 1979
prices, and figure 2.11 their estimates for the economic rates of
return at different molasses prices.
Figure 2.10 Estimated late 1979 capital costs of ethanol plants
170 ico too .mo
plant capaci ty » litems per day. anmyrousethanol-
Source: Alcohol production from biomass in developing countries(26).
They suggest that countries with agricultural surpluses and energy
deficits are more likely to invest in biomass ethanol production than
others, which is a more logical supposition than the more common
attempts to relate this to energy use per capita and per caput GNP.
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Source: Alcohol production from biomass in developing countries(26).
As a guide they provide a figure showing these ratios for a number of
countries (see figure 2.12).
The OECD Development Centre organised a meeting of "experts" on
molasses and industrial alcohol in December 1976 for a French busi¬
nessman, M. Pierre Mariotte, whose company SOFECIAf traded in
molasses and alcohol. His support for this meeting was the outcome
of a synthesis between his professional interests and his concern for
the impact of the energy crisis on the developing countries.f Many of
| Societe Financiere d'Entrepostage et de Commerce Internation¬
al de 1'Alcool.
| As he wrote in a letter to the author in June 1977, "II est
vrai que je m'interesse pour des fins tres precises a
1'utilisation des produits vegetaux pouvant etre distilles et
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Figure 2.12 Energy and agricultural self-sufficiency ratios.
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Source: Alcohol production from biomass in the developing coun-
tries(26), p.51
the papers presented at this meeting made brave attempts to estimate
the trade in molasses and alcohol, worldwide and in specific coun¬
tries. Those present estimated that by the 1980s there would be a
world demand for some 90-105 Mt of sugar which would supply some
30 Mt of molasses. Of the about 27 Mt molasses produced in 1975/76,
about 12 Mt were used in the US, Japanese and EEC markets with the
balance of 15 Mt used or wasted in the producer countries. The inter¬
national alcohol market was some 0.5-0.6 G1 or 5-6% of a total world
transformees en alcool afin de permettre aux pays en voie de
developpement d'avoir des sources d'energie et ceci meme si le
prix de revient est plus eleve que le prix du petrole."
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output estimated at 9.5 G1. Much of this is produced from ethylene,
the notable exception being beverage alcohol. There is no free market
in alcohol trade, as there are tariff and non-tariff regulations
everywhere except Switzerland and the USA. Therefore prices are more
a matter of negotiation than in molasses trade.
Other papers covered the use of molasses in the producing coun¬
tries, notably the papers by Paturau(ll), and that on livestock feed¬
ing on molasses written by Preston(27). Brown(28), estimated the
production cost of molasses based ethanol in a 10 kt/a (at 95%) dis¬
tillery to cost US$200/t + the molasses cost (end 1976 prices).
Other articles written by people from Vogelbusch GmbH(29) and the
Finnish State Alcohol Monopoly(30) gave the European state of the art
in ethanolic fermentation technology.
Another meeting was organised by UNIDO in March 1979, the
"Workshop on fermentation for use as fuel and chemical feedstock for
developing countries"(31). The review paper from this workshop com¬
bines the statistics given in the different papers, including those
for cane yields (33.5-90 t/ha), investment costs (US$5-6 M for 30, 50
or 60 kl/d), manufacturing costs (3 out of 4 values close to
US$230/kl), and energy balances.
There have been many other conferences on fermentation ethanol
production, the largest recent one being the 4th International Sympo¬
sium of Alcohol Fuels Technology, Guaruja, Sao Paulo, Brasil, 5-8
October 1980. No attempt will be made here to list all the papers
given at this and other conferences, instead certain articles of
interest according to the criteria mentioned at the beginning of this
survey will be discussed.
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2.1.1. Local experiences—implications for technology assessment.
To show there is nothing new in the world of producing ethanol
from molasses, here is a description of the history of anhydrous
alcohol production in Jamaica, taken from Sangster(32) :
In 1952, a distillation plant for production of anhydrous
alcohol was built at Caymanas Sugar Factory, outside Kings¬
ton, Jamaica. This was done by the Sugar Manufacturers
Association, stimulated by very low molasses prices and a
poor overseas rum market. The alcohol so produced could be
marketed duty free at a price equal to the then duty paid
gasolene price. Government's prior approval for use of the
alcohol as a motor vehicle fuel on a duty free basis was
obtained. The plant, supplied by APV of England, was com¬
pleted, with a capacity of 300 gallons per hour of anhy¬
drous alcohol (by benzene azeotropic distillation of 96°
alcohol from neighbouring distilleries.) unfortunately, by
the time production commenced, government had changed its
position on the decision to allow the alcohol to be sold
duty free. This about-face was probably a result of both
oil company pressures and a realisation of the revenue loss
from the duty on gasolene replaced by duty free alcohol.
Several hundred thousand gallons of anhydrous alcohol
already produced were permitted to be added to gasolene for
use on sugar estates only (10% on gasolene). Government
purchased the anhydrous alcohol plant at cost less 5%
depreciation, and it was closed down. Today over 25 years
later it still stands much as it was left, apart from the
theft of most small non-ferrous fittings. The design, how¬
ever, is now so outmoded (e.g. channel caps instead of bub¬
ble caps on the columns), that it is unlikely to have much
more than scrap value. Alternatively, it could be kept as
an Ozymandias-1ike monument to the shortsightedness of some
politicians.
One wonders how many of the distilleries being erected today
might suffer the same fortune. Doubts have been expressed about the
new alcohol distilleries in Kenya(33). The Kenyan government has
taken a majority share in two molasses alcohol plants under construc¬
tion in 1981 with a combined capacity of 120 kl/d. This would pro¬
vide alcohol for blending with gasoline and for the plastics and bev¬
erage industries. According to a simple calculation of added foreign
exchange earnings from exporting refinery products locally substi¬
tuted by ethanol, the foreign exchange savings would be about
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US$50 M. Yet there are hidden costs, most notably as there is no good
quality uncultivated land in Kenya, so land for sugarcane is taken
out of crop production, leading to food imports. The two distilleries
using molasses are being built far away from their supplying sugar
factories, thus paying transport costs and not being able to take
advantage of sugar factory steam and electricity. Neither these
costs, nor the transport of the ethanol from western Kenya to Nairobi
for blending, have been considered in the original cost-benefit
analysis. The following detailed criticism of one of the projects,
the Kenya Chemical and Food Project (KCFP) is taken from O'Keefe and
Shakow(33) :
The KCFP, initially costed at some US $55 million, was to
produce ethanol, citric acid, baker's yeast and vinegar.
Ethanol dominated the output. It was located at Kisumu,
some 60 kilometres from the nearest source of bagasse and
molasses. Costs have now risen to US $138 million. In order
to obtain further capital, the complex was expanded to
incorporate a sulphuric acid and an oxygen plant. To com¬
plete even the ethanol production system, a further US $23
million is required. Final costs are likely to exceed
US $230 million. Independent estimates suggest that costs
should not have exceeded US $30 million. At these cost lev¬
els, Kenya's ethanol production units are significantly
more expensive than the American, Brazilian or Zimbabwean
complexes.
The local market for the products, other than ethanol is
small. For example, in 1979, Kenya imported 58 tons of
vinegar although the KCFP has the capacity to produce 2000
tons. The situation is similar for citric acid and baker's
yeast. Given the high cost of production, it is doubtful if
an export market will be found. The KCFP assessment further
assumes that , despite the distance from the producers,
molasses would be obtained at U5 $20 per ton at the factory
gate. At the present moment, molasses brings U5 $110 per
ton on the world market. . . .
$ince the ex-factory cost of ethanol is a function of the
cost of the plant and the cost of the raw material—as a
technologically intensive process little labour is used—
and both these costs are high, ethanol will cost U5 $1.90
per liter which is more than double the pump price for
gasoline. The Kenyan government will have to forego tax
revenue in order to hold petroleum prices to a non-
inflationary level. But if the project were abandoned, the
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Kenyan government, as the majority equity holder, would
lose considerable capital. Poor project appraisal, based on
a misunderstanding of ethanol economics, poor planning and,
most importantly, poor decision-making have produced a
situation wherein the chemical complex continued to expand
in order to come closer to profitability. But given market
conditions, profitability was simultaneously receding.
What an economist would call "externalities" and others the pol¬
itics of decision-making can often dominate a project and determine
its outcome. A paper that explicitly considers this in the Puerto
Rican context has been presented by Thorne(34). Compare this with a
paper called "Brazil's energy alternatives"(35) in which statements
such as, "The only problem concerning large-scale sugar cane planta¬
tion is the need for a migratory flux of workers to the areas to be
tilled;", are possible. This reduces the problems of exploitation of
migratory and plantation labour to a simple consideration of whether
enough such workers can be found to keep the plant running.
Other examples of such externalities are the reality of molasses
exporting from Tanzania as explained by Mungai(36). Tanzania has
entered into a seven year contract to supply 140 kt of molasses, but
from 1974 to 1978 it had exported an average of only 13 kt/a because
of transport problems. Furthermore, the transport costs reduce the
molasses price from US$38/t at Dar es Salaam to US$16 at the sugar
factory. So these transport difficulties and costs might make ethanol
production at the factory more favourable than it would be in the
typical "free market" ethanol distillery costings which appear in the
literature. In Brazil, Pelin(37) has shown that the development of
the Proalcool programme to produce fuel alcohol from sugarcane and
molasses in the state of Sao Paulo has taken land out of domestic
crop production to the extent of 51.0% of the new cane land (9.0%
were taken from export crop production, 40% out of pasture). So even
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in countries with large areas of land not under crops, local market
pressures created by a fuel alcohol programme can take land out of
food cultivation.
2.1.2 Alternative technologies for ethanol production.
There are many references to the production of ethanol on medium
and large scales(38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46 and many others). Such
large distilleries are typified by Archer-Daniels-Midland Company's
three distilleries in Decatur and Peoria, Illinois and Cedar Rapids,
Iowa, which have a combined capacity of 150 Mgal/a (570 Ml/a)(47).
According to the theory of economies of scale, such large factories
should be able to produce ethanol at a price that could undercut any
smaller producers. Yet, even in the United States, there are many
small-scale alcohol distilleries. Canadian Renewable Energy News(47)
listed 17 of them, with capacities ranging from 1.1 Ml/a to 9.5 Ml/a.
The same article reported on the difficulties of the larger plants
arising from high maize prices and reduced petrol consumption, so
that some large plants were producing at only one third capacity. At
the same time entrepreneurs with small plants were taking advantage
of waste products, locations close to the consumer. One example of
the adaptation to circumstances that is possible in small, less
mechanised, plants was when Northwest Pacific Energy Co. ran out of
spoilt grain and had to use jelly beans and candy bars for a short
time.
Sklar carried out a study of five on-farm ethanol units in the
United States(48). These produced from 57 1/d (~17 kl/a) to
1.5 Ml/a. All used maize as the feedstock, and, therefore, benefited
from sales of distillers spent grain, as well as local tax conces-
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sions. Many were self built, one by a moonshiner. The 1.5 Ml/a plant
produced ethanol at US$0.32/1 and provided a 35% return on investment
after taxes. This plant has recently had a molecular sieve drying
column added to produce anhydrous ethanol.
The Solar Energy Research Institute has produced a guide to
small-scale ethanol production, called "Fuel from Farms"(49). In
this they outline a method for for plant scale choice and feasibility
calculations based on local conditions, with examples. This is
almost the small-scale equivalent of "A manual on ethanol & gasohol
production in Louisiana"(50). On a slightly larger scale, a group at
the University of Alabama and Dixie Steel and Supply Company have
designed and built (but not at the time commercially tested) a proto¬
type "community-sized fuel alcohol production unit"(51). They
defined community-sized to be in the range 0.6-7.6 Ml/a, and the pro¬
totype has a capacity of 2.3 kl/day. This was based on grain
feedstock, and used a gas fired boiler for steam generation. Batch
fermentation is used, and separate analysing and rectifying columns.
Of more interest to tropical developing countries is the micro-
distillery designed by the Instituto de Pesquisas Tecnologicas do
Estado de Sao Paulo (IPT). This project was undertaken to enable
small rural communities to become self-sufficient in liquid fuels.
This prototype was constructed in Piracicaba(52,53,54,55,13,56).
In 1977? the project began with the fundamental design objective
to reduce to the minimum the investment needed to produce local
fuel, through using simple equipment, unlike that in conventional
alcohol distilleries. The reference unit was taken to be a farm of
about 250 ha, consuming 25 kl of diesel annually (a medium tractor
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for 6000 hr/a and a 5 t truck covering 60 000 km/a). Taking the heat
content of alcohol as 60% of diesel, they calculated that this would
require 40 kl/a, say 50 kl/a allowing for some alcohol fueled elec¬
tricity generation.
To reduce costs, they used brickwork tanks for fermentation, and
the storage tanks for cane juice, "beer", vinasse and cooling water.
The sloping grate furnace was built of refractory bricks, in which
was mounted a locally constructed vertical fire tube boiler.+ The
still and column were built out of wood. The column was filled with
bamboo Raschig rings, supported on wooden vapour distribution per¬
forated plates. Similarly, the condenser and cooler were of wood con¬
struction, containing copper coils (for good heat transfer). The
cooling water flowed outside the coil in the cooler, and inside the
coil in the condenser. The number of pumps was reduced to a minimum
by taking advantage of the site to allow gravity feed. At the Escola
Superior de Agricultura de Queiroz in Piracicaba, three PVC pumps
were used to pump the juice to the fermentation tanks, to pump the
"beer" to the distillation column and to circulate cooling water. If
a pump was needed for the vinasse, it would have had to be of stain¬
less steel or phosphor bronze, to resist the temperature and corro-
sivity of the vinasse. Most of the tubing was of PVC, for cheapness
and corrosion resistance. Only the tubes subject to high temperatures
were of metal, mild steel for cooling water and steam, cast iron for
the hot vinasse, and copper in the heat exchangers. The cold vinasse
was carried in glass fibre reinforced PVC pipes. The alcohol pro¬
duced was stored in a ferro-cement tank, constructed on site, and
+ In the construction manual a horizontal fire tube design is
specified(13).
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lined with a suitable alcohol-resistant paint or resin. A small sin¬
gle roll mill was used to crush one tonne of cane per hour, fed manu¬
ally. This was similar to the mills used in Indian khandsari plants.
It produced about 500 1 juice per hour.
This equipment is illustrated in appendix 1 by photographs and
drawings taken from the construction and operation manual produced by
IPT. This is included for the benefit of readers outside Brasil who
might not have access to copies of this manual, since only 1000
copies were produced in the June 1980 edition.
In use, the juice from the cane mill was pumped to the juice
storage tank and from there to the fermentation tanks on top of the
yeast-containing slops from a previous fermentation, and allowed to
ferment for 24 hours. After fermentation was complete, the tanks were
allowed to settle for one hour, then the "beer" was pumped to its
storage tank and from there to the still. Sulphuric acid was added to
the slops to reduce the pH to 3 and the mixture was agitated for two
hours. As yeasts can tolerate more acid conditions than bacteria,
this reduces bacterial contamination. The still was operated in
batches, discharging the vinasse after each distillation. The vinasse
was not to be treated in any way but spread on the fields as a fer-
ti1izer.
The pilot plant proved capable of producing 51 kl ethanol on one
shift operation for six days a week over 29 weeks. It produced 45 1
of ethanol at 90%. This yield was lower than that at the larger
sugarcane ethanol distilleries, mainly as a result of lower sugar
extraction from the cane in a single mill without imbibition water.
The fermentative yield was 75% of theoretical, which was better than
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the total fermentative and distillation efficiency of 70% achieved in
the Mauritian rum distilleries. Assuming that the distillation to
90% ethanol lost only a negligibly small proportion of the ethanol,
this means that the mill only extracted sugar equivalent to 8% of the
weight of cane crushed. Because of this the team at IPT were study¬
ing the extraction of sugar in a screw press using cold water at 40
atmospheres pressure.
Vi11en(53,52) gives capital and operating costs for this plant,
as tested and expanded to produce 100 kl/a on two shifts and 150 kl/a
on three shifts.]" These costings are reproduced in figure 2.13. Note
that these costings are different to those given for the same plant
in the Centre for Industrial Development's "Inventory of adapted
technologies for ACP countries"(57). This is a compilation of case
studies, taken from many sources without acknowledgement (nor any
indication of where an interested reader might find more information
on the technologies), with costings recalculated by anonymous econom¬
ists according to a set of unit costs in unspecified ACP countries.
In the profile on a "Microplant for ethyl alcohol production", such
an anonymous economist has calculated the production cost of alcohol
to be US$0.73/1 at a 5% discount rate, US$0.76/1 at 10% and US$0.85/1
at 15%. However, Vi11 en calculated the ethanol price to be US$0.42/1
for a one-shift, 50 kl/a distillery and only US$0.34/1 for a three-
shift, 150 kl/a distillery. Why the difference?
On looking closer at the calculations of this anonymous econom¬
ist, one finds that a manager and 12 workers are required to produce
]" These are for six days per week working. The quantities pro¬
duced when working seven days per week on 1, 2, and three
shifts are 64.9 kl/a, 129.9 kl/a and 194.9 kl/a respectively.
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Figure 2.13 Costings of the IPT microdistillery.
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50 kl/a. Yet in the Brasilian references, only three workers are
required. They provide time charts (see figure 2.14) to show how the
distillery can be operated on a one shift basis so that it never
needs more than three workers.
It appears that a technologically incompetent economist has read
Vi 11en's paper of the same title as his study very quickly, seen a
reference to the plant requiring three employees per shift and
assumed that as a distillery "must" be run continuously, there would
be four shifts. He failed to understand the design of the microdis¬
tillery, as a minimal capital cost plant that could be operated on a
one shift basis to produce 50 kl/a ethanol and later expanded to a
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Figure 2.14 Time chart of operations in the microdistillery, on 6 and
7 days per week bases.
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plant capable of producing 150 kl/a on three shift operation, or
194.9 kl/a when run continuously for 29 weeks, seven days per week.
His other assumptions seem more reasonable, as cane is cheaper
in Brasil than in many ACP countries, and Villen's costing assumes
that in a remote area cane can be obtained more cheaply than at a
sugar mill (as indeed is the case at Indian gur and khandsari mills).
The building costs, however, seem high, and probably imply too high a
degree of environmental protection for a fairly rugged plant.
Overall, this anonymous economist has succeeded in reducing the value
of these profiles to the level of the "profiles" found in certain
Indian publications, such as in the "Techno-Economic Mission to Mau¬
ritius"^).
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2.1.3 Economics of fuel ethanol production.
As has already been mentioned, these are not often the principal
considerations that cause decisions to be taken on whether or not
fuel alcohol distilleries should be established in a particular coun¬
try. For this reason, and because many of the economic factors are
specific to a location, the literature on this field will not be
extensively discussed here.
Undoubtedly the most comprehensive economic assessment of
ethanol production under United States conditions was produced by the
Mitre Corporation(59). This reviewed 28 processes which had appeared
in 14 ethanol-from-biomass studies during 1976—8, in the context of a
common economic analytical framework: their life cycle cost model.
The different processes were based on maize, sugarcane, molasses,
wheat straw, wood, and algae. Among them is the Battel le study
already mentioned. Another US study that concentrates more on sugar¬
cane is the "Manual on ethanol & gasohol production in Louisi¬
ana" (50) .
Neither of these studies consider European technologies designed
to reduce energy consumption(60,61,62,63), or for continuous fermen¬
tation^,43,65,66,67). The effects of such technologies on the
potential for producing biomass ethanol in the United Kingdom (not
from sugarcane), as outlined in a paper by Emery and Kent(68). A
fuller report on the conversion of UK biomass to ethanol and other
liquid fuels will shortly be available from the Energy Technology
Support Unit at Harwell.
More relevant to developing countries is the article by Paturau
which directly addresses the question, "Is ethanol the fuel of the
- 62 -
future for sugar cane producing territories of the Third World?"(69).
In this article is considered the energy balance for the sugar fac¬
tory with annexed distillery, the production costs from cane juice
and molasses, and the merits of ethanol as a fuel.
Also relevant to developing countries is the Brasilian experi¬
ence, although prices are determined by government policy which
guarantee a return on ethanol distilleries, and which maintain a low
cane price compared to that of sugar. Such costings can be found in
Borges(41), and "The Brazilian alcohol program and its objec¬
tives" (40), among others.
Among costings from other sugar producing countries are those by
Bejraputra(39) for Thailand, and McCann and Prince(70) and Kelly(44)
for Australia. This latter suffers from the tendency to take recent
changes such as increased agricultural mechanisation as given, as
illustrated by the following quotation:
Agricultural machinery is generally not distinguished for
the standard of maintenance achieved, perhaps more so when
small scale units are employed. The most costly and physi¬
cally largest mechanical unit employed on the sugar cane
plantation is the present day chopper type harvester. At
present practically every stick of cane in Queensland is
mechanically harvested, but a study of statistical records
indicates that these very costly machines are being used to
only about 13% of their potential capacity.
It is rare to find an ox-cart which is broken down for 87% of the
year. So his very own evidence contradicts his assertion that small
scale units are worse maintained than large. The ideological assump¬
tions override logic here and elsewhere in his paper. Finally, many
feasibility studies have been carried out around the world for the
establishment of power alcohol distilleries based on molasses or
sugarcane. These are normally confidential to the government con-
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cerned. However, one study has been published as part of the OAS
study on by-product use in Jamaica(8). This part of the study was
carried out by a Brasilian team. They established that the market for
ethanol for blending with petrol was much greater than the amount
exceeded molasses availability and so scaled their study on the
molasses supply, with one exception. For they claimed that the smal¬
lest distillery available from the manufacturers had a capacity of
12 kgal/day (55 kl/d), i.e. 3.9 Mgal/a (18 Ml/a). This may have been
true in Brasil, but as has been shown above there are smaller distil¬
leries produced in the USA. For their chosen distillery they showed
that ethanol production would be uneconomic at the then prevalent
petrol and molasses prices.
2.4. Other molasses uses.
The predominant use of molasses worldwide is in animal feeding.
Some references on this subject can be found in the section of this
review that deals with animal feed from sugarcane by-products, others
in "tine bltliog-tapky •
Bakers yeast production is dealt with in depth in the chapter on
the Mauritian yeast factory, Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. References
on this subject will be found in that chapter. Also note that a pro¬
file of bakers yeast production at 500 kg/24 hours has been produced
by the Centre for International Developmental).
References to other products from molasses may be found in
the bibliography.
3. Uses of bagasse.
There have been few general reviews of the utilization of
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bagasse to the depth of Paturau's book, since it was published. A
short article has appeared in the 3rd edition of the Kirk-Othmer
Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology (72), and Li Sui Fong has written
a brief review of new uses for bagasse(73). Paturau's articles on
the utilization of both molasses and bagasse have already been men-
tioned.
Some general reports have been written on the potential uses of
bagasse in individual countries, most of them confidential such as a
report on the use of bagasse in Mauritius prepared by J. Olivier, who
has summarised his ideas on the range of possibilities in a pam-
phlet(74). Other studies have been carried out by UNIDO consultants,
such as one on Fiji, by Travnic®(75).
3.1. Availability of bagasse.
This subject is intimately tied to the energy requirements of
the sugar factory, for the more efficiently it uses its energy, the
more surplus bagasse is available for conversion to electricity or
fibre-based products. It is in the countries which are already mak¬
ing use of electricity generated from bagasse that produce the most
detailed studies on this. Notable among them is the "Energy Inventory
for Hawaiian Sugar Factories—1978"(76), and papers presented at the
University of Mauritius Seminar on Energy and Energy Conference,
including d1 Espaignet(77). The summary of the fuels used, steam
energy produced and electricity produced, sold and consumed in Hawaii
is shown in figure 2.15.
D'Espaignet described the energy balances of the present
® Available only from, or with the permission of, the Fiji
government.
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Figure 2.15 Hawaiian raw sugar factories—Summary of fuels used,
steam energy produced, and electricity produced, sold, purchased and
consumed.—1978
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Mauritian sugar factories, and possible improvements under various
conditions. Other articles, discussing potential improvements to the
steam cycle and bagasse drying in order to make more surplus bagasse
available, by Paturau have already been mentioned in this survey.
Experiments on bagasse driers that led to the installation of
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such a drier in a Dedini boiler in Alagoas, Brasil have been reported
by Maranhao(78). He reported an increase of steam production of 16%
or an increase in surplus bagasse production by 13% from the
installed bagasse driers.
When surplus bagasse is not sufficient, another fuel has to be
substituted for the bagasse in the mill. The procedures for calculat¬
ing the replacement values are well established (see Paturau's book,
and articles by Atchison), but a recent article concentrates on the
difference between the fuel values of pith and whole bagasse(79).
This is important where bagasse is to be used for paper or fibreboard
production, and the moist-separated pith is returned to the sugar
factory for use as a fuel. The article details the experiences of
mills in Venezuela, South Africa, Peru and Taiwan. Overall, the steam
generated using pith can be 10-15% less than when burning whole
bagasse (undried in both cases).
3.2. Bagasse storage.
Walter has written an article(80) touching on some of the
aspects of his PhD dissertation on the storage of bagasse. In it he
lists the microorganisms that grow on decaying bagasse, the rela¬
tive ineffectiveness of biological preservation systems, and of
preservation with boric acid. His tests showed that organic sulphur
compounds were effective preservatives of bulk stored bagasse at
0.1-0.2%.
Descriptions of the bagasse storage system at a working pulp
mill in Taiwan have been given in an article by Wang(81). They use a
bulk, bio-liquor system for storage. While the systems used in Cuba
have been dicussed by Lois et al(82).
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3.3. Electricity from bagasse
The articles by Paturau and D'Espaignet, already mentioned, con-
In 1-77-8,
sider the production of electricity from bagasse.^ 31% of the elec¬
tricity generated on Hawaii, Kauai and Maui came from bagasse(76).
In larger countries, less intensively covered by an electrical
grid, fewer factories generate electricity for sale outside the fac¬
tory. Rao described the situation in India(83).
In other countries a suitable grid has existed, but a lack of
interest by either the sugar factories or the electricity supply
authorities has hindered attempts to export power from the factories.
One attempt to overcome such a situation was the negotiation of an
electricity interconnection agreement in Queens!and(84).
These agreements have to be updated, or changes in the opposite
sense occur. Arzola(85) explains how interconnection agreements
established in Puerto Rico in the 1950s whereby factories bought
electricity from the grid at a reduced rate, and were paid for sur¬
pluses at the cost of the most efficient Puerto Rican generating
plant, were maintained into the 1970s. Under the changing economic
conditions, the factories chose to save on fuel oil by buying more
subsidised electricity from the grid, and exporting very little
power.
Other articles on electricity generation can be found by con¬
sulting the bibliography, not all as good as the articles mentioned
here. For example, Rodriguez Torres and Horta(86) outline a way to
convert a Puerto Rican sugar mill from sugar production to power pro¬
duction by converting all the sugar to ethanol and then burning this
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in a gas turbine, and using the bagasse to provide electrical energy.
This is energetic nonsense. For most distilleries have a net negative
energy balance, requiring more energy to distil the ethanol than is
in the ethanol produced. When the distillation is fueled by bagasse,
this is a reasonable way of converting a solid, bulky, energy source
and sugars to a high value liquid fuel for transportation. Yet Rodri¬
guez Torres proposes to burn this ethanol to provide electrical
energy when the bagasse (and molasses) can be burned directly to pro¬
duce steam for electricity generation.
3.4. Bagasse board.
Particleboard production from bagasse is discussed in detail in
the chapter which analyses the failure of the Mauritian particleboard
plant. Only a few references of interest will be mentioned here.
A historical review of the composition panelboard industry,
stressing the use of non-wood fibres has been written by Atchison and
Col 1 ins(87). Figure 2.16 shows their list of bagasse fibreboard and
particleboard plants that had been built up to 1976, and figure 2.17
shows how the consumption of particleboard is overtaking that of ply¬
wood worldwide.
Another, earlier review on the subject was a meeting organised
by UNIDO, "Production of panels from agricultural residues" (88).
This considered all agricultural residues, and was primarily con¬
cerned with production in developing countries, as was a later FAO
organised "World Consultation on Woodbased
Panels"(89,90,91,92,93,94).
As a result of this conference, a number of particleboard equip-
- 69 -
Figure 2.16 Bagasse particleboard and fibreboard plants known to
Atchison(87) in 1976
TABLE VI
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ment manufacturers were asked to provide case studies of small scale
particleboard plants(95,96). A number of companies now offer "small
scale" plants for particleboard(97) and fibreboard(98), however,
these plants are often still too large for small Third World markets.
Marenzi(90) studied the operation of two small-scale fibreboard
plants, one in Madagascar of 10 t/d capacity and one in Kenya of
24 t/d. Another African plant was described in the Centre for Indus¬
trial Development profile(99). This produced 24 t/day hardboard,
medium density board and insulation board. These three small fibre-
board plants used wood. De Wilde studied much smaller strawboard
plants in Sri Lanka(100,101), which suffered from political selection
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of an untrained work force and management. Mars(102) studied in some
detail particleboard production in India in order to asses the feasi¬
bility of producing particleboard from groundnut husks, figure 2.18
shows the plywood and particleboard end uses in India.
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Source: Mars(102).
In her discussion of the panel markets in India she explained that
the plywood used in furniture was mainly 15 mm to 19 mm, used in
better quality furniture. This is quite unlike the Mauritian usage of
thin plywood for cheap furniture.
Brief mention should be made of other board products that have
been or might be made from bagasse. These are cement-bonded
board(93,103), medium density fibreboard (MDF)(104), and oriented
boards(105,106,107).
One of the most significant costs in particleboard production is
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the cost of synthetic resin. Research done on trying to find natural
products to substitute for this (as lignin does in fibreboard) has
been reviewed by Kulvik(108).
Last but not least should be mentioned the most important arti¬
cle on particleboard production that the author has read. It is "Pos¬
sibilities and problems regarding production of particleboard in the
developing countries" by Bassi1i(109). This is the only article
known to the author which directly concerns itself with the marketing
/ user education problems discussed in the chapter of the thesis on
the Mauritian particleboard factory. These problems are well known in
the industry, but are rarely mentioned in the literature.
3.5. Pulp and paper production from bagasse
A case study of a proposed paper mill in Jamaica(8), is criti¬
cally compared with a study in Indian small scale paper mills(llO),
and articles on bagasse-based Indian mini-mi 11 s(111,112,113), in a
later chapter in this thesis. This literature survey of bagasse pulp
and paper will, therefore, be limited to mentioning the reviews and
principal articles on the technology of pulp and paper production
from bagasse.
There has been an extensive bibliography prepared on the pulping
of bagasse, by Louden(114), with 132 references, with abstracts of
each. Other references are available from the Finnish Pulp and Paper
Research Institute(115).
After Paturau's book was published, UNIDO held an "Expert group
meeting on pulp and paper", in which several papers were devoted to
the production of bagasse newsprint(116,117,118).
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Several papers have been published on the results of particular
working mills. Wang(119) described the decision-making leading to the
establishment of a 300 t/d bagasse pulp mill (then the world's big¬
gest), special features of the project and improvements made during
test operation. Several stages of feasibility studies were carried
out. The first was by local consultants (China Technical Consul¬
tants), the second by a Canadian company (Stadler Hurler Interna¬
tional Ltd.) which agreed with the local study and quantified some of
the factors (e.g. market size) and investigated some extra factors
(water quality and effluent disposal). The third stage was the set¬
ting up of a Construction Office for the project, advised by four
experts. They had to prepare the tender specifications, evaluate the
bids, advise on construction and civil works, on the installation and
test run, on the bagasse storage and transportation system and plan
the personnel training programme. They studied the process to be
used, the plant size and the site before preparing the tender specif-
ication.
The sulphate process was chosen over the soda, sulphite, caustic
soda-chlorine (Celdecor) and mechano-chemical processes as bleached
pulp for export was to be produced, and the process produced a rela¬
tively strong pulp of good flexibility while permitting chemical
recovery by a well-developed process.
The plant size was established from the bagasse supply available
from sugar mills at economical transportation distances, as there
appeared to be no severe market limitations for such pulp in the
region. The factory site was chosen taking into account the raw
material supply and storage, chemicals supply, water quality and sup¬
ply, fuels and power, transportation facilities, labour resources,
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climate, and effluent pollution.
On this basis they invited tenders for a turn-key plant, erected
by the Taiwan Sugar Corporation under supervision. The specification
included conditions that 30% of the equipment, machines and materials
should be manufactured in Taiwan; the supply of field engineers for
erection supervision, testing, start-up and performance tests and
training; that the supplier or cooperating manufacturer must have had
experience in supplying relevant equipment three years before 1 July
1971; and the following:
Supplier or its cooperating engineering firm must have
designed or constructed at least one complete bleached
bagasse pulp plant using Alkaline Process to produce 85° GE
or over bleached pulp at design capacity not lower than
fifty metric tons per twenty four hour day. This plant
should have met performance guarantees and should have
operated at design capacity for at least one year before
July 1, 1971. A notarized letter from the Chief Executive
of the mentioned pulp mill is required to certify the
mill's capacity, the brightness of the bleached pulp, date
of initial operation and performance test runs and the name
of the designing (sic) and or construction (sic) of the
pi ant.
With such conditions it is perhaps not surprising that the
tender was opened and retendered three times from August 1970 to June
1973, when it was finally awarded to Ishikawjima-Harima Heavy Indus¬
tries Co. Ltd., cooperating with Parsons Whitmore Co.
The plant had a mechanised bagasse feeding system for unloading
bales which arrived by train from sugar factories, an improved Ritter
bulk storage system in which a biological liquor is prepared contain¬
ing acid-producing bacteria and pumped over the bagasse in a yard,
and a wastewater treatment plant including neutralisation, sedimenta¬
tion and activated sludge steps.
As some parts of the design did not work in practical operation,
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they made several improvements. Such changes were made to the bagasse
pusher, the dump pit, the bale breaker and the depither which had had
its suspension and lubrication system completely modified before
installation. Nevertheless, it suffered from vibration, lubrication
and centre alignment problems, and its capacity was below design
level. Faced with this the engineers of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation
replaced the pin bagasse feeder to the depither by a screw feeder so
that they could ensure an even feed flow, enabling the depither to
run at maximum load condition all the time.
If more projects were started, studied and run like this one,
there would be less failed industries in developing countries.
Other bagasse pulp and paper mills reported in the literature
include the Mandya National Paper Mills Ltd., Mysore, India(120), the
Orizaba mill in Mexico(121), the Stanger Pulp and Paper mill in South
Africa(122), the Edfu pulp mill in Egypt(123) ,* and a new pulp and
paper mill in Cuba, Project Cuba-9(124). The 35 t/d Indian mill had
difficulties for two and a half years after start-up, in power and
bagasse supplies. The bagasse was moist depithed at the sugar fac¬
tory, further depithed in a Hydrapulper at the pulp mill, and con¬
tinuously digested with caustic soda in a Black Clawson Pandia diges¬
ter. The pulp was then bleached by a three-stage process. They suc¬
ceeded in making printing paper from 100% bagasse pulp, although the
plant was designed to use 20% long fibred pulp. Nevertheless they
preferred to use only 80% bagasse for the flexibility it allowed and
the limitations bagasse draining puts on a paper machine with a nor¬
mal length fourdrinier section. Note that this is an Indian mini-
* Only available from, or with the permission of, the Egyptian
government.
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mill, below the quoted "minimum economic capacities".
The Cuban plant will be a pilot plant for producing newsprint
and dissolving pulp. This has been designed by ICI DCA. The Mexican
plant is a 60 kt/a expansion to Kimberley-Clark's plant there, using
a soda base pulping line and chemical recovery incorporating a
fluidised bed liquor burning system which can burn 35% solids liquor,
greatly minimising the problems of chemical recovery in soda process
pi ants.
The Egyptian mill was built in 1965 with a large chemical
recovery plant to allow an early doubling of capacity. The costs of
running this recovery furnace at 42% of design capacity and paying
financial charges on an expensive (because of this) plant have led to
it running at a loss ever since. The project seems to have been
somewhat ambitious, as the Egyptian market grew slowly, and in 1969
was estimated to need an extra 32.3 kt/a extra chemical pulp by
1980—somewhat different planning to that in the Taiwanese case.
Finally, for those readers unfamiliar with the technology used
in Indian mini paper mills based on agricultural wastes, appendix 2
includes diagrams and information extracted from Western(llO) illus¬
trating the processes employed. For an account of the misadventures
of poorly run mini-mills in India, see a recent article in Economic
and Political Weekly(125).
3.6. Other bagasse uses.
Many people have tried to briquette bagasse for subsequent use
as a fuel, or for easier transport to pulp mills, with varying
degrees of success. One type of briquetter is produced by SPM Cor-
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poration(126). It was one of these that did not work in Mauritius,
although they have been successful elsewhere under different condi¬
tions. Other cheaper, small-scale briquetters are produced by Thai
and Indian(127) companies. Recently machines to form highly
compressed bagasse pellets have appeared. One such is the "Woodex"
pelleter, which is being used in Hawaii to compress bagasse for use
as a fuel at central power stations(128,129). A woodex plant of
20 kt/a capacity would cost about US$2.83 M.
Another energy use of bagasse for which plants have been
designed is the production of charcoal and/or gas by pyrolysis. Trad¬
itional types use molasses to bind the charcoal briquettes, some
newer processes produce gas by pyrolysis and limited combustion of
bagasse in suspension, e.g(130).
Some attempts have been made to produce biogas by anaerobic
digestion of bagasse. One such plant, to a Hungarian design, was set
up at the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur, India(131). This pro-
3 3
duced 200 m of gas with an energy content of 5200 kcal/m
3
(21.8 MJ/m ) from one tonne of organic matter. If we take bagasse to
contain 49% water and 1.5% ash, then one tonne of wet bagasse will
3
contain 495 kg organic matter, which could produce 99 000 m biogas
by this process, with an energy content of 2155 MJ. Yet burning this
bagasse, with a net calorific value of 8040 kJ/kg(2p.31), this would
produce 8040 MJ of energy. So in making biogas from bagasse in this
process, only one quarter of the energy available by burning bagasse
is present in the gas.
Other products can be obtained by hydrolysis of bagasse. Acid
hydrolysis can produce furfural from the pentosans in the
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bagasse(L32,133,134*), enzymatic hydrolysis might eventually produce
sugars from sugars from bagasse(135,136). The Tsao process of dis¬
solving the cellulose in bagasse, in a solvent such as concentrated
sulphuric acid,and then precipitated as amorphous eel 1ulose,which can
be more easily hydrolysed(137,138). Partial hydrolysis can improve
the palatabi 1 ity of bagasse to cattle, and can provide substrates for
fungal growth(139).
Bagasse can be converted to compost without pre-treatment pro¬
vided it is mixed with manure, filter mud and bacterial/fungal cul¬
tures to accelerate the decomposition(140), or sprayed with
vi nasse(141).
4. Other by-products of sugarcane
In a number of countries,wax has been extracted from filter mud.
This is done commercially in India(142,143). The only factory there
at present producing wax is attached to the Ravalgaon Sugar Farm
Ltd., Maharashtra. This 1200 t/d factory uses sulphitation clarifica¬
tion. The filter mud is sun dried and then extracted with white
spirit in a batch process of successive extractions with weakening
solutions of wax. The solvent is recovered from the spent filter mud
by steam distillation, and the wax solution is concentrated by the
same process. The crude wax is then treated with slaked lime at
120 °C, which treatment is followed by refining the wax by cold
extraction in isopropanol. In India cane wax sells for about
US$8.5/kg, compared to the landed price for carnauba wax of US$9/kg.
* Available only from, or with the permission of, the Trinidad
government.
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5. Animal feeding on sugarcane by-products.
As this thesis concentrates on the industrial use of sugarcane
by-products, this section will be limited to indicating a few reviews
of the subject.
Perhaps the fullest study of this is a thesis on the use of
sugarcane by-products in cattle feeding, by Brun(144).
A shorter review appeared in the Revue Agricole et Sucriere de
l'Tle Maurice(145), while a review on poultry production on sugarcane
and other by-products was published by Valdivie(146).
A general introduction to the use of molasses in animal feeding
has been produced by the United Molasses Co. Ltd(147).
6. General literature on technology transfer.
This review has concentrated upon cases of the transfer of tech¬
nologies for using sugarcane by-products. These will be compared
i
later with the Mauritian case studies, to control for specifically
Mauritian factors.
A search has been made for detailed case studies of industrial
technology transfer which consider explicitly the dynamics of the
process. Apart from Hirschman's study(148) (already mentioned) these
are few and far between. The studies in "The choice of technology in
developing countries"(149) concentrate on the economic viability of
different technologies at factor costs in underdeveloped countries,
although Timmer(150) and Thomas(151) do consider the process by which
the project proposals are produced. Wei 1s(152) studied the choice of
technology in manufacturing industry, so his paper is more relevant
to this study. However, it is a cross-sectional rather than histori¬
cal survey, comparing the technologies used in different factories at
- 78b -
the same time. He attempted to discover the reasons for investment
decisions through interviews with managers, and checked their argu¬
ments against the material conditions in Indonesian industry. He sug¬
gested several explanations for this decision-making behaviour, but
found that none of the economic explanations were rational to an
"economic man" (except, perhaps, risk minimisation), and was forced
to invoke a psychological explanation, that of an "engineering man"
who pursues engineering objectives beyond the limits of economic
sense. As Wells concludes, "The study has only begun to probe the
complex factors that influence the manager in his choice of technolo¬
gies. The simple combination of production functions and factor costs
is clearly inadequate to the task."(152,p.85)
There have been a number of accounts, in the appropriate tech¬
nology literature, of attempts to introduce new technologies, but,
unfortunately, they have not been reported in sufficient detail to be
useful to this study. This is particularly disappointing in the case
of studies which observed the introduction of a technology over a
long time, such as many of those in "Experiences in appropriate tech-
nology(153)
A few theses have been written on case studies of the introduc¬
tion of new technologies to underdevelopped countries. Notable among
them, and relevant to chapter 6, is that by de Wilde(154), who stu¬
died small-scale rural production units, especially strawboard fac¬
tories, in Sri Lanka. This is discussed in chapter 6.
Apart from case studies, the more general literature on
appropriate technology and technology transfer tends to be concerned
with issues other than those most pertinent to the studies in this
thesis. Much of the appropriate technology literature tends to be
prescriptive rather than analytic, aiming to provide criteria of
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appropriateness, handed down from upon high, like Moses'
tablets(e.g.l55,156,157). Technology transfer literature frequently
considers this from the viewpoint of obstacles set up at the supply
side, and hence concentrate upon institutional mechanisms for over¬
coming difficulties in the diffusion of ideas from developed to
underdeveloped countries(158,159,160,161). The interactions between
the transferred technology and the society into which it is intro¬
duced are often considered, if at all, as one way processes: the
impact of technology upon society or the impact of society upon the
transfer of technology. An exception is Reddy(162) who considered
the long term dynamics of the interaction between successive techni¬
cal and social changes in a society: this thesis analyses the short
term dynamic interactions between a specific technology and society
during its introduction into the society.
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CHAPTER THREE
"Top Board" - a study in failure
Articles which consider the appropriateness of a technology
often resort to a list of criteria - the more criteria the prospec¬
tive technology satisfies, the more appropriate it appears to
be(l,2,3,4). In such lists the use of local resources is always
among the first criteria. Other considerations often included are
the upgrading of wastes, import substitution, production of building
materials and employment creation (either directly or in secondary
industries). Such criteria are linked to development models of bal¬
anced development in which are balanced the aims of increased produc¬
tion, reduced economic dependence and satisfying basic needs.
Would the production of particleboard from bagasse on an island
such as Mauritius be an appropriate technology under these criteria?
It uses a local raw material, a certain proportion of which is
surplus to the sugar factories requirements and so is waste. It pro¬
duces panels for use in furniture and construction, so helping to
satisfy a basic need. It substitutes imported plywood where there is
no possibility of local plywood production (because of a general
shortage of timber). Its use as panelling for cheaper furniture pro¬
duced in small workshops could stimulate employment in these. On
these criteria such an industry is a prima-facie example of an
appropriate technology.
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In September 1971 the first particleboards made in Mauritius
from bagasse left the factory set up by the Universal Board Co. Ltd.
at St. Antoine. The board was given the trade name of "Top Board"(5).
The Universal Board Co. Ltd. went into voluntary liquidation in
June 1979, with substantial accumulated losses.
This presents an example of an "appropriate technology" which
failed. Unless we choose to enter a circular argument by say¬
ing that as it failed it was not appropriate, we need to examine this
failure to understand how it happened and where this leaves the con¬
cept of an appropriate technology.
1. Origins of the plant(5,6,7,8).
While the idea of starting a particleboard plant based on
bagasse had long been considered in Mauritius(9), the first concrete
steps to achieve this were taken by M. Maxime Raffray of the Harel
Mallac group of companies. In 1968 (the year of independence)? there
were favourable conditions for the creation of new industries as
secondary industries were being started, there was liquid cash avail¬
able, and a certain willingness, in both the government and private
sectors to create industries off the beaten track. In looking for
industrialization projects which would enable him to take advantage
of these conditions, M. Raffray looked at the use of bagasse?which
was freely available at most of the sugar factories. He claimed
another of his objectives was to create jobs and save on foreign
exchange(5). He chose to make particleboard from bagasse, given the
conditions already mentioned and an increasing world demand for par¬
ti cleboard.
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On approaching the government he was offered a development cer¬
tificate, conferring important tax advantages, and participation by
the Development Bank of Mauritius, in the form of a long-term loan.
Thus encouraged, he arranged a market survey, approached equipment
producers and set about organising the capital to finance the pro¬
ject.
The market study was limited to finding out the total imports of
plywood and particleboard, and estimating from this that there was a
market for 1200 t annually in 1970 rising to 3500 t in 1979. Assuming
similar prices for the particleboard and imported plywood, at the
prices then practised by the plywood importers a 3750 t/a particle-
board factory was estimated to be able to break even if 600 t/a could
be sold. Note in passing that the plywood price used for this calcu¬
lation was the market price less an assumed wholesaling margin rather
than the c.i.f. price.
The plant chosen was the smallest then commercially available,
considered in the industry as "small-scale"; even several case stu¬
dies for an FA0 portfolio on small-scale panel plants chose minimum
capacities of 3640 t/a(10) or even 4660 t/a(11) of 19 mm, with possi¬
bilities of expansion later. Plants of 1000 t/a capacity, expandable
to 3000 t/a were not produced.
As M. Raffray said in the PR0SI interview(5), he looked for cap¬
ital from the raw material suppliers (the sugar estates), the plywood
importers (who were appointed wholesalers for the particleboard), the
Development Bank of Mauritius, the Mauritius Commercial Bank, an
insurance company and the public in general. Although more than two
hundred investors subscribed to the issue, the main shareholders were
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Harel Mallac, St. Antoine sugar estate and the wholesalers. The
Development Bank of Mauritius granted long-term secured loans of
Rsl.8 M, and the Mauritius Commercial Bank granted overdraft facili¬
ties. The loans, together with Rs2 020 070 of shares were not enough
to finance the building, equipment and furniture, which came to
Rs4.5 M. In consequence they had to take on a suppliers credit of
Rsl.6 M from Siempelkamp GmbH covering half the cost of the plant and
/>
machinery. This loan was in Deutsche Mark at the bank rate (about
8-10%), over five years. During these five years the rupee was tied
first to the pound sterling then to the special drawing right, both
of which depreciated against the Deutsche Mark. So the Universal
Board Company was placed in the position of having to pay back
Rs2.5 M on. TKe Uan. Even with this loan only Rs 920 k was available
for working capital; beyond this amount it had to be financed by a
bank overdraft. Such a small provision for working capital turned out
to be inadequate, as shown by the value of the total stocks held in
June 1976 - this was Rs 1771 k(7). Details of the fixed assets and
the capital raised are given in appendix 3.
The factory was built alongside St. Antoine sugar factory, to
use their bagasse directly. It was operated by people from St.
Antoine sugar factory under a management contract to the Universal
Board Co., while the financial management was based in the Harel Mal¬
lac headquarters. The sales were handled by the six plywood importers
and Harel Mallac. The plant was ordered in 1969, began its first pro¬
duction in September 1971 and made its first sales in November of
that year.
From then on the enterprise was beset with problems, as may be
seen from figure 3.1, which shows the annual sales compared with the
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production capacity of the factory. Note in passing that the sales
for 1977/8 were only 742.77 t according to the monthly sales figures
provided by M. Raffray's secretary, although in the PROSI Bulletin
interview(5) M. Raffray stated that 1200 t were sold that year.
Why did the Universal Board Co. sell so little while the market
for panels rose from 1200 t/a in 1970 to 3500 t/a in 1978?(5) To
understand this it is essential to study each factor in turn, as fol-
1 ows:
1. Technical factors :
The quality of the board,
the technology of use, and
the production cost.
ii. Marketing factors :
Uses for the board,
competition with plywood,
the role of the wholesalers, and
the role of the government.
iii. Financial factors:
The DM loan,
the special loans, and
the overall profitability.
2. Technical factors
To consider the various technical factors which may have been




Figure 3.2 shows a pile of bailed bagasse outside St. Antoine
sugar factory. This stock was used by the particleboard factory out¬
side the cane crushing season. It was made up from bales produced
during the season at St. Antoine sugar factory or purchased from
other sugar factories. During the crushing season the bagasse was
taken directly from St. Antoine sugar mill. In this condition the
bagasse contained about 50% water, 10% pith and 10% dirt(12,13) both
of which have to be removed as only the fibre from the bagasse pro¬











The wet bagasse from the mill was first passed over a rotating
screen for partial wet depithing. The wet pith was returned to the
sugar factory to be burned in the boilers, in this way freeing more
surplus bagasse. The partially depithed bagasse was then broken up by
rotating knives until it could pass a screen of 20 mm x 20 mm holes.
This equipment can be seen in figure 3.3 (behind the workers, without
masks, breaking up bales). The bagasse was then sent to the particle-
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board factory by conveyor (figure 3.4) where it was stored in a 20 m^










Figure 3.4 Depithed and
milled bagasse at entry to
particleboard mi 11.
The bagasse was then dried in a pneumatic jet drier in which the
bagasse and hot gases travelled in a spiral path allowing good heat
and mass transfer and hence a short retention time (30-180 s). The
drying gases were a mixture of recirculated gas and the combustion
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products of a fuel oil burner. When the burner temperature reached
600 °C the furnace feed was changed to a mixture of fuel oil and
bagasse dust, so saving oil.
The dried bagasse was passed through a wing beater mill (a type
of hammer mill), where the remaining pith cells were loosened from
the fibre bundles, to a vibrating screen (figure 3.5), where it was
separated into coarse and fine fibres and pith by screens with 2 mm
and 0.6 mm square holes. Typically the bagasse was separated into
21.1% coarse particles, 63.8% fine particles, and 8.5% pith and
dust(12). The pith and dust were burned in the bagasse drying fur¬
nace, the coarse particles were used in the core of the particle-
board, and the fine particles were used in the surface layers of the
particleboard (and also in the core when thicker boards were being








Each stream of particles was separately mixed with a prepared
glue mixture in continuous flow mixers (see figure 3.6). Urea-
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formaldehyde resin was used as, although it was not waterproof, it was
much cheaper than phenol-formaldehyde resin. Even the cheaper urea-
formaldehyde resin made up 30% of the direct production costs of the
particleboard(5). The glue was mixed with paraffin wax to retard
water absorption, extra urea to react with excess formaldehyde in the
resin (necessary for the curing reaction) and a fungicide. Fungicide
was not added to the first boards produced, resulting in massive fun¬
gal growths on boards used on the humid central plateau of the
island. After experiments with different fungicides(12), a fungicide
known as "Xyligen 30F", produced by Bayer, was chosen. On boards so
treated fungus only grew when used in parts of the island where the






The glued bagasse particles were then taken to two spreading
machines (figure 3.7) (one for fine particles, one for coarse) under
which passed two trays on which was formed a mat of glued particles.
Figure 3.8 shows the principle by which the mat was built up in
layers of fine, coarse, coarse and fine particles to produce a three
layer board. As operated in this factory, the final result was a mat
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Figure 3.8 Operating principle of the mat forming station.
»
To press
The two trays were then fed into the double opening press. This
press had platens heated by hot oil at 150 °C. When the bagasse mat
came into contact with the platens steam, formed from the 10% mois¬

















transferring the heat from the platens. At the same time the resin
cured and the bagasse was compressed. When the pressing conditions
were properly set, the board maintained the same dimensions (+2%)
when released from the press. The cycle times used varied from 2.5 to
10 min. The press, opening to show the pressed boards, is shown in
figure 3.10.
The boards were then stacked horizontally for several days to
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allow the curing process to go to completion, following which they
were trimmed and sanded on a drum sander. The sander should produce
boards of even thickness—in fact, owing to the uneven mat formation,
uneven boards were produced. This created difficulties for users such
as Boboulo (a factory which made furniture mainly from Top
Board)(14).
What quality of board was produced by this process? Figure 3.11
shows the results of tests carried out at Hesch's laboratory in Ger-
many(15), and at the University of Mauritius by the author. For com¬
parison figure 3.12 shows test results on specimens of bagasse parti -
cleboard made elsewhere, and figure 3.13 the DIN standards for
(wood-based) particleboard.
Figure 3.11 Physical properties of "Top Board".
Tested by: Hesch Newman
No. of samples 11 11 11 11 11 3 2
Thickness/mm_2 4.33 5.87 13.27 19.04 30.25 4.61+0.23 19.6+0.1
Density/kg m 770 670 640 530 420 630+40 575+25
Bending strength/MPa 27.1 22.4 17.0 14.8 9.5 14.7+2.9 13.1+0.4
Bending modulus/GPa - - - - - 1.51+0.29 1.67+0.15
Tens. strength/MPa 1.26 0.91 0.47 0.36 0.22 - -
Swel1ing/% - 2 hr 3.1 4.5 1.4 2.5 3.5 - -
24 hr 6.4 8.7 6.3 5.0 5.2 - -
Water abs./% - 2 hr 8.9 14.9 25.4 55.9 88.5 - -
24 hr 22.3 36.5 66. 3 89.0 118.4 - -
Note: figures in bold type are outwith the DIN standard or below the
design density.
Sources: tests carried out by the author at the University of Mauri¬
tius in 1976 and earlier tests carried out at Hesch's 1aboratory(15).
Compared to the DIN standard and the results achieved in Ver-
maas' selected particleboard plants, the quality of "Top Board" was
lacking in several respects. Not only was there poor control of the
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Figure 3.12 Physical properties of bagasse particleboards.
Origin: Indonesia Indi a Cuba Cuba
Thickness/mm_2 12 16 3.3 3.1 16.2 15.6 16.8
Density/kg m~ 680 625 740 772 663 703 657
Bending strength/MPa 27.0 22.3 23.9 25.5 20.9 27.6 25.0
Tens. strength/MPa 0.41 0.51 0.72 0.70 0.46 0.57 0.51
Swel1ing/% - 2 hr 2.8 6.1 3.1 3.2 3.5 2.6 3.0
-24 hr 15.3 - - - 13.0 - -
Resin content/% 8.5 8.5 12 12 8.5 8.5 8.5
Source: Vermaas(16).
Figure 3.13 DIN 68761 (Sept. 1973 issue) for particleboard.
Thickness ranges/mm All e13 13-20 20-25
Tolerances/mm
- 1ength & width +3
- thickness +0.2
Moisture/% 9+3
Bending strength/MPa "19.6 "17.7 "14.7
Tens. strength/MPa *0.39 '0.34 '0.29
Swelling (2 hr)/% *6
Source: Fahrni(ll).
mat thickness, but this carried over to affect the sanded thickness.
The bending strengths of the 13 mm and 19 mm boards were outwith DIN
68761, while the bending strength of 4mm board declined from
27.1 MPa in 1972 to 15_±3 MPa in 1976. There are no standards for the
elastic modulus in bending, as this is only important for a limited
number of applications*. However, in these applications- the use of
"Top Board" was severely limited, as the modulus was only about
1.5 GPa, much lower than that of spruce (14 MPa) or oak (12 MPa)(17).
* One such use is in table tennis tables. Throughout Mauritius
one could see sagging table tennis tables made of "Top Board",
and only the foolhardy stood on them to change a light bulb.
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Otherwise the properties were up to standard and comparable with
those of the bagasse particleboards mentioned by Vermaas.
The low strengths were related to the low densities of the
boards. According to the production programme of the factory(7), the
3
4 mm board should have had a density of 750 kg/m . The samples tested
3
at Hesch's laboratory had a density of 770 kg/m and an adequate
bending strength of 27.1 MPa, whereas the samples tested by the
3
author, in 1976?had densities of 630+40 kg/m and bending strengths of
only 15_+3 MPa. It appears that in 1976 the factory was producing
board with an inadequate supply of particles and/or glue for the den¬
sity and thickness required, as also the density of the 19 mm board
3
was below the planned level of 600 kg/m .
The weakness of the board was of little consequence to most Mau¬
ritian users, as "Top Board" was mainly used as panelling in wooden
framed furniture, or in other non-load bearing applications such as
in false ceilings or insulating panels. Typical cheap furniture in
Mauritius uses the thinnest plywood available as a base for painted
panels to give the appearance needed at the lowest cost - it does not
matter if you can kick holes in it.
For other potential uses, the mechanical properties of the board
are more important. One such use was the manufacture of tea chests
from "Top Board". Tea chests have to resist dockside handling and
chafing on ship, and also support the weight of other chests stacked
above them. As Hesch wrote (in a letter to the author(18)):
Another mistake I remember, was to reduce the quality of
the boards in order to save costs, so that a large custo¬
mer, producing tea chests from bagasse particleboard,
finally decided to return to plywood.*
1
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Another such use was in partitioning of offices and houses. In
general, "Top Board" was not used for this, partly through a relative
lack of rigidity, but mostly through a lack of knowledge of how to
use it. Although most Mauritian architects shunned the particleboard,
the European architects employed to design the new Registry House in
Port Louis were quite happy to use particleboard iji
Mauritius. They tested the product and specified thicker particle-
board (mostly 49 mm), to compensate for the somewhat poorer mechani¬
cal properties.
But for small furniture makers, the bending strength and modulus
were of less importance. More important for them was the difficulty
in working with particleboard. It cannot be nailed or screwed as the
board will often split. Joints have to be glued or dowelled, thus
spreading the forces over a large contact area. There is greater wear
of saws because of the silica in bagasse, so they had to sharpen
their saws more often, except for those who bought tungsten carbide
tipped saws. Any visible part of the particleboard has to be
veneered, as painted particleboard is very obviously painted chip¬
board and not plywood. Furthermore, for good moisture resistance all
surfaces of the particleboard must be sealed, either with glue or
veneer. Some small producers bought the board and then stuck on
veneers by hand(7), while one large factory, Boboulo, had its own
veneering equipment. The Universal Board Co. also produced a little
veneered board, but sold little: (only 2.5% by value of the sales
over the lifetime of the plant(19))
Particleboard use can be simplified if the first processing
* In fact, the tea chests were made by the Universal Board Co.
and sold as complete tea chests to this customer.
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steps are carried out at the factory, leaving the assembly of
veneered, cut-to-size boards to the furniture manufacturer or
builder. This was an early recommendation of Dr. Hesch to M. Raffray.
As Hesch said in a letter to the author(18):
As a matter of fact, I was really preaching that processing
of the particleboard to semi-finished and finished products
has to be added to the particleboard plant, especially in a
market were (sic) particleboard is not yet introduced. My
advice was finally follow (sic) to a certain extent.
Machinery suitable to produce prefabricated door, table
tops, cut-to-size veneered and unveneered particleboard and
so on was purchased, but as far as I know never put into
operation. This was one of the serious mistakes of the com¬
pany. Utilization of particleboard requires special
machinery and know-how, which could not be expected to be
available at the Mauritian consumers. It was, therefore,
imparative (sic) for the success of such a project, that
operations requiring expensive and sophisticated machinery
were done at the factory, so that the carpenters and house
builders could restrict their activities mainly to a kind
of assembly and fitting, where neither complicated know-how
nor expensive machinery were required.
In the absence of such semi-finished products people bought the
raw particle board. On trying a sheet they would hammer a nail into
it, and find that either it pulled out easily or split the board; cut
it with an old saw, and find that it took ages; leave it in a damp
workshop, and find that the board swelled or even that fungus grew on
it (for the first boards produced). Here was a disincentive to the
use of parti cleboard in Mauritius. As we shall see in the section on
the marketing of "Top Board", no attempt was made to teach the users
how they could use parti cleboard: so only the most persistent carried
on until they had found this out by trial and error or by copying
other users such as Boboulo. To quote Hesch again:
I had also arranged with the German government for a German
carpenter with teaching abilities to go to Mauritius to
arrange training courses for carpenters and do sales promo¬
tion by teaching the people how to apply particleboard in
the right manner. The German government expected from the
company in Mauritius to contribute in a certain percentage
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to the costs for such expert. The company did not accept
the proposal of the German government and a good chance to
improve the situation was lost.
The only incentive which might have encouraged users to be more
persistent would have been a low price. In fact, the margin between
particleboard and plywood prices was often quite small. Before the
factory started production, thin plywood had been selling for
Rs0.48-0.50/ff2 (rs 5.3/m^). When "Top Board" became available with
its thinnest grades selling for Rs0.42/ft2 (rs 4.5/m2), the plywood
prices dropped to the same(6). The details of selling prices will be
discussed later, for now the the technical component of this - the
production cost - will be considered.
Lam Wai Shung(12) calculated the production cost of 19 mm parti-
cleboard from the physical inputs used to produce 3750 t/a or
1750 t/a particleboard. As the production levels never reached
1750 t/a, and 19 mm parti cl eboard only made up one quarter of the
sales from 1976 to 1979, the production costs have
been recalculated to take account of reality. The object of this
recalculation is to contrast the idealised analyses often made in
project proposals and industrial profiles(12,10,20) with the material
conditions of operation of the factory. In the Third World idealized
analyses are even less adequate than in developed countries.
These calculations can be found in appendix 3. Firstly, the
sales figures were analysed to find out the distribution of sales by
the thicknesses of boards sold. The distribution was consistent from
1966 to 1979; on average 11% of the weight of board sold was 4 mm
thick, 19% was 6 mm, 36% was 13 mm, 4% was 16 mm, 26% was 19 mm, 1%
was 25 mm, and 3% was 30 mm thick.
These proportions exclude the special order for
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the Registry House, which mainly consisted of 49 mm board. So the
average thickness sold was 13 mm. This is less than the European
average of around 15 mm(21). No doubt this was due to the Mauritian
sales being mainly to the furniture market, which uses thinner parti-
cleboard than does the construction industry.
The board thickness affects the production cost in several ways.
Less weight of thinner board can be pressed per hour, so increasing
the time related costs such as the energy required to heat the
presses and the labour charges, and reducing the production capacity
below 3750 t/a. Also more raw material is wasted in the sanding, and
more resin, urea and fungicide are needed as a greater proportion of
the board is made up of surface layers.
Based on this mixture of thicknesses, and unit costs from
Lam(12) and Raffray(7,8), the variable production costs were calcu¬
lated for mid-1974, late 1979 and the financial years (July to June)
1975/76 and 1977/78. The proportionate contributions of the different
costs to the total variable costs is shown in figure 3.14.
It can be seen from figure 3.14 that the resin, fungicide and
electricity alone accounted for around 75% of the total cost, each
item costing more than the labour (about 12%) or the bagasse (up to
5%). As the resin, fungicide and the fuel oil to produce electricity
in the power stations are imported, this can not be considered a sig¬
nificant import substituting industry.
It should be noted that these are only approximate percentages,
as they are based on a model calculation rather than the accounts. A
comparison of the results of this calculation with the cost of pro¬
duction figures in the accounts (in appendix 3) showed that the model
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Figure 3.14 Importance of different items in the variable costs of
producing particleboard at St. Antoine.
% 1974 1975/76 1976/77 1979
Bagasse 0.0 5.1 4.4 5.4
Resi n 40.9 35.0 35.0 30.5
Paraffin wax 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3
Emulsifier 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7
Ammonia * * * *
nh4ci 0.7 0.7 1.3 0.7
Urea 0.6 1.2 1.3 0.7
Fungicide 20.1 20.0 19.2 17.4
Sandpaper 1.9 2 1.9 1.7
Raw Materials 66.7 66.3 64.7 59.1
Fuel oil 5.1 5.5 5.4 8.4
Electricity 17.3 16.8 17.5 21.4
Services 22.4 22.3 22.9 29.8
Labour:
ski 11ed 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.0
semi-ski 11ed 7.2 7.6 8.2 7.8
total 11.0 11.5 12.5 11.8
Total 100.1 100.1 100.1 100.0
* Less than 0.5%.
gave a good estimate of the raw materials costs, underestimated the
fuel oil cost by a factor of two, and slightly underestimated the
fuel oil costf.
The production cost breakdown in the accounts(19) does not
specify the contributions of different raw materials to the cost, but
includes other costs such as maintenance and insurance. This break¬
down is presented in figure 3.15 and figure 3.16. For ease of com¬
parison with figure 3.14, yet allowing the same table to be used to
J Including the fixed maximum demand charge.
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show the increase in costs over the five financial years, they are
presented as indices, with the total production costs (excluding
depreciation) in 1973/4 set to 100. As some of the items are a mix¬
ture of fixed and variable production costs (e.g. the management fee
and the electricity cost), two tables have been produced, one based
on the unit costs in Rs/t board produced (figure 3.15), the other on
the total production costs for the financial year (figure 3.16).
Figure 3.15 Analysis of unit production cost.
Index: 1973/74 total cost/t = 100 % increase
'73/4 '74/5 '75/6 '76/7 '77/8 in 5 years
Raw material s 48.5 42.8 72.6 74.3 130.1 169
Management fee* 10.4 22.3 36.5 87.5 43.8 323
Maintenance 4.4 4.4 4.9 10.6 12.4 179
Insurance 3.6 2.3 3.1 7.8 5.5
Fuel & oil 9.8 9.7 11.6 14.4 22.0 124
Electricity 22.0 15.0 23.9 38.5 39.1 77
Sundry costs 1.3 - - - -
Total 100.0 96.5 152.6 233.1 252.9 153
Production/(t) 505 845 1042 516 835
* Includes labour, factory management, water, lubricating oil and
grease, insurance of bagasse and transport.
® Not sensible to calculate as a variable cost.
Source: Universal Board Co. accounts(19).
Considering the cost breakdown in each year in figure 3.15 and
figure 3.16, it can be shown that over these five years, the direct
production expenditures were divided as follows:
Raw materials = 45.5%




Figure 3.16 Analysis of annual production costs.
Index: 1973/74 expenditure = 100 % increase
'73/4 '74/5 '75/6 '76/7 '77/8 in 5 years
Raw materials 48.5 71.6 149.8 76.0 215.2 §
Management fee* 10.4 37.3 75.3 89.4 72.4 600
Maintenance 4.4 7.5 10.0 10.9 20.4 365
Insurance 3.6 3.7 6.4 8.0 9.0 146
Fuel & oil 9.8 16.2 24.1 14.8 36.3 O
Electricity 22.0 25.0 49.4 39.2 64.8 194
Sundry costs 1.3 - - - - -
Total 100.0 161.4 314.9 238.3 418.1 318
Production/(t) 505 845 1042 516 835
* Includes labour, factory management, water, lubricating oil and
grease, insurance of bagasse and transport.
» Not sensible to calculate as a fixed cost.
Source: Universal Board Co. accounts(19).
Fuel & oil = 8.2%
Electricity = 16.3%
Sundry costs = 0.1%
It can be seen that apart from the raw materials and electricity
costs, the management fee was also an important component of the pro¬
duction cost. This included the wages and salaries of the workers
and supervisory staff at the particleboard factory, plus bagasse
insurance, transport, water and lubricating oil and grease.
In his interview in PROSI Bulletin(5), Raffray included among
the problems faced by the Universal Board Co.:
Augmentations spectaculaires et certainement imprevisibles
des couts de production causees d'une part par la hausse du
cout des matieres premieres importees et, d'autre part, par
les augmentations locales ... *
* Spectacular and certainly unforeseeable increases in the pro-
- 104 -
He selected certain examples of price increases over five years.
These are reproduced in figure 3.17, together with similar informa¬
tion provided by his secretary in 1980(8).
Figure 3.17 Selected price/production cost increases according to
Raffray.
% increase in 5 years
(a) (b)
Raw materials 150 170
Wages and salaries 760 600
Fuel oil 60 192
Electricity 112 80
Insurance 100 150
Sources: (a) - figures provided by Raffray's secretary in Jan.
1980(8). (b) - from Raffray's interview in PR0SI Bulletin(5).
It seems odd that there can be such differences between these
two lists of price increases, and between them and the figures in
figure 3.15 and figure 3.16. In fact, these selected price increases
were not all measured in the same way. Some are increases in the
cost per unit of the item, some are increases in the contribution of
that item to the cost of production per tonne board, and some are
increases in the contribution of a given item to the annual produc¬
tion cost. This mixture of measurements confuses the effects of
external increases of prices of inputs to the process, the efficiency
with which these inputs are used within the company, and the produc¬
tion level.
The figure of 112% increase over five years in figure 3.17 is
duction costs caused on the one hand by the rise of the cost of
imported raw materials and, on the other hand, by local price
increases (author's translation)
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the increase in electricity prices per kWh consumed over the period
(see figure A3.6), whereas that of 80% is approximately the increase
in the electricity cost per tonne board produced (see figure 3.15).
As the maximum demand charge also rose by 127% over the same period
(calculated from(22,23) ), the 80% increase in cost per tonne board
represents an increase in the efficiency of electricity use in the
factory, partly due to the higher production level reducing the
effect of the fixed maximum demand charge on the unit production
costs.
The fuel oil prices did increase by 190% over these years as
indicated by Raffray(5) (187% from figure A3.6, 192% from figure
3.17), but the fuel oil element of the unit cost of the boards only
rose 124% (see figure 3.15). This shows that the factory improved the
efficiency with which it used fuel oil, probably an effect of running
the factory on a multishift basis continuously until the production
requirements had been met, and then shutting down the factory until
the stocks had been further depleted. This enabled more bagasse dust
to be burned in the furnace of the bagasse dryer than on one shift
operation, as only fuel oil could be burned until the furnace tem¬
perature had reached 600 °C. The other figure for fuel oil price
increase in figure 3.17 must refer to a different five year period.
For between the financial years 1973/74 and 1976/77 the fuel oil cost
per tonne board rose by only 46%.
Raffray's figure of 170% increase in the cost of raw materials
in five years (figure 3.17 column b) corresponds to the increase in
the cost of raw materials per tonne board produced in figure 3.15.
However, the actual prices of the raw materials rose by less. Based
on the actual prices of each raw material and Lam's model(12),
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adapted to the thicknesses of board sold, the increase in the prices
of the raw materials was only 53% (see figure A3.7). As most of the
increase in the raw material cost per tonne board occurred between
1976/77 and 1977/78 (the increase from 1973/74 to 1976/77 was only
53%), and as 1977/78 was the year in which most of the special order
for the Registry House was produced, it is likely that the higher
quality standards required for this board, and the differences in
thickness of the boards (mostly 49 mm), led to an increased use of
raw materials per tonne board, and/or use of more expensive raw
materials than normal.]" As noted previously, according to Hesch the
Universal Board Co. had reduced the quality of board in order to
reduce the production costs.
. The figures of 600% increase in wages and salaries and 150%
increase in insurance premiums quoted by Raffray (see figure 3.17),
are the increases in the annual management fee and insurance premiums
respectively. The management fee included not only the wages and
salaries of the workers and management supplied by St. Antoine S. E.
to the parti cleboard factory, but other charges assumed by St.
Antoine, bagasse insurance, transport, water and lubricating oils. It
is not clear whether this fee should be considered a fixed or vari¬
able cost, as when the particleboard factory was not operating the
workers worked in the sugar factory. So should only the wages for the
periods when the particleboard factory was operating have been
charged to the management fee, or the wages for the whole year on the
basis that the particleboard factory was more often shut down outside
]" I do not know the composition of the board produced under the
special order, only the normal composition as described by
Lam(12). The order may well have specified a different, or
greater quantities of, fungicide, for example.
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the cane crushing season, when there was little work in the factory
for these men? Without knowing the details of the management con¬
tracts, it is impossible to tell. From figure 3.16 it can be seen
that the management fee rose rapidly until 1975/76 and then remained
approximately constant, on an annual basis, despite changes in the
quantities produced. So possibly it became to be thought of as a
fixed annual charge, to include the total wage cost plus whatever
profit margin was negotiated between the companies. Without such a
change in the basis of calculation of the management fee it would be
difficult to explain such a steep increase, as the wages of skilled
sugar factory workers only increased by 73% in the same period(24).
The insurance cost rose rapidly, no doubt because the large
stocks of unsold particleboard which came to be stored in the factory
would have been considered a fire hazard by the insurance company.
Nevertheless, this was of little importance as on average only 2.5%
of the direct production costs were due to insurance premiums.#
Again, the maintenance costs only came to 4.3% of the direct produc¬
tion costs, on average. Other proportions were: raw materials =
45.5%; management fee = 23.1%; fuel and oil = 8.2%; electricity =
16.3%.
How important were these cost increases to the profitability of
the venture? They must be seen in the context of general inflation,
and the rise of plywood prices over the same period. The cost-of-
living index rose by 68%(24), while plywood import (c.i.f.) prices
rose by 65% from 1973 to 1976 and then decreased in 1977 to give a
five year increase of 55%(25), as shown in figure 3.18.
# Calculated from figure 3.16 - production weighted average
1973-8.
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m Rs/m^ ri cei ndex
1970 1652230 437414 3.78 62
1971 1694007 457512 3.70 61
1972 2452233 608456 4.03 67
1973 3917353 648912 6.04 100
1974 6082952 804508 7.56 125
1976 10102685 1023682 9.89 165
1977 11014341 1177947 9.35 155
Source: Mauritius Customs and Excise Reports(25).
So with direct production costs rising faster than the import
costs of plywood, the profit margins were being squeezed, particu¬
larly after 1976/77 as, up to then, the variable production costs
(taken as raw materials, fuel oil and electricity) had kept in step
with the plywood cost increases. Further evidence of the sharp cost
increase from 1976/77 to 1977/78 is given in figure 3.19 which shows
the average production cost (including depreciation) per tonne board
sold. In each year old stocks were sold, while some of the produc¬
tion went into stock to be sold later. Since the old stocks were
cheaper, this changed the average cost of the board sold from that of
the board produced during the year.
As figure 3.19 shows, the average production cost (including
depreciation) had increased by only 39% from 1973/74 to 1976/77, and
then jumped in 1977/78 to over twice the 1973/74 cost. This is
partly a result of a higher allowance for depreciation, but also is
the effect of the cost increases discussed previously.
3. Marketing factors
As has been shown (in figure 3.1), the factory sold far less
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Figure 3.19 Cost of sales, production and average production cost
(including depreciation) of "Top Board", 1973-8.
Financial Cost of sales Sales Average cost
Year kRs t Rs/t i ndex
1973/74 905 697 1299 100
1974/75 731 779 939 72
1975/76 803 488 1646 127
1976/77 1014 563 1801 139
1977/78 2113 745 2835 218
All calculations to full precision of data, rounded to nearest whole
number for presentation.
Sources: Cost of sales from the annual accounts(19), quantities sold
from Raffray(8,7), see figure A3.1.
board than it was capable of producing. Was there then no market for
particleboard in Mauritius? The best answer to this question can be
found by comparing the "Top Board" sales with the imports of plywood,
as these competed for several markets. As the Customs and Excise
Reports give the plywood imports in square metres, the particle board
sales have to be converted to square metres. This has been done by
calculating the number of square metres of board which correspond to
one tonne for each thickness sold, and then multiplying these values
by the proportion of the total sales made up by board of this thick¬
ness. The total reresents the number of square metres of "Top Board"
which on average corresponded to one tonne of board. This comes to
159 m'Vt. (See figure A3.3)
Applying this factor to the annual sales of "Top Board" (see
figure A3.1), figure 3.20 has been produced. In this can be seen the
very small proportion of the plywood market which had been taken by
"Top Board". On a weight basis the market penetration would have been
greater, as it was likely that the grades of plywood sold would have
been thinner (including 3 mm plywood but very little 19 mm or 30 mm).
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Even though a certain proportion of the plywood imports were not sub-
stitutable by particleboard, obviously a 15% market penetration was
too low.
Why did people continue to buy plywood rather than switch to
"Top Board"? And as the market was expanding, why did new users not
use "Top Board"? To understand this it is necessary to study the
interests of the consumers and the sellers. As has been mentioned
previously, the consumers were mainly small furniture workshops, who
needed the cheapest, easily useable material available. Particle-
board is not easily used by people who have never used it before—one
has to learn special jointing techniques and to use thicker board if
it is required to meet structural loads. As Mauritian furniture
workshops usually did all operations manually (e.g. cutting planks
with long tenon saws), and often had problems getting really skilled
carpenters* (those who would be able to experiment in the use of new
materials), they would have had to be shown exactly how to use the
particleboard.
But no attempt was made to do this. Except for 3 months in 1975,
the Universal Board Company did not even employ a salesman, who might
have been able to help the users learn how to use the product. The
only effort made to acquaint users with "Top Board" was newspaper
advertising at the beginning (Rs22 k of advertising in 1972 and
Rs 14k in 1974(19)). Nor was any attempt made to provided instruc¬
tion at the warehouses where the board was sold. When a customer
arrived at one of these, the following (imaginary) conversation might
* For example, Peter Ming had to close a furniture workshop he
owned because of difficulties in finding carpenters who were
both skilled and conscientious.
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CUSTOMER. What's that stuff over there?
SALESMAN. Oh, that's Top Board.
CUSTOMER. I'll have some 3 rnm plywood
With such limited information available on how to use the board,
and such limited publicity, there was no reason why the users should
particularly want to try "Top Board", except perhaps its price. And
although its price was always set a little below that of plywood, it
was not so low that users would have been encouraged to persevere
after initial difficulties.
The selling prices of "Top Board" are given in figure A3.8.
These have been averaged according to the mix of board thicknesses
sold and plotted in figure 3.21, together with the plywood import
(c.i.f.) prices, and the average production costs and costs of sales
calculated in the previous section. The plywood import prices have
been calculated from the Customs and Excise Reports(25). From figure
3.21 can be drawn three conclusions:
i. the profitability of the Universal Board Co., as indicated by
the difference between the production cost or cost of sales and
the factory selling price, declined over the lifetime of the
company,
ii. the "Top Board" price increased faster than the plywood import
pri ce,and
iii. the profits on plywood to the wholesaler were up to Rs3/rn^
higher than the 18.5% margin they received on the
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The first point has already been discussed. The second is the
crux of the matter, as without a significant price difference or sub¬
stantial promotion, why should the users persevere? To change this
situation of low sales, low plant utilisation and hence low profits,
would have required a strong incentive to the users: in the form of
lower prices, or an increased sales effort. It is the third point
which provides a clue to why such steps were not taken. It is neces¬
sary to consider the interests of the sellers, and any differences of
interest between the different groups involved.
The group which had the most direct contact with the customer
was the wholesalers. The "Top Board" sales were only a small part of
their business, amounting to only a fraction of their sales of ply¬
wood (as shown in figure 3.20), which itself was only a part of their
sales of building materials. Their primary interest was in maximising
the profit of their wholesaling operation. From this viewpoint,
every square metre of "Top Board" they sold to someone who might oth¬
erwise have bought plywood lost them money. Assuming that only half
the difference between the factory price for "Top Board" and the
import price for plywood was extra profit to the wholesalers, this
would have given them an extra Rs750 k on the 500 000 /a# production
capacity of the particleboard plant, for selling plywood instead of
particleboard.
2
1 The maximum of Rs3/m assumes that the customs duties and
port handling charges are negligible - in fact, the duty was
substantially raised after the Universal Board Co. had entered
voluntary liquidation.
^ o-7rn 4./ nn \ 660.1 kg/hr(aver.) , cn 2,,# 3750 t/a(19 mm) x -,co 0 , ) -, n f x 159 m /t^ v ' 763.2 kg/hr(19 mm) '
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Against this must be put their secondary interest in the Univer¬
sal Board Co. as shareholders. They were among the preference 'A'
shareholders (together with Harel Mai lac Ltd. and St. Antoine S.
E.)(6,5). So they had contributed some proportion of the Rsl.2 M
preference 'A' shareholding. In the context of their total trading or
even their annual profits on plywood this was a small investment,
perhaps seen as a kind of insurance against possible increases in
world plywood prices, or as a means of maintaining control of the
total market for boards. Even the Rsl.7 M(8) in special loans they
had to contribute when the DM loan from Siempelkamp fell due (after
appreciation in the D M against the rupee had changed a Rsl.6M loan
into a Rs2.5 M repayment(5) ) was only the extra profit on 2.3 years
sales of plywood instead of particleboard. And as this was financed
as a loan rather than an extra share issue, they were somewhat pro¬
tected against the effects of future problems (as loans are repaid
before shareholders in liquidations)—so even after this they were
not fully committed to the Universal Board Co. in the way that Raf-
fray was, for example.
With so little interest or involvement in the success of the
venture, there was no reason for the wholesalers to change their sel¬
ling methods from their standard practice which was to put the goods
in a warehouse and wait for the customers to come to them. This, of
course, is a logical way to run an import business (as people had to
get the materials somewhere), so keeping overheads on transport and
advertising low: but it is not suited to selling a new material, out-
with the experience of most people on the island. They might have set
up demonstrations on the applications and use of parti cl eboard, have
specially trained their warehouse staff in the use of the material,
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and imported and sold chipboard screws, hinges and other special fit¬
tings which make its assembly so much easier in Europe. They did none
of these things.
Although they might have made a logical financial decision not
to promote "Top Board" as it reduced their potential profits, there
is no evidence that this was a conscious decision.§ For such active
promotion of minor lines is well outside the normal behaviour of the
large import companies in Mauritius, aggressive selling and concern
over marketing having been more in evidence in the newer Si no-
Mauritian companies(26) such as "Happy World" (an importing and
retailing group which grew very quickly in the years before the
December 1979 devaluation of the Mauritian rupee). Apart from
national advertising and competitions, these companies organised
their own delivery vans, their own shops and salesmen, price cuts and
sales—all the marks of competitive capitalism, a somewhat rare
activity in Mauritius. Examples of their style of advertising, indi¬
cating the extra services they were prepared to provide their custo¬
mers are shown in figure 3.21
The only distributers of "Top Board" who did not sell plywood
were Harel Mallac, who received distribution rights in return for
their shareholding in the Universal Board Co. Consequently, they had
a greater interest in promoting "Top Board". Nevertheless they did
not greatly modify their warehouse selling methods, rather they con¬
tinued in the traditional manner of importers, selling the new
§ Except, perhaps, the sudden price reduction of plywood on^the
market the day that "Top Board" appeared, from 48-50 ct/ft to
42 ct/ft (the original thin "Top Board" price) (6), and the
price increase following the voluntary liquidation of the
Universal Board Co(8).
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Figure 3.21a Examples of Mauritian advertisements.
Faites entrer le progres et I'economie
damvotre environnement.
Utilisez lesTL'YAUX EN PVC fabri-
ques a Maurice par Plastic Pipes and
Products Ltd selon les normes inter-
nationaies qui vous offrent la
solution sure, pratique et economique
d tous vos problemes d'adduction
d'eau.
Chaino stftrno
• Mise en place facile et rapide
grace au systeme sur et ' £-3
efficace de junction par collage. h
• Absence de corrosion et d'abrasion
Blender avec
col lee grinder
• Facilite d'adaptation a votre ins¬
tallation existante grace a la
gamme complete de tuyaux et de
raccords allant de 20 mm (1/2")
a 200 mm (8").
Pour pHjs d*t rmi«igwm«nii con lulled lei expert!
DOGER DC SfEVILLE & CO. LTD
| Advertisement by a traditional importer
in "Week-end", 6 Dec. 1981 —note the ab¬
sence of special offers or services.
TELEVISEURS | Advertisement by a Si no
Mauritian company in "Week-end"
20 Dec. 1981 —-note the specia
offers and opening hours.
COULEURS 20
La couleur naturelle
<—Advertisement by the Sino-
Mauritian agents of a Japanese
company in "Week-end", 14 Feb.
1982 —note the efforts taken to
train their staff to provide a
better after-sales service.
les 'e'evisewrs contours JVC acnt corpus
d'ep'p* .les normes technolouiques interna
tioneles es plus avancees
" Ce module vous propose des a vantages les plus
JVC HOUSE
\ ^eitdernwcf* - Pnr.eM.« 1 e> 4 3301 ' SERVICE APUfS VENTE GARANTi PAR
JM,a ~ ^ 6501 DES INGF.NIEUHS FORMES AU JAPON
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material like their imported lines. As they did not sell plywood or
similar building materials, few people went specially to Harel Mallac
to buy "Top Board" when they would have to go elsewhere for many of
their other building supplies.
St. Antoine S. E. was not, of course, concerned with the market¬
ing of "Top Board". They had a management contract for the factory,
and received rent for the land on which the factory was built. They
stood to gain more from this than from possible future dividends on
their investment in the Universal Board Co. So their interests lay in
keeping the particleboard plant working, but not necessarily invest¬
ing heavily to make it profitable.
The one group most concerned with the sales of the Universal
Board Co. were the management (and staff) of the Universal Board Co.
For much of the time it was run by M. Raffray and his secretary, both
of whom had other tasks in Harel Mallac Ltd. Raffray was very con¬
cerned about the problems of the project. His concerns, mentioned in
his PROSI Bulletin interview(5), were also evident in his first
interview given to the author in 1976(6). Furthermore, he mentioned
in this interview the difficulties the users faced in using the par-
ticleboard, and how Dr. Hesch had suggested setting up a school and a
furniture factory to help educate the users. He regretted that the
company had not made any such effort to educate the consumer, but
thought, at that time, that people had become used to the product, were
prepared to sharpen their saws more often or buy tungsten carbide
tipped saws, and that the users were sticking veneers on to particle-
board themselves. He explained how there had been a great market
demand for 4 mm plywood (used to make cheap furniture), and the
effort they had put in to making 4 mm particle board. They were
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eventually successful, although the production capacity was reduced
to 8 t/d and even after two seasons there was 25% wastage when pro¬
ducing 4 mm board.
He had received many enquiries from overseas buyers, but the
freight always made this uneconomic (and, to a lesser extent, the
high overheads on the small plant). Most of these enquiries came from
South Africa, with a few from the Seychelles, Comoros, United States,
United Kingdom, France, Australia, Bahrein and Kenya. For example,
for one potential shipment worth Rs2000/t (f.o.b. Port Louis), the
costs of freight to Australia, duty, landing and other charges would
have added 78.7% to the price. So the price in store in Australia
2
would have been A$437/t or A$6.52/m , more expensive than Australian
2
board at A$5.77/m or board imported from South Korea at
2
A$3.23/m (6). Such high freight charges are typical for particle-
board, as it is a bulky, low value, product. In general, particle-
board is not traded over great distances, but only between neighbour¬
ing countries. In 1979,at least 80% by volume of the internationally
traded particleboard was between European countries or between the
USA and Canada(27).
Consequently, the Universal Board Co. was forced to rely on the
local market. But despite Raffray's knowledge of these marketing
problems, the Universal Board Co. did little about them. Apart from
the initial advertising mentioned before, the company employed a
salesman for four months in 1975(8), who was apparently dismissed
because the directors thought that the Universal Board Co., already
in financial difficulties from losses in previous years, could not
afford to pay a salesman for a period long enough to bring results.
As Raffray said in his PROSI Bulletin interview:(5)
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A 1'evidence, il n'etait plus possible de mettre sur pied
une organisation autonome de "marketing", car la compagnie
ne disposait pas de capitaux necessaires pour se lancer
dans une telle entreprise.*
In this rests the essential explanation of why the Universal
Board Co. did so little to improve its marketing. After some years of
low sales they had accumulated losses which made some of the direc¬
tors think more of the company as a failed investment than as a going
concern. So to these people any further investment would be a waste
of money. The directors were representatives of the major sharehold¬
ers and creditors, including the Development Bank of Mauritius,.the
wholesalers, Hare! Mai lac and St. Antoine S. E. As has been shown
previously, many of these had interests outside the company which
conflicted with those of the management of the Universal Board Co. As
the prices were fixed and the sales policy was discussed by the board
of directors(6), and any significant expenditure had to be approved
by them, this greatly limited the freedom of action of the manager to
improve the marketing.
Before leaving the subject of marketing, the possibilities of
sales to users other than small furniture producers must be con¬
sidered. One successful example of this was the sales to a large fur¬
niture factory at Pailles, "Boboulo". This factory changed from pro¬
ducing collapsible furniture from wood to producing furniture from
particleboard. They relied on the skills of an Irish manager, Mr.
Priscoll, who had had previous experience in Europe in making furni¬
ture from particleboard. They veneered the "Top Board" in their own
presses using urea-formaldehyde or epoxy glues, and assembled the
* It is clear that it was not possible to set up an independent
marketing organisation, for the company did not have the neces¬
sary capital to start such an enterprise. (Author's transla¬
tion).
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furniture using special plastic hinges or wooden dowels(14). "Top
Board" was used in 95% of their production. Furthermore, they acted
as an example to other furniture makers who visited Boboulo to learn
how to use "Top Board"(6).
One attempt to sell outside the furniture market was less suc¬
cessful. From 1973 to 1977 the Universal Board Co. made tea chests
from thin particleboard for one customer. This market increased
until the sales of tea chests reached 30% of the total sales (by
value) in 1974/75(19). However, this had to be abandoned after the
tea chests suffered from declining strength (as mentioned by Hesch,
quoted previously), and problems of water absorption in ships' holds,
which weakened the boards and occasionally led to changes in the fla¬
vour of the tea(8).
The penetration of "Top Board" into the market for building
materials was also very limited. Mauritian architects and builders
were unfamiliar with the possible applications of particleboard in
construction, with how to specify parti cl eboard for particular appli¬
cations and with the methods of construction needed to achieve these
ends. So it is not surprising that the only major contract to supply
particleboard for building was placed for government buildings
designed by British architects, notably the Registry House in Port
Louis. These architects were familiar with the uses of particle-
board, so when they heard that particleboard was produced in Mauri¬
tius they asked for test samples. On the basis of their test results
they specified the thicknesses and densities they required, including
25 mm and 49 mm board which had not previously been produced in Mau¬
ritius. This contract greatly increased the sales of the Universal
Board Co. (see figure 3.1), but did not lead Mauritian designers to
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use "Top Board"—undoubtedly the early reputation of "Top Board" as a
poor material which grew fungus still remained in their minds, which
reputation, together with a reluctance to learn new techniques,
discouraged them.
4. Financial factors
Raffray has stated that the Universal Board Co. did not have
enough capital to set up its own marketing organisation(5), and that
it was forced to take credit from the equipment suppliers for want of
local capital(6). This suggests that the company was undercapital¬
ised, or at least over-dependent on loans.
The usual equity:capital gearing of Mauritian companies is 1:2,
i.e the capital is made up of 1/3 equity and 2/3 loans(26). The
Development Bank of Mauritius lends up to 50 or 60% of the equity, so
a typical capital formation might be 100 parts equity, 50 parts DBM
loan, 75 parts commercial loans (local or foreign), and 75 parts from
local banks and creditors. By these standards the Universal Board Co.
appeared to be in a favourable position at formation, as shown in
figure 3.22, since the shares supplied 37% of the capital. Even
without taking up any of their entitlement to a bank overdraft, they
had Rs0.8 M available for use as working capital, 50% more than the
figure allowed in Ledune's costing of a suggested small-scale parti-
cleboard plant design(10). At that time, the only doubts one might
have had would have been on the cost of the loans, as the loan pro¬
vided by the German equipment manufacturers, Siempelkamp GmbH & Co.,
was in DM at the German bank rate, around 8-10%/a.
In fact, this did turn out to be an expensive loan but not
because of the interest rate. The loan was expressed in DM, which in
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1970 were worth Rsl.l5(6). During the five years before repayment
fell due, the Deutsche Mark appreciated against the Mauritian rupee,
so that when it had to be repaid the Universal Board Co. had to find
Rs2.5 M to convert to the same number of Deutsche Mark which had been
worth Rsl.6 M in 1970(5). This loan had been guaranteed by the
shareholders of the Universal Board Co., so they loaned the Universal
Board Co. money to repay the suppliers credit. These special loans
totaled more than the Rs0.9 M currency transaction loss, for the com¬
pany had not generated the profits to repay the loans:, in fact it
had made a loss each year, and the accumulated losses had to be
financed by the special loans and by an increasing bank overdraft.
These special shareholders loans are detailed in figure 3.23.
Figure 3.22 Universal Board Co. Capital formation and use in select¬
ed years.
(kRs) At start June 1976 June 1977 June 1978
Financed by:
Shares 2020 2020 2020 2020
Creditors - 415 1228 1163
Loans - DBM 1800 1675* 1388 1308
- Siempelkamp 1600 - - -
- Bank overdraft - 1428 1329 1441
- Special loans - 1431 1668 1434
Total capital 5420J 7094 7633 7366
Employed as:
Fixed assets 4501 3224 3364 2977
Stocks
) 818* 1771 2212 2463Other cur. assets 376 275 326
Formation expenses 101 101 101 101
Revenue deficit — 1556 1681 1500
* By subtraction.
T Assuming no bank overdraft at that time
Sources Raffray(7) and the accourits(19).
The effect of these changes on the gearing of the company can be
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Figure 3.23 Universal Board Co. The shareholders' special loans.
~NoT Date Repayment Interest Va 1 ue /Fs
1st 10/10/73 1983






seen in figure 3.22. By June 1976 the suppliers credit had been
repaid. The level of stocks had risen to 50% of the original fixed
capital, much higher than estimates of total working capital used in
many project proposals(10,ll). Also,a revenue deficit of the same
size had built up in five years of operation*, until, in 1977, the
total capital employed was equal to 1.7 times the fixed assets at
start-up, financed 1/4 equity : 3/4 creditors + loans. This gearing
was within the range found in Mauritius, but was not suitable for
industrial investments with a low profit margin. In particular, the
interest payments on these loans had a serious effect on the profita¬
bility of the venture, as shall shortly be shown.
The amounts of unsold stock were very much higher than had been
anticipated. This was a consequence of the marketing difficulties.
As selling particleboard in markets where the product is unknown is
inevitably difficult, it is likely that any new plant in such an area
le vels
would have to carry similar stock Aunti1 the local users have become
used to particleboard.
* The fixed costs that had to be paid,despite the low levels of












Higher gearingTof a company increases the risks of an enter¬
prise. When the enterprise is profitable, the investors receive
higher dividends, as the creditors are satisfied with the same return
on their capital. But when losses occur they have to be met from the
equity resources of the company, as loans have to be repaid and
interest paid whatever the profitability of the company. As market¬
ing problems had not been foreseen when the company was formed, not
enough equity capital was sought to protect against initial difficul¬
ties in the venture. Indeed, in 1969, the profit level in Mauritian
industry, at a time of relatively low sugar prices, was probably not
sufficient to generate the large sums for new investment which were
later available at the time of the 1974 sugar boom. So,Raffray would
have had some difficulty raising more equity capital for a particle-
board factory, whi ch would have seemed somewhat risky compared to the
sugar industry itself.
Figure 3.24 Universal Board Co. - annual financial costs.
Interest /kRs 1971/72 1976/77 1977/78
Bank overdraft 47 107 137
Siempelkamp 99 0 0
DBM loan int. 27 133 129
DBM guarantee fee 0 10 10
Special loans 0 164 156
Others* 65 3 2
Total 238 417 434
* Mainly interest to suppliers.
Sources: Raffray(7) and the accounts(19).
The consequences of this high gearing were serious, as can be
seen from figure 3.24 which shows the approximate level of the
interest payments required to service this debt. Not only did the
"f or- 12-T-
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interest burden slowly grow, but i*t was high in terms of the profit
made on the low sales, turning potential profits into losses from
1973/74 to 1977/78. The financial costs of Rs434 k in 1977/78 were
almost as much as the depreciation (Rs 448 k) in this capital inten¬
sive industry, and over 2/3 of the profits before interest payments.
To put this in perspective, the earnings and expenditure for 1976/77
and 1977/78 have been summarised in figure 3.25.
Figure 3.25 Universal Board Co. - earnings and expenditure.
(kRs) 1976/77 1977/78
Sales 1401 2851
Cost of sales 1061 2126
(Depreciation) (253) (389)
Gross profit 390 738
Admin, expenses 95 122
Selling expenses 3 1
Earnings before interest 292 615
Interest 417 434
Net profit -125 181
Sources: Raffray(7) and the accounts(19)
A less important, but none the less significant, fixed cost
which reduced the profitability of the enterprise can be seen in fig¬
ure 3.25. This was the cost of administration and selling. Jt was
not discussed earlier with the other fixed costs as it could not pos¬
sibly be described as a technical factor. So this discussion follows.
4.1. Administration and selling costs.
It is perhaps surprising?that with such difficulties in selling
"Top Board", that relatively little was spent on selling the product,**^
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apart from an initial expenditure^of Rs22 k in 1971/72,on advertis¬
ing, and Rs 17k on the salary and expenses of a salesman for four
months in 1975/76, a mere Rs5 k was spent each year (on average)
throughout the life of the company. This was a mere 0.5% of the aver¬
age cost of sales throughout the same period (Rs981 k)(19).
Figure 3.26 Universal Board Co. - admin, and general expenses
(kRs) 1971/72 1973/74 1976/77 1977/78
Rent 1 24 48 48
Sec. & acct. fees 25 25 25 25
Wages 0 4 7 7
Bad debts 0 0 0 23
Prof, fees and charges 12 11 10 11
Others 3 16 5 8
Total 41 80 95 122
Source: Annual accounts(19).
The administration and general costs were somewhat higher, and
rose as rapidly as the other expenses. An approximate summary is
given in figure 3.26 The only important costs were those for secre¬
tarial and accountancy fees, which were paid to Harel Mallac for the
services of Raffray and his secretary, and for rent, which included
both the factory and sometimes extra warehouse space in Port Louis.
Any savings made here,which could have been used to pay for salesmen
and instructional material,coul d only have benefited the company.
5. Reasons for failure, possibilities of success?
In his interview published in PROSI Bulletin(5), Raffray gave
several reasons for the setback of the venture. These were:
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i. Problemes de mise en route . . . les panneaux aux
depart resistaient mal aux conditions climatiques
locales et subissaient des attaques de moisissure,
★
• • •
ii. Concurrence soutenue des importateurs qui, de jour au
lendemain, ramenerent le prix de vente traditionnelle-
ment pratique par eux jusqu'au moment de la commerci¬
alisation du produit local.#
iii. Importation par ces memes commercants (sic) d'un pan-
neau en contre-plaque de 3 mm d'epaisseur des pays
d'Asie, jusque-la inconnu sur lem (sic) arche local.f
iv. Devaluation de la roupie par rapport au deutsche mark
allemand, . . .§
v. Augmentations spectaculaires et certainement
imprevisibles des couts de production . . .f
vi. Saint-Antoine au cout de Rs70 la tonne . . . et payer
son electricite a 70 cs de moyenne l'unite, alors qu'a
1 "etude du projet la bagasse etait gratuite et
1'electricite a 4 cs 1'unite.®
vi i. La commercialisation des produits de I'usine avait
ete, a tort ou a raison, confiee aux importateurs. La
promotion locale laissa certainement a desirer. Par
ailleurs, en raison surtout du cout eleve du fret nous
n'etions pas competitifs sur les marches exterieurs.**
viii.Une condition essentielle pour la survie de la compag-
nie . . . il fal1ait controler 1 1 importation dans une
certaine mesure, . . . afin de s'assurer que la part
de 1'usine locale ne soit pas inferieure a 1 500
tonnes.
* Start-up problems ... at first the boards did not stand up
well to the local climate and went mouldy, . . .
# Sustained competition by importers who lowered overnight the
selling price (of plywood) at which they had traditionally sold
up to the moment that the local product was commercialized.
f Imports, by these same merchants, of 3 mm Asian plywood, up to
then unknown on the local market.
§ Devaluation of the Rupee against the Deutsche Mark, . . .
| Spectacular and certainly unforeseeable production cost in¬
creases . . .
9- . • . the company had to be supplied from outside St. Antoine
at a cost of Rs70/t . . . and pay on average 70 ct/unit for its
electricity, although in the project study bagasse was free and
the electricity was costed at 4 ct/unit.
** The marketing of the factory products was, for better or
worse, entrusted to the importers (of plywood). Certainly, the
local promotion left a lot to be desired. On the other hand,
because of high freight costs we were not competitive in over¬
seas markets.
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Quatre requetes successives dans ce sens furent
adressees an ministere des Finances, au ministere du
Commerce et de 1'Industrie et au ministere du Plan et
du Developpement. . . . les ministeres concernes
faisaient la sourde oreille . . .##
Raffray did not attempt to assess the relative importance of
these problems, excepting his conclusion that: " je pense sincerement
que l'entreprise aurait survecu si, d'une part, le 'marketing' avait
ete mieux organise et si, d'autre part, un effort avait ete entrepris
par le gouvernement pour controler les importations, . . .As an
aid to assessment of the importance of the causes of failure, and
under what conditions the company might have prospered, a sensitivity
analysis has been carried out on the results for 1977/78, the
company's most profitable year (in which it was supplying a special
order of particleboard for the Registry House). This analysis is
jor ■fallal
presented in figure 3.27. The different reasons^will be considered
in turn.
i. Start-up problems, especially fungal attack.
The growth of mould was not a serious technical problem, and it
was solved by the application of an expensive fungicide. Although
Raffray(5) claimed that this left "Top Board" with a bad reputation,
this can hardly explain low sales throughout so many years, as the
fungal growth problem was solved within the first two years. If such
## An essential condition for the survival of the company . . .
it was necessary to control imports to a certain extent, . . .
in order to ensure that the local factory's part (of the mark¬
et) was not less than 1500 t. Four successive requests were
made to the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.
$ . . . I sincerely think that the enterprise would have sur¬
vived if, on the one hand, the marketing had been better organ¬
ised and if, on the other hand, the government had made an ef¬
fort to control imports,
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Figure 3.27 UBC - sensitivity analysis on 1977/78 results.
(kRs/a) A B C D E
Sales income 2864 2864 3150 2864 1312
Cost of sales 2126 1867 2126 2048 804
(Depreciation) (389) (389) (389) (311) (389)
(Fixed costs) (361) (361) (361) (361) \( dl fii
(Var. costs) (1376) (1117) (1376) (1376)
Admin, costs 132 132 132 132 80
Selling costs 1 1 1 1 1
Financial costs 424 424 424 334 424
Profit 181 440 467 349 3
F G H I J
Sales income 2864 2864 2864 5728 1432
Cost of sales 1965 2046 1883 3502 1438
(Depreciation) (389) (389) (389) (389) (389)
(Fixed costs) (200) (361) (361) (361) (361)
(Var. costs) (1376) (1296) (1133) (2752) (688)
Admin, costs 108 132 132 132 132
Selling costs 1 1 1 60 0
Financial costs 424 424 424 424 424
Profit 366 261 424 1600 -562
( ) ~ aAdedi c«cfco "fcotitl
A - Base, 1977/78.
B - Without any fungicide.
C - +10% on the selling price.
D - Without any currency transaction loss on the DM loan.
E - Unit production costs and selling prices at 1973/74 levels.
F - 1/2 x (Management fee + rent).
G - With free bagasse.
H - Electricity at 4 ct/kWh
I - Sales x 2
J - Sales x 1/2
Examples of the calculations are given in appendix 3. The base fig¬
ures are taken from the accounts(19).
a reputation did exist, it could have been countered by specific pub¬
licity to show (by demonstrations or money-back guarantees) that "Top
Board" suffered no more from fungal attack at high humidities than
ordinary grades of plywood or timber. Furthermore, such a reputation
would not affect the sales of "Top Board" to the drier parts of the
island, outside the central plateau.
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The solution to this problem did, however, increase the produc¬
tion cost, as shown in figure 3.27. If no fungicides had been used?
the profits for 1977/78 would have been Rs440 k instead of RslSl k—
but without fungicide they would have sold less, and made a loss. The
problem of fungal growth^ under conditions of high humidity, should
have been foreseen when the project proposals were made, as it is a
common problem in the humid tropics, especially for bagasse-based
board, containing residual sugars. It is, however, often ignored in
general case studies(10,ll), but should have been mentioned by Verkor
S. A., Siempelkamp GmbH, or by Dr.Hesch when Raffray was planning the
pi ant.
ii. Price competition by the plywood importers.
When "Top Board" appeared on the Mauritian market they dropped
their prices for the thinnest plywood by 20%(6). As the particle-
board project had been costed assuming that the selling prices of
plywood would remain constant, this reduced the margin between the
particleboard and plywood prices which might have encouraged users to
change to particleboard, and also prevented the "Top Board" price
being increased to fully match production cost increases. No attempt
had been made to estimate the price of plywood to the wholesalers, by
making use of the Customs and Excise import statistics and the rates
of duty payable. If particleboard cannot be produced at below the
import cost of plywood, its production is doomed, since particleboard
has to be sold at a substantial discount to compensate for the diffi¬
culties of use compared to plywood. According to Pleydell, who was
involved in setting up the UAC of Nigeria Ltd., particleboard plant
at Sapele, Nigeria, this discount usually has to be at least 30%(28).
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Til The import eT 3 unm toarci
There were some potential users of particleboard in Mauritius to
whom any discount, however small, was worth taking, as they were
trying to produce furniture as cheaply as possible with no thought to
the quality of their, pioduct, They used 4 mm plywood until
the Universal Board Co. succeeded in producing 4 mm particleboard,
whereupon they switched to 4 mm particleboard. This was achieved at
great cost to the company, as the pressing of 4 mrn board reduced the
production rate from 15 t/d to 8 t/d and the wastage rate increased,
being 25% on this type of board in 1973(6). After the Universal
Board Co. had gone to these lengths to capture this market, the ply¬
wood importers started to import 3 mm Asian plywood, which undercut
the price of the 4 mm particleboard. Despite being a poor quality
plywood, it still took away this market from particleboard. This was
only serious because the usage of boards in Mauritius was different
from that in Europe, a greater proportion being thinner board used for
furniture.
iv . Devaluation of the Mauritian Rupee against the Deutsche Mark.
This converted what would have been a cheap loan at 5.5%/a
interest, lower than the inflation rate of 9.5%/a over the same
period, to an expensive one at 14%/a internal rate of return.* This
converted a possible financial gain (if the equipment appreciated at
the general rate of inflation) into a financial loss. Nevertheless,
as can be seen from figure 3.27, this had a relatively small effect
on the profitability as compared with the sales volume, selling price
* To the lender, but calculated in Mauritian rupees, as the 1
rate required to discount the total repayments of Rs2.5 M at
the end(5) plus the annual interest payments given in the ac¬
counts^) (of Rs60 k, 99 k, 111 k, 97 k, and 69 k in succes¬
sive years), to produce a present value equal to the amount of
the loan (Rsl.6 M(5)). The Mauritian cost-of-living index rose
by 58% in the same period (1970-5)(24).
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or the accumulated revenue deficits. (Rsl.7 M in June 1977: see fig¬
ure 3.22).
v. Spectacular production cost increases.
As can be sen from column E of figure 3.27 the profit would
actually have been less if the production costs and selling prices
had remained at 1973/74 levels, undoubtedly because of the high cost
of fixed charges at the low production volumes. Some of Raffray's
quoted spectacular increases referred to items which only made up a
small proportion of the production cost, such as insurance (2.5%) or
fuel oil (8.2%).
However, these costs grew at a higher rate than the general rate
of inflation and the growth in plywood import prices (see figure
3.21). As the selling prices were limited by competition with ply¬
wood, this process was in the long term squeezing the profit margins.
But more important, in terms of the cost structure of the company,
was the increase in the fixed costs, as they greatly affected the
profitabi1ity at such low sales levels.
For this reason column F of figure 3.27 was calculated, to show
the effect of reducing two of the fixed costs, the management fee and
the rent. Again this would have resulted in a small,^ but reasonable,,
improvement in the profitabi1ity of the Universal Board Co. (but at
the expense of the St. Antoine S. E., illustrating a conflict of
interest on the part of this shareholder).
vi. The costs of bagasse and electricity.
One can only wonder at the assumptions made in the original
costings. Even baled bagasse from St. Antoine for use outside the
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crushing season has a cost, as shown by Lam(12). In any case, the
bagasse cost is only a small proportion of the total costs, and the
use of free bagasse would only have increased the profits by 3% of
turnover (See figure 3.27).
Raffray claimed, in an interview(8), that the bagasse and electri¬
city prices had been in the contract with the St. Antoine S. E. Co.,
which should have supplied the bagasse and steam for conversion to
electricity, but for reasons of force majeure the contract had to be
revoked. In the case of bagasse this was understandable, as the
bagasse surplus at St. Antoine declined, and was not enough to supply
the particleboard plant. This is not so clear in the case of elec¬
tricity, unless the agreement came up against the Mauritian law that
it is illegal for any company to sell electricity to another. Only
the Central Electricity Board is permitted to sell electricity. The
Universal Board Co. Ltd. was set up as a Development Certificate com¬
pany (for the tax advantages and access to Development Bank of Mauri¬
tius loans), separate from St. Antoine S. E. As separate companies,
St. Antoine could not sell electricity to the Universal Board Co. It
seems that when the project study was made the law had been insuffi¬
ciently studied, and it had been mistakenly assumed that the Univer¬
sal Board Co. could buy electricity from St. Antoine. The idea of
St. Antoine lending the Universal Board Co. a small turbo-alternator
and supplying live steam to power this generator was described as a
new idea,in 1976,by Raffray during an interview(6) and so it does not
seem likely that this was in the original contract.
In any case, the average electricity cost could not have been
Rs0.04/kWh, as the factory would have had to buy electricity from the
the
CEB outside the crushing season, when^St. Antoine sugar factory was
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shut down. Under these conditions the company would have to pay a
minimum demand charge whether or not it was using electricity from
the CEB. It seems also unlikely that,even if permitted by law, the
sugar factory would have sold electricity for less than it would have
received from the CEB for sales of electricity to the grid. In 1976
the sugar factories received around RsO.lO/kWh for their electricity
sales to the CEB.
In figure 3.27 has been calculated the profitability of the com¬
pany, if the factory had been able to buy all its electricity at
Rs0.04/kWh and pay no demand charge. Even in these (very unlikely)
conditions the profitability would have been raised only to
Rs424 k/a, a moderate increase.
vii. The selling of the product being given to the importers, and the
inadequate local promotion.
Marketing was indeed the key to the success or failure of the
venture, as columns I and J of figure 3.27 show. The profitability
was most sensitive to changes in the sales volume. Although Raffray
understood these marketing difficulties (as explained during inter¬
view with the author), he, perhaps, did not take them very seriously,
as there is no mention of user education in his PROSI interview(5).
Or, perhaps, the reason given in this article reflects the process by
which suggestions for improving the marketing were rejected: sugges¬
tions such as the German government offer of a carpenter to train
Mauritian carpenters how to apply particleboard(18), and the con¬
tinuation of the employment of a salesman after only four months
work. As already discussed in the section on marketing, it was not in
the interests of the wholesalers to promote "Top Board" strenuously,
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nor was it within their experience to provide any more than minimal
services to the consumer.
Raffray claims, in the PROSI article(5), that the company did not
have the capital to set up an independent marketing organisation, but,
at one point, the Universal Board Co. had to hire a warehouse to store
unsold "Top Board" as there was no more space in the factory or the
wholesalers warehouses. This money would have been better invested in
marketing the board, especially as the wholesalers made no effort to
market the product, apart from giving space in their warehouses. A
more likely explanation is that, as Harel Mallac Ltd. did not have
sufficient profits in 1969 to generate large amounts of investment
capital when expanding in shipping, aviation and the fertilizer fac¬
tory, they had little to spare for ventures such as particleboard
production. Therefore, they needed the capital from the wholesalers.
At that time,there was not the liquidity in the sugar industry which
existed after the 1974 boom in sugar prices (when they could raise
Rs20-30 M at short notice when Mauritius Commercial Fertiliser Indus¬
tries were in difficulties the end of 1975).
viii. The refusal by the government to restrict plywood imports.
Although approached in November 1973, March 1976, December 1977
and June 1978,the government did nothing until the customs duties on
imported boards were raised,in July 1979, after the directors of the
Universal Board Co. had decided on the liquidation of the company. It
is clear that guaranteed sales of 1500 t/a would have ensured the
profitability of the plant—Rsl.6 M according to figure 3.27, enough
to remove the revenue deficit in one year. This would have only res¬
tricted a part of the market, as the imports of plywood were running
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at 3000 t/a(5) or nearly 1.2x10® m^ (see figure 3.20) in 1977.
The government attitude could have been influenced by the fig¬
ures shown in figure 3.20; the sales of "Top Board" were only a tiny
part of the total market, despite an increasing demand which should
have favoured the penetration of new products. Thus, it was clear to
them that the company was not trying and,.after five years,was asking
the government to bail them out. As none of the people involved were
related to Ministers, the officials saw no reason why they should
help—after all the sugar industry^ traditional ly, looked after its
own. The increase,in the 1979/80 budget, of the customs dues on boards
can be seen as an attempt to restrict demand, and so improve the ba 1 -
fatker
ance of payments,^than as an attempt to protect the particleboard
plant. Note that the particleboard has a high import content, as the
greater part of the raw materials are imported* such as the resins
and fungicides, and many other inputs are highly import dependent,
such as electricity (see figure 3.14).Nor could the plant be justi¬
fied in terms of employment policy, as it only employed 36 work-
ers(5). The other factories which had import protection (e.g. razor
blades and dry cell production) had negotiated this protection before
starting production, not two years later.
So, at last, a more balanced assessment can be made of this
failure. The prime problem was a marketing one. The factory did not
sell enough to cover the high fixed costs in a fairly capital-
intensive industry (Rs0.2 M/employee, about US$30 k/employee). All
the other reasons must be seen as subsidiary attempts to explain why
certain marketing options were restricted. The production costs were
important,in that they prevented the company from offering a substan-
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tial discount on the plywood prices. The absence of government import
restrictions and the import of cheap plywood prevented the "Top
Board" price being raised,temporarily, to cover costs at low produc¬
tion levels. And the wholesalers' conflict of interest, between their
importing operations and their shareholding in the Universal Board
Co., restricted the possibilities of better sales promotion and user
education, as there was no strong central management to overrule them
on the Board of Directors. But,the fundamental problems were in user
education and producing the right quality of board for each use.
6. Conclusions from the "Top Board" saga.
In his interview in PROSI Bulletin, Raffray states:
je pense sincerement que l'entreprise aurait survecu si,
d'une part, le 'marketing' avait ete mieux organise et si,
d'autre part, un effort avait ete entrepris par le
gouvernement pour controler les importations, . . .
I agree. However, it is one thing to wish this and another to
achieve it. It is not our ideals which determine the success of the
introduction of a new technology but the material conditions which
determine the ways in which the technology interacts with a particu¬
lar society.
To understand^what happened neither the technologist's nor the
economist's conceptions of "technology" suffice. The technical prob¬
lems were minor and the product quality was such that, in Europe, it
would have been used for cheap furniture and other less demanding
uses. Nor does the idea of technology as a production method we can
choose to produce a certain product help - indeed we could consider
particleboard in Europe (where people know how to use it) and parti-
cleboard in Mauritius as different products, thus re-emphasising the
* Tr*/*v»Ute^ <ty^ pa<j£ 111
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role of the social interactions of this solid object.
If, at a superficial 1evel, the problem of the Universal Board Co.
was that they could not sell enough; to understand this it is neces¬
sary to understand the buyers and the sellers as humans with
interests and norms (e.g. how to make furniture), playing out their
roles in the drama of "Top Board".
In Europe particleboard is an established material, used in
fact ories where the managers and workers know how to use it, and
where particleboard, fibreboard, plywood or timber is chosen accord¬
ing to the combination of properties and price required in the fin¬
ished article. The technology of particleboard is not simply the pro¬
duction of the board but. also the knowledge of how and when to use
it in a social context of long-established relationships between
customer and producer, one-to-one (special boards to order, helping
the users change their production process when changing to your board
from some other type) or generalised through standards and trade
associations.
To introduce particleboard successfully into Mauritius^ it was
necessary to introduce not only the product but also to establish a
set of social relationships, which could carry out the functions of
such a producer-consumer network and be able to introduce the basic
technology of use.
The only close relationship between the Universal Board Co. and
one of its consumers was with the Boboulo furniture factory. As
Boboulo had a manager who knew how to make furniture from particle¬
board, this was a straightforward relationship, Priscoll's only com¬
plaint being of the uneveness of the boards, as they had been assured
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that Boboulo would not need a thicknesser, as the boards would be of
even thickness, only a sander. At one point there was even talk of
Boboulo taking over or investing in the Universal Board Co.
A similar close relationship was established between the archi¬
tects of the Registry House in Port Louis and the Universal Board Co.
In this case, not only was the technology of use supplied by the
architects, but they intervened in the production by testing the
boards and specifying according to the results of their tests,
requesting special 49 mm board which the factory had not previously
produced. The board was used for internal partitioning and cladding.
In complete contrast to this^the other Mauritian users, mainly
small furniture workshops producing cheap furniture (high quality
furniture was and continues to be made of good timber), were not part
of the culture of particleboard, did not know how to assemble furni¬
ture made with parti cl eboard, did not know how to make use of the
strength of the thicker board (cheaper than thick plywood) to reduce
nor
the amount of wood framing, how to veneer the board (not only for
A
appearance but also to reduce moisture penetration and reduce
abrasive wear).
As far as the Universal Board Co. were concerned,the role of the
users was a passive one, merely to buy the product. The "market sur¬
vey" made before start-up considered only the total demand for board
products, not the specific needs of each user. Contrast the
market survey of local bakers carried out by Yeast Producers (Mtius)
Ltd. and described in the chapter on this factory. The people who
carried out this survey visited every baker on the island and found
out how much yeast each baker used, and what they thought of the
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locally produced yeast, so that the factory could change the process
to produce yeast of the characteristics desired by the users. The
users of "Top Board" did not even take on the passive role expected
of them by the Universal Board Co. Some of them became even more pas¬
sive and became non-buyers (they did not even try the board, or tried
it once only), while another small group took an active role to find
out for themselves how to use the board (by trial and error, or by
visiting Boboulo). Some of this group went as far as veneering their
own boards(6), although some of the boards seen by the author had
only been veneered on their faces and left open, at the edges, to the
effects of moisture, which suggests a more rudimentary approach than
that of Boboulo. Some of this group bought tungsten carbide tipped
blades, for circular saws,to ease the cutting of the bagasse board(6)
together with a smaller improvement in cutting timber.
This group of users was small, probably because the price saving
on plywood was not enough to encourage less adventurous souls to try
and use "Top Board" without any guidance from the manufacturers. This
small group of users seems to have declined after 1976 to judge from
n
the sales figures (see figure 3.1).1* 1976, occurred the maximum
c.i.f. plywood price between 1970 and 1977.
In the circumstances, one might have expected the groups involved
in the Universal Board Co., to have acted in order to reach the users,
show them how to use the board, and support them with publicity cam¬
paigns extolling the virtues of the new, fungus-proof "Top Board". In
other words, to try to establish a social-technological system on the
island in which particleboard would have a place. That they did not
do this implies that either they did not analyse the lack of sales in
these terms, or that their own conflicting interests prevented them
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from taking any concrete action.
Certainly Raff ray was aware of the situation. He had been
advised by Hesch at the beginning that they would need to set up
their own school and furniture plant, as he mentioned during an
interview in 1976(6). He did not, however, mention this in his PROSI
interview(5), suggesting that he considered the users' difficulties as
one of many problems. He seems to have thought, in 1976, that the
users had come to learn how to use the particleboard in spite of the
lack of support from the factory(6).
It is difficult to know whether the other main groups involved,
St. Antoine S. E. and the wholesalers, thought there was a problem of
poor marketing rather than just one of low sales. St. Antoine S. E.
was obviously more concerned with production, as it had the manage¬
ment contract for the factory. Certainly, Lam's study did not relate
why he considered a reduced level of production of 1250 t/a, but
instead concentrated on the production costs, talking about savings
through control of resin wastage and labour costs when far greater
savings could have been made by increasing the sales and production.
St. Antoine S. E.'s concern for the interests of the Universal Board
Co. was shown by the doubling of the management contract fee between
1974/75 and 1975/76.
It seems unlikely that the wholesalers even considered how the
buyers of "Top Board might use it. This is not a problem when import¬
ing well known products, so their organisations were not adapted to
provide applications advice, apart from distributing manufacturers
leaflets when they had any. Their marketing was writing letters or
waiting for people to come to them. Rather more important to the sue-
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cess of the large importing companies was their abi1ity,through fam¬
ily and communal ties, to restrict the number of authorised importers
of any given product to a select few who then agreed to share the
market at an agreed price. For example, when "Lucozade" was imported
by a Si no-Mauritian company, Scott & Co. took over the agency and
then tried to force out this family company, claiming that competi¬
tion would lead to unstable prices. Nevertheless, this family concern
stayed in the market on a 2% margin, and provided sufficiently diffi¬
cult competition for Scott & Co. that the Scott representative
resigned from this department(26).
Even if the wholesalers had realised the social aspects of the
marketing problem, they had an obvious conflict of interest in that
they sold both "Top Board" and plywood. With an unrestricted market
and fairly close selling prices, a sale of "Top Board" represented a
lost plywood sale ("Top Board was not sufficiently cheap that it
could have opened new low price markets, nor of sufficiently high
quality to take away high price markets from timber). Consequently,
their interest in selling "Top Board" depended on the relative profit
margins on plywood and "Top Board". As it appears that they made more
profit on plywood, they left all advertising to the Universal Board
Co.
This lack of commitment to the company on the part of the St.
Antoine S. E. and the wholesalers resulted from the fact that they
got their income independently of the financial state of the Univer¬
sal Board Co. While the company was loosing Rs200 k/a, St. Antoine
was receiving about Rs 350k/a in management fees, and the wholesalers
some Rsl80 k in 1975/76 on "Top Board" (at 18.5% margin) and more on
their imports of plywood. When the Universal Board Co. went into
- 144 -
liquidation the wholesalers immediately raised their plywood
prices(8), thus increasing their profits even more.
In this light can be understood some decisions which otherwise
seem to make little sense. In 1975,a salesman was appointed for four
months at Rs2000/month. Together with travelling expenses, this cost
the company Rs4000-5000 monthly, a very small sum in comparison with
the possible gains if he could have increased the sales. After four
months he was dismissed. There had been no upward trend in sales over
this time, but this was to be expected as he had to gain the trust of
potential users over a long period of time, by showing them how they
could use "Top Board" in their products, how they could joint the
boards, how to redesign their products to make use of the advantages
and avoid the disadvantages of particleboard. This is a long term
process which would have required many repeat visits. Considering the
sales problems of the company at the time this cannot, with hind¬
sight, be said to have been a logical decision. It can only be
understood in terms of the conflicts of interests between the dif¬
ferent groups represented on the board of directors of the Universal
Board Co., and the idea that many of them were most interested in
minimising their risks. The wholesalers and sugar factory had
invested little in the company compared to the income they were
receiving from their other operations and,when the Universal Board
Co. was in difficulties, they were more concerned that they did not
throw away this money on "unnecessary extras", like salesmen, than on
the possibilities of turning round the company with extra investment.
Their vision was of what they would get upon the liquidation of the
company rather than what they might get if it were a success. This
should be contrasted with the actions of the directors of Floreal
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Knitwear when that company was in difficulties. They brought in a
marketing specialist who restored the fortunes of the company by
finding new markets(26).
In a similar light can be seen the arrangement by which the
guarantees given by the shareholders to Siempelkamp, when called in,
were considered as loans rather than an increase in the equity, so
that if the company folded they would receive preferential treatment
over the other shareholders. Thus they minimised their risks at the
expense of increasing the burden of interest payments on the Univer¬
sal Board Co.
So we see that neither the social relationships between buyer
and seller, nor those between the shareholders were appropriate to
the introduction of the complete technology of particleboard produc¬
tion and use. The actors behaved according to their Mauritian norms,
not perceiving this as an obstacle to the implantation of the tech¬
nology which had been transferred to the island out of a different
social context. The users had to be taught how to use the product,
and the shareholders how to run an industrial (rather than commer¬
cial), local (rather than export) venture, and how to market a new
product. As only the production technology was transferred to Mauri¬
tius by the Universal Board Co., the only successful applications of
the product were when the rest of the technological system was
imported by others in the shape of Mr. Priscoll, at Boboulo;or the
British architects, for the Registry House.
It was the incompatibility of the technology, as introduced, and
the Mauritian social context which led to the inevitable failure.
Only if the introduction of particleboard had been considered in
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terms of introducing a complete technological/social system might
such a venture have succeeded. Such an approach would have been very
different, involving, in Mauritius, at least some of the following:
i. A proper market survey at the start, interviewing users of
imported board to get an idea of the problems they might have
and supplying samples of imported particleboard for them to try.
This survey could also have determined what thicknesses of board
were in demand, and the environmental conditions in which the
boards were kept and the finished articles used.
ii. Contacts with an existing furniture factory that might be
interested in using particleboard so that the board producers
could supply information on methods of assembly, and the furni¬
ture factory could act as a demonstration plant for the others.
iii. Contacts with technical training institutions to see if they
could include particleboard use in their carpentry courses, and
arrange special courses in particleboard use for existing car¬
penters (funded by the particleboard factory).
iv. When preparing the feasibility study, look at the advantages of
integration of the plant with a sugar factory; not only in terms
of bagasse supply, but also as a source of electricity, and
steam and flue gases for preheating the air used in the bagasse
driers. As a low demand can be expected during the first few
years of operation,there would be no need to produce outside the
crushing season, and, hence, no need to be connected to the CEB
supply. This might require, in some places, that the particle-
board plant is run directly by the sugar factory as part of the
factory company, so the tax concessions for new industries under
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schemes such as the Mauritian Development Certificate would not
be available. On the other hand the losses of the particleboard
factory in the first few years, until a market is established^
could be set against sugar manufacturing profits to reduce the
taxation of the sugar factory (there is no point having a tax
holiday if your company is making a loss).
v. Finding a design of plant which starts very small and can be
expanded later. At present such designs of small plants to sup¬
ply small countries do not exist, as even the studies in the FAO
portfolio of small scale particleboard plants propose minimum
size plants of 3640t/a of 19 mm board(lO) or 25 m^/day of 19 mm
board(ll). These are small-scale plants for larger countries
than Mauritius.
vi. Negotiate before start-up, with the government, for import con¬
trols or duties for a defined short-term period starting from
the day the factory produces a product which meets agreed stan¬
dards. (This would be more acceptable to governments than asking
for permanent import restrictions after the factory has already
started production.)
vii. Arranging for all the publicity to have an educational content.
Not only the carpenters have to know how to use the boards.*
Finally, to return to my initial assertion, that this was an
"appropriate technology" that failed. In a technical sense particle-
* For example, architects. When the Minister of Public works in
Mozambique told a meeting of local architects that they had to
design more buildings in locally produced brick rather than ce¬
ment with a 50% import content, nothing happened—the archi¬
tects did not know how to design brick buildings.
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board production remains an appropriate technology for producing
boards in a region where there are few trees but a lot of bagasse.
Even with imported resin it saves on foreign exchange; it has possi¬
bilities of integration with existing industries (not realised in
this case); makes use of renewable resources; produces little pollu¬
tion and uses little water (unlike fibreboard production); can create
employment (depending on the design - the Verkor design needs 141
people(lO)); and reduces import dependence in the basic need of hous¬
ing materials. It could be said that the type of factory was not the
most appropriate, being mechanised, not integrated with the sugar
factory and at a capacity above the total market in 1969. Given the
lack of alternative designs at the time, and the lack of a Mauritian
capacity to design a smaller particleboard plant, the only practical
alternative would have been a small-scale fibreboard plant as pro¬
posed by the Indian Government Techno-Economic Mission to Mauri-
tius(20), similar to those in existence in India and Sri Lanka(29)
and plants in Madagascar and Kenya(30). Apart from technical prob¬
lems with bagasse fibreboard plants, in terms of the production of
weak boards, water use and pollution, the basic problem remains the
same—both boards have to be handled by special techniques, unneces¬
sary with timber or plywood.
So it is not the technical appropriateness of this transfer of
technology which can be called into question but its social appropri¬
ateness. Here the term "technology" is used to refer not just to the
production process, but also the applications of the board, methods
of use, marketing methods, training programmes, and the social rela¬
tionships between the using and producing groups—i.e. the complete
technological/social network within which particleboard can be pro-
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duced and used. This technology is not fixed in time but develops, as
people learn how to use the material, invent new applications, as the
factory responds to the needs of users by producing boards of special
quality, or thickness or treatment — a historical process of the
implantation of a technology, of the creation of institutions and
social relationships within Mauritian society which could permit the
efficient use and, therefore, production of particleboard.
Why should one wish to choose or design an appropriate technol¬
ogy? One reason is to apply it in some place where such a technology
has not been available before. When so applied, the process of imple¬
mentation is critically important, and it is in this historical pro¬
cess of technology interacting with society that we can locate the
social appropriateness of a technology, not in a list of "ideal"
characteristics.
When I claim that this transfer of particleboard production
technology to Mauritius was socially inappropriate, it is because
only a part of the technology was transferred. The production but not
the use. The product outwith its social context. It could only have
been appropriate in the context of training schools, demonstration
factories, import controls, and two way communication between the
users and the producers. Such a set of social institutions were not
introduced with the factory.
It is only by considering these interactions between a society
and the social requirements of a technology as a historical process
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that socially appropriate technologies can be identified and applied.
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The dried yeast factory - inappropriate technology in Mauritius.
Of the traditional industries based on molasses only one, cane
spirit production, had continued into modern times in Mauritius.
While Mauritian molasses might be used elsewhere for yeast produc¬
tion, no yeast was produced in the island in the early 1970s. The
many bakers on the island depended on imported yeast and re-use of
old dough.
In August 1975, a factory alongside Deep River - Beau Champ
sugar factory started producing active dried bakers' yeast for export
and local sales. This factory, Yeast Producers (Mauritius) Ltd.,
ceased production in April 1978.
This chapter is the story of the rise and fall of this high-
technology yeast factory in the third world. In it is described the
history of the plant, the production process, the problems the com¬
pany faced, and their relative contribution to the final failure. The
roles of the process of technology transfer, foreign competition,
exporting from a 'sea-locked' island and social interaction in Mauri¬
tian companies will be indicated, but full discussion will be saved
for a later chapter.
1. History
In the early 1970s the Anchor Yeast Co. of South Africa started
looking for overseas sites for expansion, as the profitabi1ity of
further plants was limited by the costs of transporting either
molasses or dried yeast over large distances from the sugar producing
areas to the cities^ where most of the yeast was consumed. As
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Mauritius exports large quantities of molasseSjand has a local market
very close to the sugar factories^they went to Mauritius in search of
a partner with whom to collaborate in the setting up of a dried yeast
pi ant.*
They had preliminary discussions with the managements of several
sugar estates and, eventually, came to an agreement with Deep River -
Beau Champ Sugar Estate to establish Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd.,
with 51% Mauritian capital (Deep River - Beau Champ S. E.) and 49%
South African (Anchor Yeast). This company would set up a 1000 t/a
(nominal) capacity dried yeast plant costing about six million
rupees. As the local market had been estimated at 80 t/a (#), this
meant that they would have to export over 90% of production. The
export marketing was left to the Mauritian company, as the South
African Company had experience only of covert sales to neighbouring
African countries.
Only one and a half million rupees of shares were taken up, the
rest of the capital was raised as medium term loans and shareholders
loans. By 31 December 1977, these loans had risen to a one million
rupee shareholders loan and Rs5.2 M of medium term loans (Anglo-
Mauritius Assurance Society Ltd. - Rs2 M, Mauritius Commercial Bank
Finance Corporation - Rsl.8 M, Deep River - Beau Champ Ltd. -
Rsl.4 M)(3). So the initial gearing was at least 4 : 1, partly as a
result of the South African company not taking up the shares to which
* All information in this chapter not otherwised referenced has
been taken from interviews of M. Serge Duverge, the former pro¬
duction manager of Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd., in August
1976, November 1976, January 1980 and July 1981.
# In fact, the yeast imports in 1976 and 1977 were 42 870 kg
and 45 424 kg respectively(l), while the sales of domestic pro¬
duction were only 18 t for the financial year 1976/77(2), mak¬
ing a total local market of only 62 t.
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it was entitled under the agreement.
This Mauritian capital was used to erect a building to house the
plant, pay for locally welded stainless steel fermentation vessels
and tanks (using plans provided by Anchor Yeast), and import process
equipment such as heat exchangers and centrifuges from South Africa
(including equipment not manufactured in South Africa). The plant
erection was supervised by three South African consultants.
Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. sent an agronomist, then working as
a sugar factory chemist at Beau Champ S.E., on a five month course in
South Africa to be trained as production manager for the new factory.
This agronomist, M. Serge Duverge, had had no previous training in
industrial microbiology, but, nevertheless, was chosen for the post
even though there were Mauritian microbiologists on the island work¬
ing in jobs unrelated to their training.
Thus the company was completely dependent on the South Africans
for their technology. They had no independent expertise on the Mauri¬
tian side, nor had Beau Champ S.E. made any substantial effort to
consult other Mauritian bodies such as the University or MS IRI.
Because of this they had to accept, at face value, the assurances of
Anchor Yeast concerning their technology - no critical evaluation was
possible. There was no way of checking Anchor Yeast's production
costing of Rs3.25/kg. Also, the managers and workers did not have
the fundamental knowledge of the process needed to adapt it when
necessary (as was made clear later when they did adapt the process,
but only under the guidance of engineers from another foreign com¬
pany). Anchor Yeast had not bothered to transfer this part of the
technology, and the Beau Champ S.E. managers had not realised that
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this was needed.
So^ on the insecure foundations of limited technical knowledge
and a 4:1 geared company, Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. set out to
conquer world markets.
They started production in a small way in August 1975, by pro¬
ducing small quantities for samples while the staff learned how to
manage the factory.In December 1975?they learned one lesson the hard
way. They had a bad wild yeast infection which reduced their produc¬
tion from fifteen tonnes to five. The source of the infection was
traced to the air filter, or rather, to the absence of one. The South
African engineers had assumed that as the factory was in the country¬
side there would be little pollution, and no filter would be needed.
In fact, the sugarcane fields provide a vast reservoir of wild yeasts
growing on the stems. So an air filter had to be installed.
Apart from this, the factory managed to produce reasonable quan¬
tities of yeast. What proved more difficult was to sell it. Figure
4.1 shows the factory's production and sales throughout its life.
From this we see that for the first year and a half Yeast Producers
(Mtius) Ltd. sold very little yeast, about 100 t out of about 350 t
produced.
The man then responsible for export sales was M. Hugnin, who was
also manager of Mauritius Breweries Ltd. ,Gaz Carbonique and the Coca
Cola factory. Thus his yeast marketing was very much a sideline
activity. Fie did not have the time to visit prospective overseas
buyers, nor did Yeast Producers (Mtius) have the cash to pay for
this, so he could only write letters. When interviewed,on 29 November
1976.he described the problems which he had had to face.
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Figure 4.1 Yeast production and sales of Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd.
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He explained how their yeast was an unknown brand in competition
with the well-known brands of a handful of yeast manufacturers who
dominate the world yeast export markets. In the importing countries
the bakers are a small group who have traditional suppliers, while
agents are few and far between, and often tied to particular export¬
ers. (For example, in Mauritius, Ireland Blyth used to import DCL
yeast and M.A. Cassim imports 1Saf levure1). Even in countries which
imported yeast through government agencies by competitive tenders,
the Mauritian yeast had difficulty in penetrating the market; in Tan¬
zania, for example, they were never invited to tender (perhaps
through not having established personal interests in the right quar¬
ter).
M. Hugnin then outlined their problems in shipping the few ord¬
ers they did manage to win. They had had difficulties with inferior
quality packaging, which suffered a lot of breakage on their second
shipment to Bombay. The shipping dates of well-known lines were
delayed, while they were often forced to use tramp steamers and
indirect routes, including a, supposedly^ di rect shipment to Sri Lanka
which was trans-shipped at Bombay, the tins left out in the sun for
some time and then taken to Sri Lanka^to arrive three months after
the shipment had left Mauritius. The freight rates themselves were
high for the distances involved, compared with the rates on routes
with more traffic, such as those used by their competitors from
Europe to the countries around the Indian Ocean.
The only large customer the company supplied was in Sri Lanka.
After these events, receiving yeast months late, and finding that in
this time the yeast had lost its activity, they ordered no more.




accounts for July to December 1977 show a debt of Rs38 075.83 owed by
the Co-operative Wholesale Establishment, Sri Lanka. This debt was to
have been written off on 30 June 1978(3).
Unsurprisingly, the company was loosing money as the unsold
stocks accumulated and much of the factory capacity remained unused.
So they started searching for a new foreign partner, as Anchor Yeast
had refused to put any more money into the company (or even the
amount to which they had initially agreed). They were interested in
finding a company that would market their yeast and put in money into
the company^ to enable them to pay off some of the ever increasing
loans.
They had talks with a Dutch company, one of whose representa¬
tives visited Mauritius, but these came to nothing. Eventually, they
came to an agreement with Lallemand Inc., a Canadian yeast company
which had supplied markets in the Far East previously, but had had to
pull out to supply an increasing home market. Lallemand agreed to
market the yeast produced by the Beau Champ factory under their name,
and sent engineers to Mauritius to change the process conditions so
that they could produce yeast which would retain its activity after
long delays in shipment. They did not agree to invest in Yeast Pro¬
ducers (Mtius) Ltd. The agreement began on the 1 March 1977, and as
shown in figure 4.1, led to greatly increased sales, which often
exceeded the production.
The large initial sales of reject yeast (as feed yeast) were
from the stocks produced earlier under Anchor Yeast technology. They
initiated extra tests for activity, and only found six tonnes which
were of a high enough standard to export as active bakers' yeast.
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This yeast lost 67% of its activity in six months(4). The production
"the
manager had been misled byAaccelerated aging test, he had learned in
South Africa, of keeping the yeast at 45 °C for 8 days, supposedly
equivalent to storage in normal conditions for one year. Under this
test the yeast lost only 40% initial activity(5). But the conditions
on ships and on docks in India are closer to the 45 oq test than the
'normal 1 conditions.
The Lallemand engineers worked with the Mauritian staff, improv¬
ing the driers and the fermentation and drying schedules, and carry¬
ing out experiments to optimize the quality of the yeast produced. In
this way the Mauritians learned from them, and later M. Duverge was
able to set up his own programme of experiments to increase produc¬
tion (6) .
Meanwhile, the Lallemand marketing staff began looking for cus¬
tomers for the yeast produced in the Mauritian plant. They found cus¬
tomers in Sri Lanka, Jordan, Indonesia, Kenya, Mogambique, Lebanon,
Hong Kong and the Seychelles. Then they, too, came up against the
problems of being 'sea-locked'. As Mr. Chagnon, who was then market¬
ing director of Lallemand Inc., explained in a letter:(7)
The first and foremost problem, and only insoluble one, was
the impossible shipping situation from Mauritius to any
market other than Mauritius itself. The port was often on
strike, ships would often cancel their scheduled stop at
Port Louis because of "congestion" and there were few if
any direct service lines to markets other than Europe,
South Africa or Singapore. This is why we had to set up an
expensive entrepot operation in Singapore to service our
customers in Lebanon, Jordan, Kenya, Mogambique, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia and yes, even the Seychelles.
When interviewed, one of the directors of Compagnie des Tran¬
sports Commerciaux in Port Louis, a firm of shipping agents who han¬
dled the yeast shipments for Lallemand Inc., confirmed the lack of
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direct shipping lines to most markets. Sometimes there would be a
Clan Line ship to Sri Lanka, otherwise they would have to export via
Bombay or Singapore. Yeast for Jordan would be put in a container,
shipped to Marseilles, then from Marseilles to Aqaba, and then over¬
land to Amman. He said it took two months from leaving Mauritius to
reach Aqaba. The whole journey to the customer took longer at times,
as Mr. Chagnon wrote of this route to Jordan, "This mean (sic) up to
a six month period of incubation for the dry yeast in a container at
temperatures up to 40 °c."
Shipping costs over such devious routes were high. To quote Mr.
Chagnon again:
Cost of shipping was also as a result prohibitive and we
determined that it was much cheaper to ship from our Mont¬
real plant to Kenya than from Mauritius.
Freight costs and commissions are given later in this chapter in
figure 4.10.
While the export sales were steadily increasing, local sales
remained sporadic, as shown by the following quotation from the first
market survey the company carried out into the local market, in
October 1977 - more than two years after starting production(2).
La vente totale a la Mauritius Cold Storage pour 1'annee
financiere 76/77 se terminant au 30 juin 1977 n'a ete que
de 18 000 kg, ce qui se comparant a un marche local estime
a 80 000 kg par an - chiffre obtenu des statistiques de la
douane - demontre un net manque d'agressivite de notre dis-
tributeur exclusif.*
* The total sales to Mauritius Cold Storage for the financial
year 76/77 ending on 30 June 1977 were only 18 000 kg, which
compared with a local market estimated at 80 000 kg per year -
figure obtained from the customs statistics - shows a clear
lack of aggression on the part of our exclusive distributer.(my
translation)
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At this late stage they started paying attention to the needs of
the local bakers, and why they continued to buy imported yeast at
higher prices than the locally produced product. The authors of this
survey proposed direct selling to the bakers? from a van based at the
factory, but this was never taken up by the directors of the company.
Indeed, by the beginning of 1978 it was becoming clear that the
losses were continuing (although not at the rate of the first two
years production), and the directors decided to close down and sell
the plant. The last production was in April 1978, the stocks of dried
yeast were sold between May and November with a large quantity going
to Lesaffre, their competitor in Indonesia. Finally^some 60% of the
equipment was bought by an Australian company for erection in Sri
Lanka.
According to M. Duverge, the final loss was of the order of five
to six million rupees, of which three million rupees were recovered
by the sale of equipment. The package boiler was to be sold locally,
and Beau Champ were to find another use for the building, perhaps
recovering another million rupees. When I visited him in January
1979 they were packing away the last of the equipment which had been
sold, the building was being used as a storeroom, and M. Duverge was
working as a planters' advisor from his office there.
This case raises several important questions concerning; the
process of technology transfer (and the differences between the two
occasions on which this occurred); decision making in Mauritian
industry (and the effects upon it of the lack of information exchange
between different elite social groups); the nature of the interna-
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tional yeast market; the effects of exporting from a sea-locked econ¬
omy; and whether dried yeast production could be a technology
appropriate to a small island at all.
The rest of this chapter is devoted to analysing this case, with
a view to finding answers to these questions. A description of the
production process is followed by an analysis of the financial
results of the operation to determine what changes were brought about
by the intervention of Lallemand Inc., and which factors most
affected the profitability of Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. Finally,
the more important factors,and how they bear upon the above-mentioned
questions?are discussed in greater detail.
2. The Production Process
This can be considered as the sum of three sets of processes and
operations, the preparation of the growth medium (wort), the multi¬
plication of the yeast by batch aerobic fermentations, and the
separation and drying of the yeast produced.
The wort was prepared by continuously sterilising a mixture of
molasses at 83 °Brix and filtered chlorinated water as shown in fig¬
ure 4.2. This mixture is heated to 100 °C by a heat exchanger, and
then raised to 120 °C by injecting live steam. The mixture was held
at this temperature for three minutes, which should be enough to kill
most microorganisms which might infect the yeast culture.* During the
sterilisation colloids coagulate and on cooling to 95 °C these are
precipitated, and removed in a clarifying centrifuge. This centrifuge
is shown in figure 4.3, alongside the plate heat exchanger used to
*In the UK, for example, DCL at Menstrie sterilise at 130 °C
for half a minute only.
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save energy in the sterilisation process.












Such continuous sterilisations not only save the time otherwise
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needed to sterilise the wort in the wort or fermentation tanks (fif¬
teen minutes to several hours depending on the organisms one wishes
to destroy plus a long heating and cooling time(8)), but also reduce
the destruction of nutrients in the molasses(9).
In contrast to the continuous wort sterilisation, the fermenta¬
tion itself was a batch process. The yeast was propagated from an
agar slant, on which was a pure culture of a strain of Saccharomyces
cerevisiae selected for use as a dried bakers' yeast, to 15 ml glass
flasks in the laboratory, grown on McCartney medium for one day until
there was enough yeast to inoculate a one litre flask containing
sterile molasses medium. The yeast was then grown, on an ever
increasing scale, on sterile wort,in stainless steel welded tanks, in
the factory, as shown in figure 4.4.






Extensive precautions were taken against the risk of infection.
Before every fermentation, except the final sales fermentations, the
tanks were washed with detergent and then sterilised with steam for
eight to ten hours. To ensure that no infections entered with the
wort or added chemicals, in the 10 1 and 700 1 (Dl*) stages, all the
wort and chemicals were placed in the vessel and sterilised, in situ,
by passing steam through the mixture before the yeast was added. From
the D2/3 stage onwards chemicals and wort from the continuous
steriliser were added, from time to time, during the fermentation to
replace exhausted nutrients, and sulphuric acid was introduced as
necessary to maintain a pH sufficiently acid to inhibit bacterial
growth. Yet, despite these precautions infections did occur during
the first months of operation. As mentioned earlier, these infections
were traced to the air which was blown vigorously through the medium
to provide oxygen for respiration of the yeast cells (without air
yeast produces ethanol rather than more yeast). As the aeration
3
requires between 20 and 30 m air/kg yeast produced(10), this
afforded ample opportunity for wild yeasts to infect the medium until
an air filter was installed. An idea of the scale of the aeration
can be obtained from figures 4.5 and 4.6 which show an aerator in
detail, with its large tubular air outlets, and the inside of a fer-
menter looking down from the top past the stainless steel cooling
water coils to the aerator at the bottom.
As can be seen from figure 4.6, the fermentation tanks are lined
with cooling tubes. These are needed to maintain the temperature at
30 °C, as higher temperatures result in lower yields of yeast, poorer
* Dl etc. are standard terms used in the yeast industry to













quality yeast, and an increased risk of infection from thermophilic
bacteria which are the most likely to survive the sterilisation. Only
in the final sales fermentations was the temperature allowed to rise
to 35 °C at the end of the fermentation, causing the dry matter con¬
tent of the yeast to increase.
These temperatures reflect the standard practice of the yeast
industry, but are more often hoped for than achieved in tropical
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countries. This factory was fortunate to be sited close to the Grande
Riviere Sud Est, one of the largest rivers on the island, from which
it could draw as much cooling water as it required.*
In each series of fermentations, after the first fermentation in
the main fermenter (D4), the seed yeast produced was separated,in a
centrifuge, from the wort as a 22% solids cream. After being washed,
this seed yeast wascstored in a tank at 4 °C. At this temperature the
yeast's metabolism is very slow, so it can be kept for some time
without adding extra nutrients. About one quarter of this yeast was
then used to seed a sales^fermentation in the main fermenter. This
fermentation differed from the others by reduced attention to steril¬
ity and by starting with a more dilute initial mixture, to which
additional strong wort was added throughout the fermentation.
The yeast produced was then separated in a centrifuge, again in
the form of a 22% dry matter cream. Salt was added to the cream to
remove water from the cells by osmosis and the cream was then fil¬
tered, through a starch layer on a filter cloth on a rotary vacuum
filter (see figure 4.7), to produce a 30% solids paste. This paste was
fed into the top of the drier.
This drier had been described to M. Duverge by the Anchor Yeast
engineers as a 'fluidised bed drier1. In fact, it was a tower drier,
which could be described as a spouting bed drier - hence its tall,
narrow shape. When the Lallemand engineers, together with the factory
manager, studied the operation of this drier they found that the yeast
fell onto the bottom plate where it stayed until it was nearly dry,
* This was possibly one of the reasons why the yeast factory
came to Beau Champ rather than some other sugar factories.










producing local overheating as shown by the proportion of oversized
pellets produced. These pellets had to be ground up and sold at a
discount on the local market.
The yeast was dried for six hours at 50 °C followed by six hours
at 70 °C, producing 450 kg of dry yeast (92% dry matter)(11). The
output was then packed into 1 kg tins or 25 kg polythene bags (for
export), or 1 kg or 5 kg plastic bags (for local sales). Yeast with
no immediate prospects for sale was bagged in 25 kg or 40 kg plastic
bags and put into their cold store.
All stages of the process were monitored by a series of quality
control tests, of the chemical and microbiological quality of the
yeast, and of the presence or absence of contaminating microorgan¬
isms. Some 50 to 60 microbiological and chemical analyses were made
per week under South African practice, which number increased to 300
per week under Lallemand. (This required the services of a labora¬
tory technician for 34 hours/week). The tests introduced by the Lal¬
lemand engineers were also more rigorous, as shown by the reclassifi-
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cation of the yeast produced before February 1977 - only six tonnes
were of export quality as against 238 tonnes of feed quality under
the new classification(12). An acceptable result of 120mm Hg ini¬
tial baking activity (measured as the pressure of CO^ produced in a
standard test) and 70 mm Hg after being kept at 45 °C for eight
days(5), became an unacceptable 33% loss in activity over six months
under the Lallemand tests(4).
3. An economic analysis of the venture
According to M. Duverge, the original feasibility study
presented by Anchor Yeast was very brief and simple. It assumed that
the factory would produce 800 t/a and that they would be able to sell
ttet
all of this. They assumed^the company would need little working capi-
tal to finance unsold stocks of yeast, and that raw material costs
would remain constant. Such simplistic assumptions are typical of
certain types of bad feasibility studies.
To counter such an idealist approach, the present analysis of
what actually happened in the case of Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd.,
shows not only the pitfalls of simplistic project appraisal, but also attempts
to determine the key factors which affected the results of this com¬
pany through a sensitivity analysis of how they affected the losses.
Through studying the reactions of the participants, in this
enterpri se, to the problems encountered it should also be possible to
see if the mechanisms described by Hirschman came into play here -
the feasibility study serving the promotional function of persuading
cautious investors to invest in a new enterprise, which they might not
have considered if they had known all the problematic factors
involved; then, having invested in the project, they are forced to
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overcome these problems as and when they occur; in overcoming the
problems they gain experience from this creative activity. In this
way they acquire the knowledge and confidence which they can apply to
their next venture(13).
Turning to the analysis of the economics of this yeast factory,
it is necessary first to consider the production and sales figures,
already given in figure 4.1. There is an obvious difference between
the periods before and after 1 March 1977. The sales lag far behind
production up to February 1977 (121 t active yeast sold out of 363 t
produced), whereas after March 1977 both increased to appreciable
levels (about 45 t produced and 30 t sold per month). This change
corresponds to the beginning of the agreement for Lallemand Inc. to
market the yeast produced by Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd.. The data
falls naturally into two periods, an initial period using the tech¬
nology supplied by Anchor Yeast and Mauritian marketing, and the
period after 1 March 1977 when the factory depended on Lallemand for
marketing and technology.
On considering the sales of reject yeast (sold as animal feed
yeast both to Singapore and in Mauritius), large quantities were sold
in May, July and October 1977. Most of this yeast was produced before
March 1977, using Anchor Yeast technology, and sold later as feed
yeast when it was found that the yeast was not active enough to serve
for baking. The stock figures for the end of February 1977 give only
6 t of yeast for export, but include 238 t of feed quality yeast(4).
Taking this into account, it is possible to calculate the fate of
the yeast produced before and after 1 March 1977. This is shown in
figure 4.8 together with the breakdown of active yeast sales into
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local and export sales.
Figure 4.8 Destination of production
Prodn. under technology of:
Anchor Yeast La 11emand Total
/t %P /t %P /t
Production (P) 363 100 644 100 1007
Active yeast sales :
1 ocal 14 4 52 8 66
export 112 29 546 85 653
total 121 33 598 93 719
Rejects: unsold 23# 8 0 0 29
sold for feed 214 59 46 7 260
# Made up of twenty tonnes written off after being stored without re¬
frigeration in plastic sacks at Ferney sugar estate until no longer
active. These were lodged there out of sight so as to prevent a visi¬
tor from a Dutch yeast company seeing the vast stocks of unsold
yeast. Other yeast was lost during transport to and from such lodging
places when bags split open, and two tonnes were stolen from the fac-
tory(12).
From this can be seen that an important achievement of the La 1 -
lemand engineers, and their Mauritian colleagues, was the reduction of
the proportion of yeast which had to be rejected from 66% to only 1%.
As the yeast cost over Rs5/kg to produce, and the factory received
only Rs0.50/kg for sales of feed yeast, this reduction in rejection
rates had an important influence on the losses.
To quantify these losses it is necessary to calculate the pro¬
duction costs and the receipts from sales. Starting with the latter,
the July to Dec. 1977 accounts give the freight costs and commis¬
sions for some of the export shipments made in this period and
before(3). These are summarised by destination in figure 4.9
This shows clearly the effect of the high freight rates from
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Figure 4.9 Freight costs and commissions for exports in 1977, by des-
tination
Destination Quantity Received Commissions Forwarding + Total
(Net) Importer Lallemand Dock Dues Val ue
t Rs/kg Rs/kg Rs/kg Rs/kg Rs/kg
Jordan 90 4.30 0.35 0.27 2.00 6.92
Sri Lanka 90 7.43 0.47 0.47 1.03 9.40
Singapore 31.8 6.05 0.08 0.36 0.72 7.21
France 18 4.96 0 0.32 1.16 6.44
Hong Kong 8.5 5.90 0.35 0.38 0.33 6.95
Mozambique 2.5 4.06 0 0.28 0.17 4.51
Kenya 1 3.04 0 0.19 1.19 4.42
Seychel1es 0.75 5.61 0 0.37 5.86 11.85
Madagascar 6 6.40 ? ? ? ?
Australia 2 4.68 ? ? ? ?
Neth.(1976) 16.56 5.90 ? ? ? ?
Kenya(1976) 1.92 7.03 ? ? ? ?
Feed yeast
to Sing. 81.4 ? ? ? ? 1.49
Mauritius, especially for indirect shipments such as those to Jordan
(via Marseilles) and the Seychelles (via Singapore). Other examples
of freight rates are RsO.82/k g for a shipment of two tonnes to Mom-
bassa in February 1978(14), and the following rates quoted by M. Hug-
nin in 1976: Reunion - Rs0.26/kg; Tamatave - Rs0.33/kg; Seychelles -
Rs0.62/kg; Sri Lanka - Rs0.75/kg; Mombassa - Rs0.90/kg; Rotterdam -
Rs0.90/kg; and Baghdad - Rs2.50/kg. All of these rates do not
include dock charges, and so did not differ greatly from the 1977
fi gures.
The net receipts at Port Louis were often not very favourable,
especially as these prices include the packaging. Theywere also high,
as shown in figure 4.10, in which is summarised the different cost¬
ings of packing and transport made at different times for Yeast Pro¬
ducers (Mauritius) Ltd. Such high costs are to be expected on 'sea-
locked' islands, as the plastic and steel needed to produce the con-
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tainers is all imported, at similarly high import transportation
costs.
Figure 4.10 Costs of packing and transport to Port Louis(15,16,17,2)
Source: Costs in Rs/kg:
Packed in Labour Materials Transport Total
Feb. 1977 costing:
1 kg tupperware 0. 05 2. 30 0. 04 2. 38
25 kg polythene bags
-in carton 0. 05 0. 44 0. 04 0. 52
-in twi11 bag
-in container 0. 05 0. 16 0. 04 0. 25
-on pallet 0. 05 0. 30 0. 04 0. 39
18x1 kg plastic bags 0. 05 0. 75 0. 04 0. 83
4x5 kg plastic bags 0. 05 0. 38 0. 04 0. 46
Dec. 1977 costing:
1 kg tins 0. 05 1. 00 0. 05 1. 10
Local sales report:
20x1 kg plastic bags 0. 05 0. 71 0. 05 0. 81
4x5 kg plastic bags 0. 05 0. 36 0. 05 0. 46
1978 costing:
2.5 kg tins 0. 05 1. 30 0. 08 1. 43
The shipments to Jordan and France were in 25 kg
polythene bags inside twill bags packed in 18 t containers, many of
the shipments to Singapore were in polythene bags on pallets, the
early Australian shipment was in 25 kg polythene bags each in a card¬
board box, the local sales were in boxes of 20x1 kg and 4x5 kg plas¬
tic bags, and that those to Mombassa and the early sales to Sri Lanka
were in 1 kg tins(18,14). Making reasonable assumptions for the
other shipments, it is possible to estimate the receipts at the fac¬
tory for each kilogram of yeast produced. This has been done and is
shown in figure 4.11. These are prices in the cold store, or at the
drier outlet, as they also are net of packing labour (up to ten men
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at a time, hired when there was packing to be done).
Figure 4.11 Calculation of factory price
Prices (Rs/kg):
Destination
Factory Packing & Net
(in store) Transport Received
Jordan 4.04 0.26 4.30
Sri Lanka 6.33 1.10 7.43
Singapore 5.65 0.40 6.05
France 4.70 0.26 4.96
Hong Kong 4.80 1.10 5.90
Mogambique 2.96 1.10 4.06
Kenya 1.94 1.10 3.04
Kenya(1976) 5.03 2.00 7.03
Seychel1es 4.51 1.10 5.61
Madagascar 4.02 2.38 6.40
Australia 4.16 0.52 4.68
Netherlands(1976) 3.90 2.00 5.90
Local sales:
-20x1 kg bags 6.94 0.81 7.75
-4x5 kg bags 7.29 0.46 7.75
We see that the most profitable sales were to the local market,
as no freight had to be paid on these. Indeed, some imported yeast
sold in Mauritius at Rsl2.00/kg (to the baker)(2). Some of the other
prices are very low, even Rs2/kg. Such prices represent attempts to
enter new markets by selling at a loss, or when forced to sell at low
prices by competition from established suppliers. In Indonesia, a
French company sold its yeast at half price for six months until
Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. were forced to withdraw from the market
after loosing one million rupees(4).
There have been several production costings made during the
lifetime of the plant. The variable costs have been summarised in
figure 4.12. The steam usage has been divided between sugar factory
steam and steam produced in an oil-fired package boiler, according to
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the time Beau Champ sugar factory was in operation during the times
yeast was being produced. The electricity cost does not include the
fixed maximum demand charge, paid whether any is consumed or not,
which is better considered as a fixed cost.
Figure 4.12 Variable production costs under Anchor Yeast and La 1 -
lemand operation(15,16,19,10).
Item Usage/t ADY under technology of: Unit costs/Rs Total costs
Paturau Anchor Yeast Lai 1e- Anchor Lai 1. Rs/t ADY
Initial 2/177 mand 2/ 177 12/'77 Anchor Lai 1.
Molasses/t 3.4-4.3 5 5.05 5.09* 180 200 909 1018
Chemicals/kg:
Urea 0 150 132 120 2.50 1.90 330 228
Di-Amm.phosphate 0 35 37.4 40 3.90 4.45 146 178
Superphosphate 120 0 0 0 ? ? 0 0
Ammon.sulphate 53 3.0 4.2 0 1.00 ? 4 0
Mg sulphate 0 3 3.8 0.8* 2.72 3.00 10 2
Sulphuric acid 50 3.5 4.8 4.2* 3.50 4.00 17 17
Starch ? 100 100 97* 3.30 2.75 330 267
NaCl ? 125 151 212* 0.45 0. 55 68 117
Defoamer ? ) 27.4 25 4.30 4.60 118 115
Gly.monostearate ? ) 6.3 6 7.00 7.00 44 42
Detergents ? )20 7.3 3 2.85 4.00 21 12
Ca hypochlorite ? ) 8.4 3 2.30 13.00 19 39
Total for raw materials 2016 2035
Steam/t-factory )5.8 10.3 11.5 6.3 4.02 4.02 46 25
-package boiler ) 4.7 5.3 9.7 33.28 50.00 175 483
Electricity/MWh 1.4 1.5 2.39 2.47* 260# 350# 621 865
Water/m 150 87.5 103* 0.10 0.10 9 10
Total for services 852 1384
Total variable costs 2868 3418
* Average consumption over July 1977 to April 1978.
# From CEB annual reports.
Of the modifications to the process introduced by Lallemand, the
only ones which significantly affected the raw materials and services
costs were the increased usage of salt and electricity (to improve
drying and aeration), and an increase of production outside the cane
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crushing season (as they were selling more). The plant does, however,
use substantially more molasses, steam and electricity than the plant
designs quoted by Paturau(lO), this suggests it was not designed with
energy economy in mind, and that the yield on Mauritian cane molasses
was lower than on the cane and beet molasses mixtures used in other
pi ants.
Note that the total variable costs of Rs2.87/kg and Rs3.42/kg
were higher than the sales income at the factory, for some of the
sales, thus establishing a loss on these sales even before considera¬
tion of the fixed costs. These fixed costs are presented in figure
4.13. This is based on the pro-forma accounts for July-December
1977(3), and the costing, prepared in February 1977, based on 1976
operating costs(15).
The accounts were for six months, so the estimated annual
equivalents were obtained by doubling these figures with two excep¬
tions: the maintenance costs were taken from the production costing
made at the same time(20) as the maintenance and repairs may not have
been distributed evenly throughout the year; and the electricity
demand charge was separated from the electricity costs in the vari¬
able costs and placed here.
As the February 1977 costing was produced in the factory, it
does not include costs for the Port Louis administration. These have
been estimated from the July-December accounts, further taking into
account salary increases, a probable increase in licence payments (to
Lallemand as well as Anchor Yeast), and charges for travel abroad in
connection with the Lallemand marketing (M. Hugnin did not travel
abroad to sell yeast). Where actual figures were given for January to
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Figure 4.13 Annual fixed costs (kRs)
Item Accounts 1 1—» no —1 Costing 2/177
As Estim. As PI us
gi ven annual gi ven est.
equiv. items
Management & labour 340.404 481 42/ 42/
Pension contrib. 30 30
Medical expenses 10 10
Factory expenses 20.188 40
Maintenance 70.904 88 85 85
Elec. demand charge 180 119 119
Rent of cold room 33.320 67 63 63
Insurance 18.778 38 36 36
Port Louis admin. :
Salaries 138.169 277 245
Professional fees 11.200 22 22
Licences 12.440 25 12
Office 19.972 40 40
Travel abroad 15.468 31 0
Tot. before dep. 1288 1089
Uepreciation 220.566 441 434 434
Tot. before int. 1729 1523
Interest paid 358.916 718 450 450
lotal fixed costs 244/ 1973
September 1976 consumption, in the body of this costing, they have
been used for the calculation of the items in the table rather than
have M. Duverge's assumptions.
Notable amongst these figures are interest charges, administra¬
tive salaries, electricity demand charge and rent of a cold room in
Port Louis. This last was necessary because the cold room at the fac¬
tory was full of unsold yeast. The electricity demand charge is a
remarkably high proportion of fixed costs, over 10% of the total
before financial charges. The competitors of Yeast Producers (Mtius)
Ltd. and Lallemand, in Montreal, paid far less for electricity. The
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administration salaries were more than half the salaries of the 28
workers in the factory and the production manager and his assistant.
Even if the salary of an accountant at Rs80 000 per month were
included in the administration salaries, they would still seem exces¬
sive for the work of correspondence with Lallemand and the local
agents, and preparing the accounts. All the other work was done at
the factory.
The crippling level of interest payments was a consequence of
the high gearing of the company, and the need to pay interest on
loans raised to cover the accumulated losses. By 31 December 1977 the
revenue deficit had reached Rs5 241 617(3).
The estimates of variable costs, fixed costs, and factory reve¬
nue given in figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.11, have been used to calculate
the total annual costs and revenues and hence the annual losses dur¬
ing the two phases of operation (under Anchor Yeast technology, and
under Lallemand technology). To simplify this and subsequent calcula¬
tions the sales of yeast produced under a particular technology have
been attributed to the period of production. (In this way the finan¬
cial consequences of having to sell yeast produced before March 1977
as feed yeast are clearly shown in the figures for the Anchor Yeast
period). The results are given in figure 4.14.
ft
Figure 4.14 Annual production costs, factory revenue and losses be¬
fore and after 1 March 1977
(MRs/a) Production costs Factory Losses
Vari abl e Fi xed Total Revenue
(V) (F) (T) (R) (L)
Anchor yeast 0.7 2.0 2.6 0.5 2.1
Lai 1emand 1.9 2.4 4.3 2.8 1.6
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The table shows the five-fold increase in revenue, after 1 March
1977?as the sales of good yeast increased under Lallemand marketing
and production technology. The increase in production led to a
reduction of the proportion of fixed costs, in the total costs, from
three-quarters to a half of the total production cost.
As a check on these calculations, the losses for the periods 1
July - 31 December 1977 and from the start of production to 30 June
1977 were calculated and compared with the revenue deficits for the
same times given in the accounts for July - December 1977(3). This
was not easily done, as the accounts contained internal inconsisten¬
cies. The total sales listed in Schedule 8 were 324 442 kg whereas
the total given in the pro forma cost of sales table was 399 591 kg.
Also, the total payments made for forwarding and docks dues and for
commissions listed in Schedule 8 were more than the entries for the
same in the pro forma profit and loss account. The difference of 75 t
appears to correspond to the 75 000 kg stocks of yeast in Singapore,
mentioned in Schedule 2, and to shipments of 75 t to Sri Lanka in the
factory records(21) not included in the list of sales in the
accounts. So these 75 t of yeast were probably in Singapore awaiting
sale and shipment to Sri Lanka. Another 48 t of local sales of
rejects as feed yeast in October 1977, recorded in the factory records,
were ignored in the accounts (even M. Duverge did not remember this
sale until he checked his notes in July 1981).
The total sales revenue to the factory during these six months
was then calculated,by multiplying the quantities sold to each desti¬
nation (from Schedule 8) by the factory price (from figure 4.11) and
subtracting an estimate of the packing cost of the 75 t in stock in
Singapore (at Rsl.lO/kg), assuming that the freight costs on this
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would not have been paid until the yeast was sold, that is after
December 1977. The variable costs were taken from figure 4.12, assum¬
ing the feed yeast was produced before 1 March 1977, and the fixed
costs from figure 4.13.
On this basis, the loss between 1 July and 31 December 1977 was
calculated as Rsl.01 M which compares with Rsl.07 M (before extraor¬
dinary items, and corrected for the slight errors in commissions and
freight charges) in the accounts.
Applying the same calculation to the operation up to 30 June
1977, the losses were calculated as Rs3.8 M whereas the total revenue
deficit at 30 June 1977, as recorded in the pro-forma balance sheet
for 31 December 1977, was Rs4.2 M. This difference reflects the accu¬
racy to be expected from these calculations. As the costings for the
operation under Lallemand technology and marketing were derived from
these accounts, it is not surprising that the calculated losses for
July to December 1977 agree so closely with those in the accounts.
To check on assumptions made in the preparation of the costings
and sales revenue estimates, a sensitivity analysis was carried out
on the effects of changing these assumptions. The results of this
analysis are shown in figure 4.15.
The first check is on the simplifying assumption of attributing
all sales of yeast produced before 1 March 1977 to that period. The
alternative used here is to attribute the income from these sales to
the period when sold. As can be seen in figure 4.15, this makes very
little difference.* Similarly, changing the assumptions for repairs
* Note that the costs and losses have been calculated for the
whole operating periods under Anchor Yeast technology and Lal¬
lemand technology, then reduced to an annual basis for com-
Figure 4.15 Sensitivity analysis - check on assumptions made.
(MRs/a) Anchor Lai 1emand
V F T R L V F T R L
Basic assumptions 0.7 2.0 2.6 0.5 2.1 1. 9 2.4 4.3 2.8 1.6
Attr. sales to when sold 0.7 2.0 2.6 0.5 2.1 1. 9 2.4 4.3 2.9 1.5
Maintenance cost 0.7 1.9 2.6 0.5 2.1 1.9 2. 5 4.4 2.8 1.6
P.Louis admin. - free 0.7 1.7 2.3 0.5 1.8
- same as Lallemand 0.7 2.0 2.7 0.5 2.2
Interest payments - Rs 550 k/a 0.7 2.1 2.7 0.5 2.2 1. 9 2.3 4.2 2.8 1.4
- Rs 800 k/a 1.9 2.5 4.4 2.8 1.6
Packing - cheapest 0.7 2.0 2.6 0.6 2.0 1.9 2.4 4.3 2.9 1.4
- most expensive 0.7 2.0 2.6 0.5 2.1 1.9 2.4 4.3 2.5 1.8
# Anchor=:>Rs 50 k/a, Lallemand= =Rs 142 k/a
and maintenance cost to Rs50 000/a for the Anchor Yeast period (the
estimate used in the summary of the February 1977 costing), and to
Rsl41 808/a for the Lallemand period (twice the cost for the second
half of 1977), makes no difference to the calculated losses.
Certain errors could have been introduced by the assumptions
made concerning the Port Louis administration costs, before 1 March
1977, as the production costings produced at the factory did not
include administration costs. As we see from figure 4.15, this can
make a difference of around Rs0.2 M/a. Errors of the same size could
have been introduced by the assumptions on the interest payments, as
the Rs450 000, in the February 1977 costing, may have been based on
1976 figures, and the interest rates in Mauritius rose throughout the
parisons. This is consistent with the objective to analyse what
actually happened. As a result, the Lallemand period is not
analysed as a going concern, since some of the sales were made
when the factory had shut down. While the factory was operating
the average monthly sales were lower, and, hence, the monthly
losses were greater. But to project this on an annual basis
would imply ever-increasing stocks of unsold yeast, an even
more arbitrary assumption than that of 800 t/a production and
sales.
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lifetime of the plant from 8.5% to 11.5% per annum for medium-term
commercial bank loans between December 1976 and March 1978(22).
To summarise, it can be said that the figures based on these
assumptions are accurate to no more than _+10%. Nevertheless, they
will serve for an analysis of which changes introduced by Lallemand
had the greatest effect, and which factors most influenced the final
outcome of the project.
Lallemand intervened in several ways. As a result of better
marketing they sold more yeast, of both bakers' yeast and feed yeast
quality. By modifying the production process their engineers and Mau¬
ritian colleagues improved the activity of the yeast produced, and
reduced the proportion of rejects. With these changes in process came
an increase in the production costs, both variable and fixed. In
addition Lallemand took a commission of about 5% on export sales. In
figure 4.16 is considered the effect of each modification on its own,
e.g. the consequences of selling 551 t/a of yeast under otherwise
Anchor Yeast conditions (with a high rejected proportion) and selling
229 t/a under Lallemand conditions. In each line of figure 4.16 the
values for the given variable are interchanged.
Figure 4.16 Sensitivity analysis - Lallemand introduced changes.
(MRs/a) Anchor Lai 1emand
V F T R L V F T R L
All Changes 0.7 2.0 2.6 0.5 2.1 1.9 2.4 4.3 2.8 1.6
Sales level 1.6 2.0 3.6 1.0 2.6 0.8 2.4 3.2 1.6 1.7
% rejects 0.7 2.0 2.6 1.5 1.1 1.9 2.4 4.3 1.1 3.2
Var. cost 0.8 2.0 2.8 0.5 2.2 1.6 2.4 4.0 2.8 1.3
Fixed cost 0.7 2.4 3.1 0.5 2.6 1.9 2.0 3.9 2.8 1.1
Commission - - - - - 1.9 2.4 4.3 2.9 1.4
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This table shows the great effect of improving the yeast so that
it was of sufficient quality to ship over long distances and sell as
active bakers' yeast. If the factory had just sold more without
improving the quality, the losses would actually have risen. On the
other hand, if under Lallemand yeast technology the factory had only
sold the same amount of yeast as before, the losses would have been
only slightly higher than they were.
The cost increases (variable, fixed and commission) had less
effect, although^
C'♦the factory would have lost half-a-mi11 ion rupees a year less if it
had kept its costs down. It must be remembered that these cost
increases were only partly due to changes in operating procedures.
There were substantial increases in labour and electricity costs at
the same time.
The final part of this sensitivity analysis enables considera¬
tion to be given as to how the operation could have been made more
profitable than it was,after the changes introduced by Lallemand had
taken effect. This is given in figure 4.17.
From figure 4.17, the importance of the difference factors
affecting the costs and revenues of the company can be evaluated.
These are listed below in decreasing order of importance:
i. Export price - if Yeast Producers (Mauritius) Ltd. had managed
to sell all yeast produced at the best price received (from Sri
Lanka), the losses would have been only a third of what they
were.
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Figure 4.17 Sensitivity analysis of Lallemand conditions to further
changes
(MRs/a) V F T R L
Lai lemand conditions 1.9 2.4 4.3 2.8 1.6
Sales level - 800 t/a 2.7 2.4 5.2 4.0 1.2
- 900 t/a 3.1 2.4 5.5 4.5 1.0
Local market capture (62 t/a) 1.9 2.4 4.4 2.9 1.5
Export price - all at Rs 3.04/kg 1.9 2.4 4.3 1.8 2.6
-all at Rs 7.43/kg 1.9 2.4 4.3 3.8 0.5
Molasses price - Rs 100/t 1.6 2.4 4.0 2.8 1.3
- Rs 600/t 3.0 2.4 5.5 2.8 2.7
Steam price - all at Rs 4.02/t 1.6 2.4 4.1 2.8 1.3
-all at Rs 50/t 2.0 2.4 4.5 2.8 1.7
Elec. from sugar factory in
season at Rs 0.10/kWh 1.8 2.4 4.2 2.8 1.4
Molasses use - 3.4t/t ADY* 1.7 2.4 4.1 2.8 1.4
Elec. use - 1.4 MWh/t ADY 1.7 2.4 4.1 2.8 1.4
Steam use - 5.8t/t ADY 1.7 2.4 4.2 2.8 1.4
Interest payments - Rs 0/a 1.9 1.7 3.6 2.8 0.8
Admin, cost - halved 1.9 2.2 4.1 2.8 1.4
ADY = air dry yeast.
ii. Sales level - if there had been the markets to sell all the
yeast the factory could produce, the sales income would have
risen by half without any increase in fixed costs.
iii. Interest payments - a great burden on the finances was the
interest payments on the loans taken to cover the accumulated
losses and the initial over-gearing of the company. If more
share capital had been available in the early stages the company
might have stood a chance of becoming profitable.
iv. Molasses prices - the production cost is very sensitive to the
molasses price. In mid-1981 the price of molasses in Mauritius
reached Rs600/t. Under these conditions the factory could not
have been profitable.
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v. Steam, electricity and molasses usage, steam and electricity
prices - with the plant producing at about 65% of full capacity,
these were relatively unimportant. Although the electricity cost
was high, only small reductions could have been made by taking
electricity from Beau Champ sugar factory during the cane crush¬
ing season, as the yeast factory would have to remain connected
to the CEB grid for off season supplies and so would have to pay
the maximum demand charge all year round.
4. Discussion
The foregoing analysis has identified the most important
economic factors which affected the failure of Yeast Producers
(Mtius) Ltd. To summarise, these were, in decreasing order of impor¬
tance, problems of market penetration and the returns on these sales,
of quality yeast production, of the financing of the company, and of
high production costs.
This statement leaves many questions unanswered. Why were Yeast
Producers (Mtius) Ltd. not able to penetrate many Indian Ocean mark¬
ets? How was it that the production technology was not easily
transferred to an island of highly educated people, and where many
people had substantial experience of running and controlling chemical
processes and operations in the sugar industry? How did the company
come to have such a low proportion of share capital? Why were the
high production costs not foreseen?
Such questions do not lead to simple answers. To understand thern
a dynamic analysis is needed, studying not only how the economic
situation of the factory evolved, but also how the participants
understanding of this situation changed and how they reacted to their
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understandings. To state, with the benefit of hindsight or on the
basis of some set of idealist prescriptions, what the Mauritians
involved should have done in an ideal world is inadequate - the world
is not ideal, so what is necessary is to understand how they (or oth¬
ers in similar situations) react to certain concrete conditions. Such
studies may lead one to an understanding of the mechanisms involved,
of the operation of the "hiding hand" of Hirschman(13), and to how
repetition of such failures might be avoided in the real rather than
an ideal world.
The opinions of the participants on the marketing difficulties
of Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. should first be considered.
4.1. Marketing
As mentioned previously, M. Hugnin, of Mauritius Breweries Ltd.
and the Coca-Cola plant, was responsible for the export marketing of
the yeast produced at Beau Champ for much of the time up to February
-that
1977. In an interview with him on 29 November 1976 he claimed^the
following factors were responsible for the poor sales:
i. The yeast was of an unknown brand,
ii. the international yeast market was divided between only a few
firms, who reacted forcefully against any newcomers trying to
enter their markets,
iii. in most of the countries bordering the Indian Ocean bakers were
a small group accustomed to traditional suppliers,
iv. in any country there were few agents, who were often tied to
large producers,
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v. certain countries had no foreign currency with which to buy
yeast (e.g. Tanzania and Madagascar),
vi. corruption (even in countries which bought yeast under competi¬
tive tenders by government bodies they were never asked to
quote),
vii. the packing material was of inferior quality. A lot of tins
broke open on the second shipment to Bombay,
viii.they had shipping difficulties. The shipping dates of well-known
lines were delayed, and then the shippers broke their contract.
Other lines (e.g. the Shipping Corporation of India) were very
irregular, and once a supposedly direct shipment to Sri Lanka
was transhipped in Bombay, where the tins were abandoned for
some time until they were finally taken to Sri Lanka to reach
the much displeased buyer, anal
ix. the freight rates were high.
This understanding of the sales difficulties was shared by the
production manager, M. Duverge, when interviewed in August and
November of that year. In August, he had not seemed too surprised by
the delay in obtaining orders, explaining that the factory had had to
produce yeast samples before they could start selling. Later he real¬
ised that the baking activity of the yeast was greatly affected by
the long journeys between factory and consumer, and ascribed the lack
of repeat orders, in the early phase of operation under Anchor Yeast
technology, to the poor keeping qualities of the yeast. He continued
to assert that the full sales potential of the factory was limited by
unfair competition from the big yeast manufacturers, giving as an
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example (during an interview in January 1980) the reaction of a
French company to an attempt to break into their market in the Far
East. This company dropped their price, forcing Yeast Producers
(Mtius) to sell at a loss for a year, until they had to give up after
loosing one million rupees.
In contrast to this interpretation of the yeast market is that
of Mr. Chagnon of Lallemand Inc. He has already been quoted on the
difficulties and costs of shipping from Mauritius earlier in this
chapter. About the yeast market he claimed:
The world yeast market is no different than may (sic) other
markets, it is not the exclusive preserve of any "special"
producers. The major ones are simply the most cost effec¬
tive quality producers. Us smaller companies simply have to
work harder to improve our efficiencies to meet the lower
prices they sometimes use to "buy" out a market or to
defend their established markets.
Note that he did not deny that the major producers bought out
markets, but the interpretation is inspired by optimism rather than
pessimism - it is possible, not impossible, to penetrate yeast mark¬
ets.
What evidence is there concerning the openness or otherwise of
the yeast market? Firstly, it is necessary to define which yeast
market. It is a market for active bakers' yeast, which can
ferment/respire in dough and by so doing grow quickly, causing the
dough to rise. Bakers, unlike distillers, are not interested in the
performance of the yeast over a 24 hour fermentation.
Of the active yeast produced, much is in the form of pressed
yeast, containing about 30% solids, rather like the yeast cake that
was fed into the drier at the Beau Champ yeast factory. Pressed yeast
has limited keeping qualities, so the pressed yeast factories only
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supply their own immediate adjacent market. Smaller communities and
cities without pressed yeast factories use dried yeast.
In developed countries much of the dried yeast used is produced
locally or regionally, whereas many developing countries still depend
on imports from developed temperate countries, often from their
former colonial rulers(23). It is the sales of active dried bakers'
yeast to these countries which constitutes the international dried
yeast market. It was into this market that Yeast Producers (Mtius)
Ltd. tried to sell, in selling to countries bordering the Indian
Ocean. And, as they had carried out no market survey before setting
up the plant, they had no idea of the size of the markets they were
entering, or whether it was expanding, which would facilitate the
entry of new suppliers, or static, in which case the existing market
leaders would fight to preserve their share.
The statistics available on trade in yeast are very poor, as
yeast is too specialised a commodity to merit separate entries in
most compilations of imports and exports (it has a six-figure clas¬
sification in the SITC). In the trade statistics of many countries,
figures for yeast are combined with those for baking powder or even
submerged in the classification 'food products n.e.s.'. The only
available tables which divide yeast exports into active, inactive,
bakers' and seed yeast are the EEC statistics classified by the
NIMEXE system(24).
These statistics show that little yeast is exported from the EEC
by countries other than France, the Netherlands, the U.K. and Den¬
mark. Of these, Denmark exports mainly to Scandinavia, whereas
France, Netherlands and the U.K. house major international yeast
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exporters like Lesaffre, and DCL (Yeast), who export worldwide. The
exports from these three countries of active bakers' yeast are shown
in figure 4.18.
All three increased their exports between 1966 and 1980, but
with periods of less rapid growth or even, in the case of the Nether¬
lands, reductions in their level of exports. Consequently, although
the markets were expanding, the severe short-term fluctuations pro¬
vided an incentive to protect markets against competition.
That the market was very competitive can be seen by comparing
figure 4.18 with the export prices shown in figure 4.19 (calculated
from(24) in DM to reduce the effects of inflation). Reductions in the
price of exports from the Netherlands corresponded to increases in
their sales, and most of their price increases corresponded to sales
reductions. Why the French exports and prices did not show such
variations is not clear - perhaps they sold more to traditional mark¬
ets, whereas the Dutch company was trying to enter new markets.
The destinations of these exports are less certain, as, in gen¬
eral, the EEC statistics give only the exports to other EEC members
and major exports outside the EEC. The Netherlands' exports outside
the EEC were all classified as 'Secret'. Only up to 1973 did France
give a more or less complete breakdown of its yeast exports. Other
information on the direction of trade in yeast and baking powder can
be found in the UN 1976 World Trade Annual(25) which only gives the
major exports from OECD countries, and in import figures for indivi¬
dual countries. From such incomplete statistics it is not easy to
determine either the total world dried yeast or the Indian Ocean
market. An independent estimate of the total world yeast production
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Figunes 4. 18 and 4. 19. Quantities and





was 144 kt/a in 1964(26), but this included production for home con¬
sumption and pressed yeast production. To obtain an estimate of the
Indian Ocean market,the exports by France in 1973 were added to those
of other OECD countries in 1976, for each country around the Indian
Ocean. The larger of this figure or the imports as given in the
country's import statistics were added to the country totals to get
an estimate for the Indian Ocean market. This came to eight thousand
tonnes per annum. It can be only the very roughest guide to the
Indian Ocean imports of active dried yeast, as it includes imports of
baking powder and leaves out Indochina, the Indian sub-continent,
some Arab states and Somalia.
Roughly speaking, Yeast Producers (Mtius) were trying to capture
some 10% of this market. This would imply having to sell to many
countries, as, excepting only Australia, no one country could have
imported all 800 t/a. Some might use more, but in the form of locally
produced pressed yeast. Nevertheless, some of the markets were sub¬
stantial and worth defending - in 1973, for example, the French sold
600 t dried yeast to Indonesia, 3% of their exports outside the EEC.
Such a market would be worth defending, even at the expense of tem¬
porarily selling at a loss, this loss being financed by the profits
on the other 97% of sales. But for Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. this
market represented 75% of production capacity - they did not have the
resources to meet losses on such a scale for more than a few months.
These marketing and financial advantages, together with a reduc¬
tion in the proportion of overhead costs in the cost of production,
for larger companies has, histori cal ly, 1 ed to an increasing centrali¬
zation of the industry, exemplified by the concentration of the yeast
industry in the U.K. between 1952 and 1957. To quote Willmott:(27)
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There were still seven yeast factories operating in the
United Kingdom, of which three were owned by D.C.L. The
others were the Standard Yeast Company's new factory at
Dovercourt in Essex (which had also started operating in
May, 1952), the British Fermentation Products factory at
Ipswich, the Tower Yeast Company in Birmingham, and the
Premier Yeast Company in London. All of these factories
were appreciably smaller than the D.C.L. units and as a
result of agreements the last two named ceased to operate
by 1957. The management of the Standard Yeast factory at
Dovercourt was transferred to D.C.L. who eventually bought
it in March, 1957. With the acquisition of the Dovercourt
factory, and the improvements at Bristol and Glenochil, the
retention of Vauxhall Yeast Factory was no longer neces¬
sary. It was, therefore, closed down in September, 1957,
after continuous operation as a yeast factory for twenty-
eight years.
It is interesting that the 'appreciably smaller' British Fermen¬
tation Products factory still survives as part of a large Dutch com¬
pany. This suggests that the advantages of larger companies are not
so much in 'economies of scale' in the cost of production, but lie,,
rather, in financial strength and marketing advantages.
From the foregoing, the international export dried bakers' yeast
market can be characterized by the dominance of a few, large yeast
producers, in competition with each other. The market has been
expanding, but irregularly, encouraging these companies to defend
their markets to an extent that would not be necessary in a steadily
increasing market. Each company has its traditional markets where,
usually, they have little competition, and others where they compete.
This makes it particularly difficult for new 'third world' pro¬
ducers to enter the world market as the traditional markets of any
supplier tend to be heavily defended, whereas the markets in which
there already is some competition offer lower returns. The new pro¬
ducers must have a very good competitive advantage in cost, quality
or service and either a large home market or an adequate financial
base to enable it to sustain heavy losses for the first few years of
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market penetration.
Mauritius had a very small internal yeast market, and is not
part of any regional grouping which might have provided a larger
'home' market. It had neither cheap energy, cheap labour nor cheap
molasses, so Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. had little prospect of com¬
peting on cost with the large semi-automated plant to European pro¬
ducers. It had difficulties in reaching the quality of the yeast pro¬
duced by the international exporters, let alone providing a superior
quality product. Its only apparent advantage was the possibility of
providing a superior service to customers as deliveries only had to
cross the Indian Ocean, in principle allowing more frequent shipments
sent at short notice.
Such was not the case. As mentioned earlier, Mauritius is not
served by regular, timetabled liner services to the countries that
might have bought its yeast. World shipping routes serve 'North -
South' trade between Europe and North America and the Third World,
leaving 'South - South' trade to the irregular movements of tramp
steamers and local shipping lines. This led to shipment to Jordan
via Marseilles, Sri Lanka via Singapore and so on. Whereas the direct
shipments might only take two weeks to reach Singapore, or eleven
days to reach Mombassa(14), the indirect shipments took much longer,
up to three months to reach Sri Lanka or Amman. Despite the efforts
of Lallemand Inc., and their Mauritian shipping agents,to reduce these
delays, direct shipments were rare and these indirect routes were
often the only possible ones.
As a result Yeast Producers (Mauritius) Ltd. could provide no
more than a relatively poor service to the customers, which led to
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deterioration of yeast during transit (reducing the possibility of
competing on quality), and also to high freight costs, such that it
was cheaper to supply Kenya from Montreal than from Mauritius(7). It
was as cheap to send yeast from Mauritius to France or the Nether¬
lands as it was to Kenya or Singapore (see figure 4.9). Such diffi¬
culties are typical of shipping from 'sea-locked' economies.
To return to M. Hugnin's other points, concerning the tradi¬
tional nature of bakers, the local agents being tied to one supplier,
lack of foreign currency and corruption, apply only when selling from
a distance, sitting behind a desk in Mauritius. When a company sends
salesmen to visit the importers most of these obstacles can be over¬
come. The lack of foreign currency argument only applies when the
country concerned produces yeast locally; if the people eat bread and
there is no yeast then the country has to import, as Ceres Industrias
Alimentares of Maputo, Mozambique did from Lai 1emand(3), despite a
severe lack of foreign exchange. Once the style of marketing changed^
upon Lallemand Inc. taking responsibility for this, such difficulties
were often overcome, and the sales increased.
Why did Yeast Producers (Mtius) hope to sell yeast by these
methods? Certain insights can be gained in to this by studying the
local marketing of yeast in Mauritius.
No yeast was sold before May 1976 because of confusion between
Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd., Mauritius Cold Storage and officials of
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry about whether they could sell
any of their production on the local market whilst being a company
with an Export Enterprise Certificate. In fact, such companies are
permitted to sell 10% of their production on the local market, but by
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the time this had been clarified several shipments of imported yeast
had arrived on the island.
Even after they had begun to sell yeast locally, they managed to
capture only a small part of the market. In the financial year
1976/77 the total sales were only 18 t(2) while the yeast imports for
1976 and 1977 were 43 t and 45 t respectively(1). This led Yeast
Producers (Mtius) to undertake their first local market survey in
1977(2). This survey showed that:
i. Most yeast consumers in Mauritius were not acquainted with the
local yeast.
ii. Some bakers had already tried local yeast and thought it slow,
but were well satisfied with the samples produced in 1977 using
Lallemand technology.
iii. Mauritius Cold Storage had made little effort to deliver far
from Port Louis. They supplied the yeast in broken cartons,
open plastic bags, from which the yeast had spilled.
iv. Some 80% of the bakers used 'Saf levure1 sold by M. A. Cassim at
Rsl2/kg (cf. Rs9.50/kg local yeast). This had two advantages,
the bakers could buy their flour, salt and sugar in the one
trip, and they obtained credit from M. Cassim.
v. Neither Mauritius Cold Storage nor Yeast Producers (Mtius) had
had any contact with the bakers or any knowledge of their prob¬
lems.
The authors of this report concluded from their survey that
marketing techniques of Mauritius Cold Storage left much to be
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desired. They wrote:
La levure locale, n'etant qu'un des nombreux produits
vendus par la Mauritius Cold Storage, n'a pas regu, a notre
avis, suffisament de consideration. II y a eu un peu de
publicite faite sur les journaux mais, malheureusement, le
message n'a pas passe. Rien n'a ete fait pour y remedier.
Par manque de contacts avec le consommateur, la Mauritius
Cold Storage ne connaTt pas les problemes de ce dernier.
Pourquoi n'uti1ise-t-i1 pas la levure locale? Quelles sont
les qualites qu'il reclame? Est-ce l'activite de la levure?
Est-ce une livraison reguliere? Est-ce un emballage solide,
attrayant, des petits logements ou des gros? Est-ce le
prix? Est-ce la renommee? Est-ce les facilites de paiemant?
Et ceux qui utilisent notre levure pourquoi le font-ils?
Est-ce le prix, la fratcheur du produit ? Autant de ques¬
tions qui sont restees sans reponse a ce jour. Resultat: un
fosse entre le vendeur et le client et un autre encore plus
grand entre le client et le producteur local.*
How could such a situation have arisen, and why was it allowed
to continue for so long? Such commercial behaviour has often been
described as due to an 'import mentalitywhich is supposed to reside
in the heads of managers of the larger importing companies. In using
the term 'mentality', this behaviour is considered irrational - yet
for importers of essential goods in a heavily import-dependent econ¬
omy this makes commercial sense. Most of the imports of the larger
importers are of well-known products that 'sell themselves'. The com-
* The local yeast, being only one of numerous products sold by
Mauritius Cold Storage, has not received, in our opinion, suf¬
ficient consideration. There was a little newspaper publicity
but, unfortunately, the message did not get across. Nothing has
been done to correct this.
Through lacking contacts with the consumer, Mauritius Cold
Storage does not know their problems. Why do they not use local
yeast? What properties do they require? Is it the activity of
the yeast? Is it regular deliveries? Is it solid, attractive
packaging in small and large sizes? Is it the price? Is it a
renowned brand? Is it the payment terms? And those who use our
yeast, why do they do so? Is it the price, the product fresh¬
ness . . ? So many questions which have remained without reply
to this day. The result: a gap between the seller and the
client and another even bigger between the client and the local
producer.
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pany need not spend any time or money in promoting or distributing
the product, the customer bears the costs of transport and finding
out when the product is in stock. Typically^ an importer will be the
sole agents of certain dominant brands. Thus removed from competition
with other importers, there is no incentive to improve service to the
customer. Instead?there are advantages to be gained by reducing ser¬
vice levels to cut costs. The logical conclusion is the provision of
a warehouse in Port Louis where the customers corne from all over the
island. To further reduce their costs they can employ unskilled
labour in their warehouses - if this results in torn bags of yeast,
broken boxes, or other damage to the product the customer will still
buy when he has no alternative.
This straightforward commercial practice of cost cutting in a
guaranteed market no longer suffices when there is brand competition,
between different importers^ or when a new local product has to be
sold. The experience of selling competing imports is not to be found
in the large Franco-Mauritian importers, as very often just one of
them imports a given product, or, if several do (e.g. plywood) they
somehow manage to all sell at the same price and keep the same pro¬
portion of the market every year. New local products have been so few
and far between(#) that such companies have no experience in market¬
ing them - so why should it occur to them to change their methods?
Unlike the large Franco-Mauritian importers, it is the small
Sino-Mauritian or muslim companies that usually introduce competing
# Some new local factories produce traditional products by car¬
rying out the finishing operations on semi-finished inputs,sup¬
plied by a foreign company which used to export the finished
product. Such local products merely substitute the market share
of their parent company, so there are no new marketing prob¬
lems.
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imports. These use more dynamic marketing methods, more suitable for
new local products, than the methods of the large importers. But, it
does not occur to anyone in the sugar industry to sell through them.
Even the authors of the Mauritian yeast market survey did not con¬
sider trying to get M.A.Cassim to act as their distributers.
Why then should Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. have entrusted
their local marketing to Mauritius Cold Storage, and then waited
until October 1977 before carrying out a market survey? They were
not, after all, an import company, so how could they suffer from an
'import mentality'?
Nirmal B. Gobin has described Mauritian companies as
production-oriented rather than marketing oriented(28). The follow¬
ing quotes from his articles make this clear:
The production-oriented company manufactures (or imports)
the product and then tries to sell it, while the
marketing-oriented company first seeks to identify customer
needs and then satisfy these needs by offering the right
product or service. In a rapidly developing economy - such
as the Mauritian economy in the years 1973-74-75 - where
demand exceeds supply, the company can sell almost anything
But as an economy cools down, reduced or decreasing income
makes consumers selective in their buying.
It is a known fact that already a few Mauritian industries
have stopped or nearly ceased production because they are
in a glut. Many companies have erected factories with the
hope or hunch that they would readily sell what they would
produce. And suddenly they find that the market cannot
absorb their production, result: machines are stopped and
capital in terms of millions of rupees are tied down, idle!
He emphasised the need for two-way communication between the
company and its market, and for an integral approach to marketing,
giving examples of problems which arise in a production-oriented com¬
pany, such as, '. . . delivery of goods in unsaleable conditions to
the customer by the distributor as a result of unfavourable stocking
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and handling conditions
His typification of a production-oriented company fitted Yeast
Producers (Mtius) like a glove; both in its local and export market¬
ing. Yet, it is not enough to make an idealist comparison between a
production-oriented company and a marketing-oriented one. Given the
social origins of the company and its managers within the sugar
industry, it was inevitable that the company became production-
oriented.
The decision to set up a yeast factory was not taken as a result
of Mauritian initiative. No Mauritian investor had studied the
market, decided there was a particular need, and then studied how to
supply this need, as Daniel Lagesse did before setting up Packaging
Industries Ltd. The initiative came from a South African company,
while the Mauritian company played an essentially passive role. Deep
River - Beau Champ like all sugar companies, had had liquid capital,
from the 1974 sugar crop,avai1able for investment. For them it was
easier to put this money into an outsiders proposal rather than
search out more investment opportunities on their own.
Similarly, it was easier to ask a friend,in an allied company,to
look after export sales than to start their own marketing organisa¬
tion and hire a salesman to fly to the markets and talk to potential
buyers. It was easier to ask a friend,in Ireland Blyth Ltd., to take
care of local sales rather than set up their own sales network or
even negotiate with a distributor outside the franco-mauritian com¬
munity.
This last point is important - the people involved with the
beginnings of the company were all within the sugar industry elite.
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The selection of production and marketing managers,and of local sales
agents, was done on the particularist basis of looking to friends or
colleagues in the same community and, if possible, within the same
financial grouping. This particularist behaviour in small island
societies was described by Burton Benedict(29,30), who contrasted it
to the universalist behaviour of appointment on the basis of com¬
petence. The members of the Mauritian sugar industry elite are
notoriously slaves to particularist decision-making. Note, for example,
the difficulties University of Mauritius sugar technology diplomates
have had in obtaining employment in the sugar industry - unless they
were white!
Particularist decisions taken by Deep River - Beau Champ S.E.
led to the appointment of staff and agents from within sugar
industry-1inked companies. As all marketing of sugar and molasses is
handled by the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate, the Mauritius Molasses Co.
Ltd. and the Alcohol and Molasses Export & Co. Ltd., industry
managers and owners have had little experience of marketing. The
consequence was a production-oriented company.
In conclusion of this section on marketing,there follows a syn¬
thesis of the alternative static explanations of the difficulties
encountered within a dynamic account of how Yeast Producers (Mtius)
Ltd. acted on and reacted to marketing problems.
Founded by a sugar estate, it chose to employ methods and per¬
sonnel from the sugar industry. This choice was natural and inevit¬
able, given the particularist decision-making typical of the sugar
oligarchy. As people within the sugar industry have had little
experience of marketing, but much of production, the company was
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production-oriented. Consequently, no market surveys were carried out,
and the marketing function was delegated outside the company, as it
was not seen as a principal concern of the company. These 'outsiders'
were, in fact, also members of the same community, similarly
production-oriented, and so failed to obtain many first orders. As
they had no system for feedback from the customers they were not
aware of the low yeast activity, which was responsible for the lack
of repeat orders.
This was not perceived as a difficulty by the participants at
that time (I am writing with the benefit of hindsight), although
other Mauritians interviewed in 1976 had pointed out the poor returns
on marketing by letter. But, when Lallemand took over the marketing
they managed to obtain many new orders while facing the same external
difficulties that Yeast Producers (Mtius) had. Lallemand was more of
a marketing-oriented company.
Once Lallemand took over the marketing, sales were no longer
limited by a lack of attention to marketing, but by the fundamental
difficulties of transport and competition. The transport difficulties
reduced the number of markets in which the factory could compete as
deliveries to certain destinations were almost impossible, and also
reduced the revenues because of high shipping charges. Competition
from established companies prevented entry into certain markets (e.g.
no yeast was sold to Reunion) and in some places reduced the returns
as Lallemand was forced to compete on price.
Of these two, I would think that the transport problems of ship¬
ping from a 'sea-locked' country were more important, as the company
losses were more sensitive to price than sales volume, and the
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freight costs were 10-20% of the total value of the shipments.
Yeast factories in more favourable locations would not suffer
from the same problems in shipping, but would still have difficulties
in penetrating an unstably expanding market, defended by highly capi¬
talised companies, unless these factories were partly owned by such a
company or had a protected regional market.
4.2. Yeast quality - transfer of production technology.
The yeast produced at first was considered slow by Mauritian
bakers(2), and had an initial baking activity of 120 mm Hg and only
70 mm Hg after eight days at 45 °C(5), whereas a good yeast can keep
its activity for as long as a year in the absence of air(31).
Yet, after changes in the operating and quality control pro¬
cedures, i ntroduced after trials by Lallemand engineers and the Mauri¬
tian staff, the keeping quality of the yeast was improved so much,
that by December 1977,". . . the yeast produced was of a quality as
good as the competitors1."(6) This was achieved using the original
equipment installed by Anchor Yeast.
How was this achieved? M. Duverge(6) listed the objectives of
the trials under the supervision of the Lallemand consultants as fol-
1 ows:
i. the elaboration of a good seed and sales fermentation schedule,
ii. the eradication or, at least, the minimisation of infection,
iii. a good filtration and drying procedure,and
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iv. a good quality control covering the maximum of check points
during the production andespecial ly on the finished product.
The drier operation was changed to reduce the accumulation of
yeast at the bottom and, hence,the incidence of hot spots, which had
led to the formation of large clumps of dead yeast cells. More salt
was added before fi 1 tration, to remove more water from the cells,
leading to a drier paste entering the drier.
The incidence of infections was reduced by a stricter control on
the fermentations, involving many more microbiological and perfor¬
mance tests - 222 incubations and colony counts, 48 cell counts, 12
hours of dough and gassing power tests each week(32), instead of the
50 tests per week previously undertaken.
The result was a reduction in the proportion of reject yeast
from 67% to 7%, achieved by changes in technique rather than equip¬
ment.
This clearly shows that,in dried yeast production,the technology
consists of not just the fermenters, heat exchangers, centrifuges,
rotary filters, driers, and pumps to be picked out of some shopping
list ("choice of technology" according to Pickett et a 1 (33) ) but
includes the way in which the equipment is used, and the process
managed.
Under this perspective of technology, there were two transfers
of technology to the production staff of Yeast Producers (Mtius)
Ltd., the first from Anchor Yeast, the second from Lallemand. Why did
they have different results?
Consider three aspects of these transfers:
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i. What was the technology available to be transferred from South
Africa or Canada?
ii. What relevant knowledge and skills did the recipients possess
before each transfer?
iii. How was the transfer of knowledge, skills and technique
effected?
Anchor Yeast had factories in large South African cities, where
it produced active dried bakers' yeast for sale in the cities and
throughout South Africa. The distances and transport facilities are
such that yeast can quickly reach the consumer. The company never had
to face the problem of maintaining yeast activity during long ship¬
ments, a problem faced and overcome by the established international
yeast exporters.
So they had no need to produce a yeast with exceptional keeping
qualities. Even if South African bakers had thought the yeast slow,
they had no choice as the market was protected as a consequence of
the post-war National Party policies to develop local industries(34).
The absence of commercial pressures to improve yeast quality led
to a certain complacency in the South African yeast industry. So,
while the factories grew bigger, and the equipment was modernised to
reduce production costs (*), the number and interpretation of quality
control tests remained at the level reflected in M. Duverge's train¬
ing.
* Even to the extent of using tower driers, whereas rotary drum
driers have been standard until very recently even in DCL fac¬
tories.
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In complete contrast, Lallemand Inc. was used to competing in
international markets, producing yeast capable of meeting high stan¬
dards even after long shipments, and knew how to reach higher stan¬
dards when necessary to cope with exceptionally long delivery times.
Before the Beau Champ yeast factory was erected,no-one involved
with the project knew much about the technology of yeast production.
Deep River - Beau Champ had not made any detailed study of this, or
any substantial effort to contact Mauritian sources of expertise, such
as the MSIRI or the University of Mauritius. Although there was at
least one Franco-Mauritian microbiologist on the island (#), they
chose Serge Duverge, their own factory chemist, to be trained as
production manager. He learned all he knew about yeast in his five
months training course in South Africa.
By the time the Lallemand consultants arrived, M. Duverge and
all the workers had substantial practical experience of running the
factory, but no more theoretical understanding of how it worked.
The methods used to transfer technology differed greatly between
the two companies. Anchor Yeast relied upon their training course in
South Africa for the factory manager, and tried to copy in Mauritius
the operation of their factories in South Africa. Their principal
concern was in the erection of the equipment, so they sent three
engineers to Mauritius to supervise this. Once the factory was work¬
ing, after a fashion, they left and returned to South Africa. The
Mauritian staff had to deal on their own with infection problems
caused by the absence of an air filter in the South African company's
# Gerald de Senneville, working in Scott & Co., dealing with
imports of whisky and chocolates.
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design.
When Lallemand consultants arrived in March 1977 they studied
the factory operation and proposed modifications to the process. They
then tested these procedures alongside the Mauritian staff until they
had succeeded in improving the yeast quality. From this joint effort
the Mauritian staff learned not only the technique proposed by Lal¬
lemand (which they strived to put consistently into practice between
March and December), but also enough about the process to initiate
their own experiments, in November, in order to increase the factory
production capacity(6). That they did this, also shows their increase
in self-confidence during this experimental period.
We see then,that Anchor Yeast only transferred to Mauritius a
part of the technology needed to produce dried bakers' yeast. To pro¬
duce a quality yeast requires not just good equipment, not just a set
of instructions to follow, but a trained, confident, staff who under¬
stand why they are doing what they are doing, and a set of operating
procedures developed for the particular factory (infections and
overheating are more easily avoided in Montreal or Clackmannanshire
than in Mauritius).
The carbon copy approach of Anchor Yeast did not provide this -
it was only sufficient for the minimal objectives of Anchor Yeast, to
sell the plant and get it to produce some yeast.
Lallemand, however, succeeded in completing the technology
transfer by sending consultants to Mauritius who modified the process
to meet the specific conditions of production and shipping in Mauri¬
tius, and trained the Mauritian staff in factory operation and
factory-scale experimental techniques. This was needed to meet their
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objective of guaranteeing the production of a high quality yeast,
then and after they had left.
4.3. Formation and financing of the company
Why did Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. have such a low proportion
ma i nly
of share to loan capital? This can be put down/\to the failure
of Anchor Yeast to take up its 49% share entitlement. To understand
how this was possible, it is necessary to study the particular
interests of Anchor Yeast and Deep River - Beau Champ S.E. in forming
Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd.
In the beginning there was little interest in Mauritius in pro¬
ducing bakers' yeast. Although this was mentioned in the MSIRI
report(35), which devoted more attention to food yeast and the produc¬
tion of chemicals by fermentation (ethanol and citric acid). There
are only two references, by M. Paturau and other, to the production
of bakers' yeast in the report. In the various articles, appearing in
the Mauritian press over the years, advocating the utilization of
molasses in Mauritius, little mention was made of bakers' yeast. In
particular, Beau Champ S.E. had made no study of bakers' yeast pro¬
duction before Anchor Yeast came to Mauritius - the initiative lay
completely with the South African company.
Why did Anchor Yeast come to Mauritius? This initiative does not
clearly fit into the general pattern of South African investment in
Mauritius. As the process of labour exploitation in South Africa
changes from one of extracting absolute surplus value, from a cheap
labour force of low productivity to one of extracting an increasing
relative surplus value, by increasing the productivity of each worker
by some degree of mechanisation, they are encountering a shortage of
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skilled workers. Although they could have employed 3.7 mil¬
lion workers in 1980 they would only have been able to find 1.7 mi 1 -
1ion(34). One response to this has been a slight liberalization of
the labour laws to allow black South Africans to work in some jobs
hitherto reserved for whites. But this is limited by the resistance
of white workers who provide the social base of the National Party.
Thus, a more rapid solution to the needs of South African investors is
to erect factories overseas making use of more abundant skilled work¬
ers who, however, are paid less than the white workers in South
Africa (e.g. textile factories in Mauritius).
However, Anchor Yeast's initiative did not fit into this pat¬
tern, as the yeast factory at Beau Champ only employed 28 permanent
workers, with additional casual labour for packing when needed. Such
a low number of workers could readily be found in South Africa. Ins¬
tead, it was forced to look overseas by other limitations on expan¬
sion in South Africa. In the cities it had to compete against
pressed yeast producers, while in the countryside dried yeast was
used by Africans in the prepartion of alcoholic beverages as an
alternative to wild yeasts, and, therefore, had to be cheap. In both
markets its profitability was reduced by the increasing cost of fuels
in South Africa, both for drying,and transport of molasses to the fac¬
tory from the sugar-producing areas, and of yeast from factory to con¬
sumer. Trade embargoes limited the possibilities for export of
yeast, so expansion had to be by diversification in South Africa or
overseas (by investment or sales of technology).
Having chosen the overseas option, Anchor Yeast looked for places
where a yeast factory could be erected close to a molasses source,
consequently reducing the costs of transporting molasses, with at
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least some consumption of yeast nearby(5). Not surprisingly, in view
of the close links between the sugar industries in the two countries,
the country meeting these conditions that it chose to visit was Mau¬
ritius. It was in its interest to negotiate with Mauritian companies
to achieve the following:
i. To sell its equipment and designs.
ii. To have the possibility in sharing in any profits of the fac¬
tory .
iii. To minimise the risks in the undertaking born by Anchor Yeast.
Deep River - Beau Champ was interested in investing some of the
money earned, as a result of high sugar prices in 1974, in new ven¬
tures. Naturally they were interested, if not flattered, when Anchor
Yeast came to Mauritius with the proposal for a profitable sugar-
linked export venture, as were others.
The directors of Deep River - Beau Champ S.E. appear to have
seen this as a situation of competition between the sugar factories
for the favours of Anchor Yeast. Either because of this, or through
habit, they negotiated in secret, consequently isolating themselves
from any Mauritian yeast expertise. Therefore, they were unable to
evaluate the technical and marketing proposals of Anchor Yeast from
their own resources.
This absolute technological dependence on Anchor Yeast would
have weakened their negotiating position, such that the agreement
reached appears to have been biased towards the South African com¬
pany, in that all equipment was imported via Anchor Yeast, all techn¬
ical details were decided by them (whether relevant to Mauritius or
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not), and that Anchor Yeast could get away with not subscribing to
the share capital of Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. (Whether this was
allowed in the agreement or in breach of it, Anchor Yeast succeeded,
showing its dominant position.)
This shortfall in share capital was made up by loans from Deep
River - Beau Champ to Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. By 31 December
1977, these had reached Rs2.4 M while the company owed Rs5.8 M in
other loans and a bank overdraft(3), as a result of accumulated
losses. The interest payments on these were substantial, as shown in
figure 4.13, and made a great difference to profitability (see figure
4.17).
4.4. Cost of production - could the factory ever have become profit¬
able?
The final decision to cease operation, and sell the equipment, was
taken on the basis of rising production costs in face of low selling
prices after payments for freight and packaging(4).
From the sensitivity analyses it can be seen that both the fixed
and variable costs rose from February to December 1977, as a result of
changes introduced by Lallemand consultants to improve yeast quality,
and cost inflation over the period. While the changes introduced by
Lallemand undoubtedly improved the profitability of the company, by
increasing the volume of sales, they were not enough to make the fac¬
tory profitable.
While it might have been possible to reduce the production cost
by concentrating on methods to save on every item, each change on its
own would have had little effect, as shown in figure 4.17, and the
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company did not have the time to undertake an extensive experimental
programme intended to effect energy, raw material and overhead cost
savings. The factory had not been designed for energy economy, as
shown by the difference in steam and electricity requirements between
this factory and those quoted in Paturau(lO) (see figure 4.12). Even
the savings of taking electricity from the sugar factory, during the
season, at greatly reduced cost would not have made much difference. *
In short, active dried bakers' yeast production turned out to be
an inappropriate technology for Mauritius. This is not surprising as
there was no Mauritian input into the choice or design of the tech¬
nology used. No study had been made of the local yeast market, of the
international market, of the Indian Ocean market, of the skills
available locally, or of the possibility of starting a small
pressed-yeast plant to supply the local market.
Such low-cost producers exist all over the world, using simple
technologies, as shown in figure 4.20, which shows a yeast growth tank
at Dhampur Sugar Mills, U.P., India. These successfully compete with
imported dried bakers' yeast (such as in Maputo, where SIPAQ produces
all the yeast needed by local bakers with not one worker who knows
what is happening in the process).
Dried bakers' yeast production in a small country would only be
economic if the factory was owned by a larger producer which could
give the financial support to sustain high early losses, or there is
a regional protected market where one country has been allocated the
* This was supposed to be illegal in that the EPZ factory was a
separate company which could only buy from the CEB - but ac¬
cording to a Mauritian accountant there was a legal way of tak¬
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CHAPTER FIVE
Rum and alcohol production in. Mauritius - a traditional
industry.
This chapter outlines the state of a traditional sugarcane by¬
product utilization industry in Mauritius, the production of alcohol,
in particular cane spirit. The factories are compared with others
visited by the author in India and Egypt.
1. A brief history of alcohol production in Mauritius(l).
To judge from newspaper reports, alcohol production from
molasses has just been invented in Brazil. In fact, the fermentation
production of alcohol from sugarcane, used to produce arrack, cane
spirit or rum, often predates sugar production. In Mauritius, for a
long time after the beginning of arrack production under the Dutch
(around 1697), it was as important as sugar production. Before the
Dutch left, they abandoned sugar production but continued to make
arrack. Even in 1803, some 60 years after the re-establishment of
sugar production in Mauritius, under Mahe de Labourdonnais, the reve¬
nues from 3250 t of sugar were only three times those from the 1.3 Ml
of arrack. Many planters could not afford to build sugar factories,
so they built distilleries.
As well as arrack, from cane juice, some rum was made from
molasses. In 1744,the Villebague sugar factory produced a rum "qui
jouit pendant longtemps d'une reputation coloniale". This reputation
did not last long, for by the end of the eighteenth century people
were complaining that it was worse than Jamaican rums. Charpentier de
Cossigny found that it contained lead, from the distilling equipment.
Complaints about the quality of the rum continued up to the present
day; but, now, the problem is a lack of impurities rather than an
excess. The wort is distilled to 95-96.5% ethanol, thus removing the
desirable impurities which give West Indian rums their flavour,
before being diluted and bottled with flavourings. With the excep¬
tions of Gi1 beys' Green Island Rum and Medine's Vieux Rhum, none is
aged, so, strictly, these are cane spirits rather than rums.
By the time the British captured Mauritius, in 1816, 80 distil¬
leries were producing 4 Ml each year, i.e 39 1/head! With British
encouragement sugar production increased ten-fold in the next 13
years. The planters turned away from spirit production (down by 10%
over this period) as they noticed the disastrous effects of rum on
the slave population (such as not working hard enough). Baron
d'Unienvi1le, one of the leaders of a campaign to continue the slave
trade to Mauritius, said that rum production should be abandoned.
Figure 5.2 Number of distilleries in Mauritius 1855-1981
Year No. Year No. Year No.
1855 16 1910 6 1950 9
1860 18 1920 5 1952 9
1870 14 1930 6 1977* 4
1880 21 1940 6 1981* 4
1900 9 1945 12
Source: MCA Centenary Report(2) and personal observation (*)
kl 7500. 5000, 2500..












The local consumption continued to decline, so much so that of
the 109 distilleries operating in 1829 only 22 were left in 1858 (see
figure 5.2). Nevertheless, during this period exports increased
greatly (see figure 5.1), so that the production in 1858 was the same
as in 1829. These exports, mostly to Madagascar, reached 3 Ml in 1870
and continued at between 3 and 4.5 Ml/a up to 1895, when the French
conquered Madagascar. They banned imports of rum into the island,
because of its effects on the local population - especially those
working for French companies. Consequently, Mauritian exports
dropped to 0.5 Ml/a, mostly to the Seychelles, Aden, East Africa and
the UK. As freight rates changed, favouring West Indian rum, the UK
sales dropped until they ended in 1920 when the British government
put a high duty on Mauritian rum.
At this time molasses began to be exported, increasing 13-fold
between 1885 and 1897, and also was used more as a fertilizer. So the
production costs of rum increased greatly, especially as the indus¬
trial yield, in 1911, was only 30% of the theoretical yield. Further¬
more, the excise duty was raised from RsO.96/1 to Rsl.67/1, which
gave rise to a drop in the local consumption of taxed spirits, to
447 kl, and a great increase in illicit distillation. Little more
was exported until the Second World War, when large quantities of
distilled cane spirit (at 95-96.5%) were exported for blending with
gin and other spirits for the troops. This continued after the war,
reaching 9 Ml in 1951, but declined to 28 kl in 1954 when Britain
could again produce enough alcohol on its own.
The other wartime development in this industry was the produc¬
tion of power alcohol for blending with motor spirit. This was not
the first use of alcohol to fuel motor vehicles in Mauritius. In the
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early 19301 s Eduoard Langlois and Phillipe Fayd'herbe produced, at
St.Antoine distillery, a motor fuel called "Cernite", made up of 30%
ether, 64% ethanol (at 95-96.5 °G.L.), and 6% motor spirit. While the
price of petrol was high (RsO.39/1) they sold all the Cernite they
could produce. When petrol prices came down they had to abandon pro¬
duction.
From 1932 Adrien Wiehe, and numerous sugar technicians, sup¬
ported the production of anhydrous alcohol for blending with motor
spirit - but the distillery owners did not follow this up (a pattern
often repeated). Fiowever, in February 1939 the colonial government
was contemplating producing power alcohol as a state enterprise, to
assist their policy of making Mauritius more self-sufficient in food
and other essential commodities. The Chamber of Agriculture offi¬
cially wrote to the Governor, stating that certain factory owners
were prepared to produce anhydrous alcohol and that the government
would have to make the use of anhydrous alcohol compul sory(3). The
Governor replied to the effect that he would not object to them pro¬
ducing absolute alcohol but "the manufacture alone of anhydrous
alcohol for the purpose of replacing 20% of the imported petrol would
hardly justify the exercise of the compulsion necessary to oblige the
public to mix 20% of alcohol with their petrol". It appears that he
thought that the alcohol would be supplied separately from the petrol
and customers would mix the two in their tanks (as with two-stroke
oil).* The factory owners then offered to set up a plant if the
government would guarantee a minimum price of Rs0.60/gal. The govern¬
ment indicated that this was too high and dropped the project in
* Even today, I have spoken with Mauritians who thought this,
and did not realise that the petrol and alcohol would be mixed
before they get to the pump.
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August 1939, just before the start of the Second World War. (This
bears comparison with some of the statements on cheap energy made
just before the OPEC oil embargo in 1974).
During the war, petrol was in such short supply that high proof
alcohol with 10-20% petrol, known as "carburant", was used as a motor
fuel. The government requisitioned the molasses to be fermented in
eight new distilleries which were specially built for this purpose.
Over 50 Ml/a ethanol were used for carburant in 1943-5. As petrol
became available after the war the fuel alcohol use declined to
0.3 Ml/a. The consumption of fuel alcohol and petrol is shown in
figure 5.3.
Of the eight distilleries built during the war, five were built
entirely of materials which could be found on the island. Much of the
equipment in the three Mauritian owned distilleries now operating
dates from this time, although the St. Antoine distillery was origi¬
nally built in 1900, and Medine in 1926.
The idea of producing anhydrous alcohol was studied by various
committees, including the Power Alcohol Sub-committee (1944-7) and a
government ad hoc committee in 1949. The latter suggested that anhy¬
drous alcohol could be manufactured locally for less than the
imported petrol cost and blended with petrol in the ratio of 25 parts
alcohol to 75 parts petrol. The market would be 3 Ml/a if it were
compulsorily added to petrol. From distillers figures, submitted to
the government in January 1951, it seemed that it would cost Rs0.45
to produce one litre of anhydrous ethanol from rectified spirit at
Rs0.35, with an estimated capital expenditure of Rs450 000. This put





the redistillation plant) and assumed a molasses price of Rs30/ton.
As the world molasses price was then Rs85/ton the plan was postponed
until "economic conditions returned to normal". They never did, and
as figure 5.4 shows, the proportion of molasses exported continued to
rise. Meanwhile, the production of alcohol declined and the number
of distilleries also declined to the present day figure of four dis¬
tilleries (see figure 5.2).
2. Technology
is
The following description^of the production of ethanol for use
in spirits as practiced in Mauritius, Egypt and India in 1977. The
production of alcohol for use as a fuel has been discussed in the
literature review.
Comparative data on distilleries visited by the writer (the
three Mauritian distilleries which fermented molasses*, Medine,
St.Antoine and the O.K. Distillery at Solitude sugar factory**, Pani-
pat Cooperative Distillery Ltd. in Haryana, India, and the Hawamdieh
Distillery of the Egyptian Sugar and Distillation Company) are given
in figure 5.5.
To help in understanding the following account of the processes
used in the Mauritian distilleries, a flow sheet, based on that used
at Medine distillery^ is provided in figure 5.6. This diagram also
gives a partial mass balance for the process, showing the inputs and
outputs corresponding to the use of one tonne of molasses. Steam and
cooling water usage have not been included in the diagram, nor have
* Gilbeys' distillery at Plaine Lauzun uses 76% alcohol bought
from the three Mauritian-owned distilleries.
** Since closed down and replaced by a new distillery next to





























Molassesan lysi Sucrose Reduc.sugars Totalsug rs Non-fermentablesugars Wortanalysis Molasses -sugars -sucrose -invert Ammoniumsulphate HF Sulphuricac'd Fermentationconditions Temperature(°C)-winter
-summer
pH %EtOHinbeer(v/v) Columns 1st 2nd 3rd By-products Yeast Heads Fuseloi Vinasse -treatment Yield
1EtOH/tmolasses %theoretical Production 1971 1973 1975 1976(expected) Economics Employment Averagemonthlyw Wagecost/1EtOH Prodn.cost/1EtOH Sel1ingprice/1EtOH
19/b 31.01% 18.25% 49.26% ?
Range 27-31% 18-20% 48% s.g.1.090,-17-21% 8-10% 5.2-5.6% 3.3-3.7% 194ppmw/v 57ppmw/v 1300ppmv/v 25 35 4.5 10%onEtOH
1%(at88%)onEtOH pH4 bagassecompost 220 74(d) 750kl 800-1000kl
—im— 32.32% 15.12% 47.44% 5%(est.)
842ppmw/v 600ppmv/v
1976(a) 30.40% 19.50% 49.90% ?
)38 4.8
*76%Et0H(forGilbeys) —»94%EtOH pH4 none 196 69(d) 240kl 326kl 625kl 555kl Alldistilleries 196(e) US$140(e) US$0.10(e) US$0.29(f) US$0.45(in1976)
33 40
-•86%EtOH(approx) -*94-95%EtOH -*96-96.5%EtOH pH4 irrigation/none 215-20 72-73(d) 850kl
320-500ppmw/v 31 40 4.6-4.8(yeastgrowth) 4.0-4.3(fermentation) 6-7(c) 20platesat480mm 46platesat150mm 10klpotsti11 Usedasdenaturant Usedinpharm.&c ms. 3.5-4.5%BODred.to0.3 inanaerobiclagoonswith ammonifyingbacteria 225(c) 14kl/d 300 US$0.06 US$0.08-0.10(c)
Egypt Hawamdieh 33.7-40.2%(b) 14.5-17.2%(b) 50.0-55.0%(b) 3.5-5.0%(b) Useureaand Amm.phosphate 33 38 4.5 1465t/a(g)
355ppmonEtOH(g) 1-1.5%red,sugars(b) 1500m/d,(b) untreated(b) 237 80 AllEgypt: 25Ml 30Ml 600(g) US$100(g) US$0.24(g)
I kj I
(a)HighestsugarsinNorthf r 1976(BeauCh mpfactory). Source:MSIRIAnnualReport 1976(4).
(b)Source:Madi(5). (c)DataforllIndir m Sharma(6). (d)Calculatedassuming5%non-
fermentablesugars. (e)CalculatedfromBi-AnnualSur¬ veyofEmploymentandr ings, Sept.1978(7).
(f)Source:Aritoine(8). (g)Pers.commAlpine Sourcef ralltherd ta:pers. comms.duringvis ts
- 225 -
all the process water flows (e.g. evaporation from the open fermenta¬
tion vats).
The three Mauritian distilleries used equipment which was put
together in the Second World War. They took molasses, diluted it
about four times to produce a wort containing 8-10% fermentable
sugars, added some ammonium sulphate and some sulphuric acid to
reduce the pH (so reducing the chances of infection). They bought
packets of ordinary dried bakers' yeast, which was then grown aerobi-
cal ly on the wort up 40 1, then to 1000 1 and then 20 000 1 in the
'mother' tank. One third of this yeast inoculum was drawn off into
another tank, where it was filled with more wort and left until the
alcoholic fermentation was complete. This took place in open tanks,
cooled by water sprayed down the outside of the tanks. This is not a
very good cooling method, and the fermentation temperature reached
40 °C in the summer at both Solitude and St. Antoine distilleries.
When the fermentation was complete, and the wort contained up to
6% alcohol, the contents of the tank (including the yeast) were
pumped to the distillation column (or analyser). This was operated to
produce either an 86% ethanol solution, which was fed to the rectify¬
ing column, or a 76% solution,which was sold to the Gilbeys' distil¬
lery (for rectification to produce high quality spirits). The recti¬
fying column produced 94-95% ethanol, plus heads (10% of the quantity
of ethanol produced), plus fusel oil (1% of the ethanol produced).
Most alcohol produced in Mauritius is diluted to 40%, flavoured
and sold as cane spirit. This market is shared equally between the
distilleries (which are all operating at below capacity). 0. K. dis¬
tillery at Solitude put some through a third column to purify the
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Figure 5.6 Flow chart for a Mauritian distillery,
Water 4. 1-5. 3 t
Hoi
(sucrose 0. 31 t)
(red. sugars 0. 18 t)
(Ki 0 45.7 kg)
(PjOb 1.8 kg)





HF ©oln. a 776
(HF 0.21C )
(water 0. 56/ ) 5-5 kl










































































A little alcohol is denatured as follows:
White power alcohol - To 94-95% ethanol add 2% of pyridine
and 2% of motor spirit. (This is
used nowadays for varnish rather than
alcohol to 96-96.5% while reducing impurities other than water. This
is used in the production of their higher quality cane spirits,
Ricard, and perfumes (using imported essences), while some is
exported. Noui the distillery at Solitude has been replaced by a
new one, at Beau Plan, which can produce more high quality alcohol for
export. Medine distillery also uses a little of its alcohol for
tAic^
vinegar production. Gil beys distil the 76% ethanol9^they buy from the
other disti11eries, to produce 96.6-96.8% alcohol (in a Gruman Herme
column). This is used for their three kinds of cane spirit and gin
production (using an old pot still, shown in figure 5.7). They also
produce matured rum, leaving the 76% spirit in old sherry barrels for




Heating and lighting spirits - To 87-88% ethanol add 0.5% of pyri¬
dine, 0.5% of paraffin and 0.05% of
methyl violet.
Blue spirit - Made from the heads (much of this is
methanol) and fusel oil. (Used as a
cheaper alternative for alcohol lamps
and stoves. Disliked because of the
smoke and smell it produces.)
The Panipat distillery is a 15 000 1/day (at 94-95% ethanol)
si~tu.a"tedt
disti11ery ^north of Delhi in Haryana state. They produce country
liquor, "whisky", several kinds of cane spirit and rum, and some
industrial alcohol (10% of production). The molasses and water are
blended in a steam heated column which can sterilise the wort, if
necessary. This is done to the wort used in the first stages of yeast
propagation, up to 2000 1 . As can be seen from figure 5.5, they
adjust the pH and ammonium sulphate additions separately for optimum
yeast growth and optimum alcoholic fermentation. The final stages of
yeast growth and the fermentations take place in unsterilised open
vats (up to 51 kl), so temperature control is as difficult as in Mau¬
ritius - it can reach 40 °C in summer (the optimum for their yeast is
30-32 °C).
The beer is then distilled and rectified and, for final purifi¬
cation, it is redistilled in a 10 000 1 pot still. The usual quanti¬
ties of by-products are produced. The heads are used to denature
industrial alcohol and the fusel oil is sold to pharmaceutical and
chemical companies.
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At Hawamdieh-Giza, in Egypt, there is a much larger industrial
alcohol distillery producing 25 Ml ethanol annually from 110 000 t
molasses. Originally built in 1949 it has been expanded to improve
yields and recover by-products.
Egyptian molasses are richer in sugars than Mauritian molasses,
and so are a better fermentation feedstock. Also advantageous for
fermentation is the high biotin content of 609 ppm(5), compared to a
typical 1-3 ppm for cane molasses(9). Biotin is an essential yeast
nutrient(10).
The molasses were partially clarified by centrifugation before
dilution and the addition of urea and ammonium phosphate. Despite
this clarification there were still problems of scaling in the dis¬
tillation columns, which had to be cleaned periodically with a water
jet. This was because the scales were due to the formation of calcium
sulphate salts (74.9% of the scale weight)(5). The build-up of depo¬
sits could be reduced by the addition of descalers (e.g. "Fabkron"
at 25 ppm) although this was expensive.
At a more modern disti 1 lery, in the south of Egypt? sulphuric acid
clarification was practised. The molasses were diluted to 40-
42 °Brix, superphosphate and ammonium sulphate were added; in the
quantities necessary for fermentation, and sulphuric acid to pH 4.5.
This mixture was held at 95 °C for one hour, allowed to settle for
two hours and then centrifuged. This resulted in a decrease of 65% in
the calcium content and an increase of 3% in fermentation efficiency^
against losses of 0.3-0.5% in clarification. The scale then had to be
removed only every 200 days instead of every 15 to 45 days(5).
At Hawarndieh the fermentation was carried out in covered steel
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tanks - covered to reduce the chance of infections and to collect the
carbon dioxide produced. The spray-ring water cooling on the outside
of the tanks was inadequate at times in the summer when the fermenta¬
tion tanks reached temperatures of 37-39 °C. The optimum temperature
for the yeast used (their own strain, adapted to high temperatures)
was 33-34 °C.
The fermented wort, or beer, was centrifuged to separate the
yeast (used for fodder), and then distilled to produce industrial
alcohol at 90 or 95%. 1200 1 /day of the alcohol produced was fer¬
mented to acetic acid on site. The company also owns two perfumeries
and an ethyl acetate plant, in which plants they use some 3.6 Ml/a of
alcohol. The rest of the alcohol produced by all their distilleries
is used as follows(5) :
i. 9 Ml/a for alcoholic beverages, chemical and pharmaceutical
industries, hospitals and laboratories.
ii. 3 Ml/a of 95% and 90% specially denatured alcohol are used in
solvents and chemical compounding.
iii. 14 Ml/a of 90% completely denatured alcohol are used for heating
and lighting.
iv. A surplus of 10-15 Ml/a was available for export at 95% for bev¬
erages or in exchange for petrochemicals.
2.1. Alcohol production efficiency
Looking at the efficiencies shown in figure 5.5 it can be seen
that the yields of the Mauritian distilleries were only about 70% of
the theoretical yield according to the equation of Gay-Lussac:
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CcHio0c = 2C H OH + 2C0 AH = -113 kJ
o Iz b c o c
applied to the sucrose and reducing sugars in the molasses and assum¬
ing a non-fermentable sugars concentration of 5%. This compares with
80% in the Egyptian plant and over 90% in the most modern distil¬
leries. The Mauritian yield is the same as it was when Rene Leclezio
wrote his article on the history of the Mauritian sugar industry(l).
This is not surprising,as the distilleries in 1977 were substantially
the same as they were in 1957. After a French student working at
MSIRI (M. Leveque) had shown that adding ammonium sulphate to the
wort improved yields, that hydrofluoric acid had no effect, and that
fodder yeast could be cultivated on vinasse(ll,12), some of the fac¬
tories had started adding ammonium sulphate and two were experiment¬
ing with yeast recovery, by centrifuge, before distillation(ll) These
were all the changes made to the fermentation technology by 1977,
while no changes in distillation equipment had been made, except at
the Solitude distillery where a third stage had been added and
improved so that it could produce extra fine alcohol for use in
blending spirits such as Ricard(13).
Some of the factors responsible for the lower yield were:
i. The molasses were not clarified.
ii. No yeast was recycled. This would save on the molasses sugars
used for yeast growth under aerobic conditions.
iii. The fermentation vats were open, allowing easy infection by wild
yeasts blown from the cane fields.
iv. The yeast was ordinary dried bakers yeast, a strain selected for
high initial activity rather than prolonged fermentation
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activity, or a high tolerance to alcohol, to sugars or to high
fermentation temperatures.
Compare this with the practice in the Hawamdieh disti1lery,where
a special strain of yeast was used, adapted to high fermentation tem¬
peratures and the molasses were clarified, or at Panipat, where dif¬
ferent wort compositions and pH were used for the yeast growth and
fermentation in order to optimize yields.
So these three Mauritian distilleries (Medine, Solitude and St.
Antoine) were not technically optimised for the production of indus¬
trial alcohol. Perhaps they were better suited to the production of
high quality rums, with considerations of flavour being more impor¬
tant than the yield of ethanol. But, in fact, the cane spirit pro¬
duced is not of a high quality and it has to be distilled to 95% to
remove some of the off flavours, then diluted and mixed with other
flavours before bottling. Mauritians add dried fruits to the cheaper
cane spirits to disguise other less pleasant flavours (when celebrat¬
ing New Year, for example). This does not result from the composi¬
tion of Mauritian molasses being greatly different from that in other
rum producting countries, as is shown by an experiment under the
Mauritius-Reunion Agricultural Collaboration Committee in June
1953(3). Mauritian molasses were fermented and distilled in Reunion,
and produced a rum comparable to a high quality Reunion rum. In the
experiment, the rum was distilled to 62% to keep the cogeners which
contribute to the flavour, while in Mauritius it could be said that
the cane spirit is rescued from a bad fermentation by distillation to
a high alcohol concentration. No special yeast mixtures were used in
Mauritius to produce these cogeners, rather accidental mixtures of
bakers yeast and wild yeasts from occasional infections.
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From the foregoing we can see that the lower Mauritian yield was
not due to any attempt to retain flavours in their rum (as in
Jamaica, where pot stills are used for this reason or in the Gilbeys'
distillery in Mauritius for gin distillation). To understand why this
yield was the same in 1977 as it was in the 1950s one has to look for
explanations that are not purely technical.
2.2. "Wastes" of alcohol production.
These are the carbon dioxide produced in the fermentation, the
slops from the fermentation tanks, the aqueous residue from the dis¬
tillation (the vinasse), the more volatile components of the distil¬
lation which come off above the ethanol (the heads), and the fusel
oil which separates out in the rectifying column.
Among the five distilleries studied, only at Hawamdieh was the
carbon dioxide recovered(5). The carbon dioxide was collected,
washed to remove impurities (mainly acetaldehyde and butyraldehyde),
scrubbed in potassium permanganate solution, passed through activated
charcoal towers, liquefied under pressure and bottled in 20 kg
cylinders(14). The plant was supplied by Whittemann and Haselberg of
Buffalo, New York, and needed four workers per shift, plus two extra
in the morning for loading(14). They produced 3134 t in 1976, which
production was limited only by the market and the liquefaction equip¬
ment (capacity 10-12 t/d), as the factory was producing about
17 kt/a.*
A full description of such a plant is given in an article at the
17th ISSCT congress in Manila(15). A plant designed to recover
* Based on 16 kg carbon dioxide per 100 kg molasses, from Pa-
turau, p.182(9)
- 234 -
24 t/d of carbon dioxide was installed at the Central Azucarera Don
Pedro in the Philippines. The equipment, installation and building
costs came to P6.5 M, while the income from carbon dioxide sales were
P18 k per 24 hours operation (at May 1979 prices). It uses about
3
300 kW of electrical power and 37 m /d of washing water (for removing
alcohol and other impurities). The gas is collected from the fermen¬
tation vats, passes through polyethylene tubing to a water separator,
a fan, an alcohol recovery column, a water scrubber, two stages of
compression with intermediate cooling, activated carbon and desiccant
columns, and a heat exchanger to reduce the temperature to -19 °C,
whereupon the carbon dioxide liquefies under a pressure 1.96 MPa.
Gaseous impurities are vented through the back of the liquefier. The
liquid carbon dioxide is mostly pumped to road tankers for bulk tran¬
sport, while some is loaded into cylinders. No equipment for produc¬
ing solid carbon dioxide ("dry ice") by the expansion of the cold gas
to atmospheric pressure is mentioned in the article, so it can be
assumed that this transformation is carried out by the users.
Problems mentioned in the article include that of obtaining a
consistent gas supply from the fermentation tanks, foam or air enter¬
ing the recovery system, vibration and specifying the optimum operat¬
ing conditions and maintenance schedules. As described in the article
the result was:
To date, Central Don Pedro's liquid C02 recovery plant has
performed creditably for over a year. This was due mainly
to the regular and periodic maintenance jobs we have
adopted like leak tests in fermentation, valve and
strainer/fiIter checks and equipment performance tests in
the CCL plant, etc. We have started this unique (sic) ven¬
ture here and we hope that it persists in giant stride.
It is perhaps the relative complexity and difficulty of mainte¬
nance of this equipment (compared to that in a simple distillery)
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that has discouraged other ethanol producers from collecting the CC^
-formed during the fermentation. At the Mauritian di sti11eries,and at
Panipatjthe gas is allowed to escape. In fact, on Mauritius not only
did the three distilleries lose a potentially recoverable 2400 t of
CO,, per year,** but, in 1977, no attempt was made at the brewery to
collect it. Yet the same company which owns Mauritius Breweries Ltd.
owns Gaz Carbonique Ltd., where 360 t/a C0£ are produced by burning
oil. This they sell to the companies which bottle soft drinks.
2.2.1 Heads
This fraction from the distillation is used as an alcohol dena-
turant in some places because of its methanol content. This occurs at
Panipat Cooperative Distilleries, whereas in Mauritius the heads are
mixed with fusel oil to make a cheap, smoky, fuel. It is interesting
to note that methanol imports into Mauritius have recently increased
from 750 kg/a (average 1969-73), to 3727 kg/a in 1974, and to
5404 kg/a over 1976-7.
2.2.2. Fusel oil
This is a mixture of alcohols with boiling points between 80 °C
and 160 °C, mainly amyl, isoamyl, isobutyl and n-propyl alcohol. It
is often used as a solvent for lacquers or resins(16,17), and in
India is in demand from pharmaceutical and chemical companies. In
Egypt it is used as a lacquer solvent and for the evaluation of
fats(5). It can command a high price where local chemical companies
can make use of it, but,in Mauritius, it is merely blended with the
** Calculated from the ethanol production, the yields on mo¬
lasses in figure 5.5 and the ratios of C0? collectable to
ethanol produced in Paturau, p.182(9).
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heads to make cheap "blue spirit".
2-2.3 Yeast
During fermentation some yeast grows. This may be separated
before distillation for reuse, or for use as a source of yeast hydro-
lysates (e.g. "Marmite") or animal feed. In many small distilleries
the yeast is not separated and the wort,containing suspended yeast, is
pumped to the analysing column. There the yeast breaks down, increas¬
ing the organic matter loading in the vinasse, to which is added the
slops from the fermentation tanks (also containing yeast). Such a
practice also increases scaling in the columns. Nevertheless, to
save on the capital costs of centrifuges, many distillers are
prepared to accept these disadvantages. Such was the case at the St.
Antoine, Medine, Solitude and Panipat distilleries.
At Hawamdieh it had been planned, in 1967, to modify the process
to produce ethanol and fodder yeast in a single process - the Vogel-
busch process(5). The diluted molasses were not treated with sul¬
phuric acid but just partially clarified by centrifuge. The fermenta¬
tion was operated with partial aeration and added nutrients. After¬
wards, the yeast was separated in centrifugal separators, washed and
drum-dried. The drying both improved the keeping quality of the yeast
and broke open the cell walls, making the nutrients available for
animal digestion. It was intended to produce fodder yeast with 50%
protein.
Thus^100 kg of monosaccharides would produce 53.5 1 of 100%
ethanol and 7.6 kg of fodder yeast at 90% dry matter and 50% protein.
This is based on 14 hour fermentations using ammonium phosphate,
superphospate and urea fertilization. The yeast production is some
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2.5-3 kt/a.
As there were difficulties in obtaining 50% protein in their
strain of Saccharomyces cerevisiae,unless more nutrients were used,
the process was modified to produce yeast containing 40% protein as
this was the most economical process.
In Mauritius, however, none of the distilleries practised yeast
recovery in 1976, although experiments had been carried out at the
Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute and at Solitude distil¬
lery (12). Leveque carried out these experiments with a Westfalia
SAOH 205 centrifuge. On a 200 1 sample of the "beer" at Solitude
distillery 1306.0 g dry matter were recovered. If the alcoholic
strength were 5%, this is equivalent to 130 kg/m^ alcohol. This par¬
ticular centrifuge was not very efficient, recovering only 65% of the
dry matter (according to other experiments of Leveque). So he
3
estimated a recovery of 160 kg/m with a more efficient centrifuge.
At Solitude this would have come to 1.2-1.3 t/d of yeast.
These experiments were made in October 1974. Yet, in January
1977 none of the Mauritian distilleries were separating the yeast
produced. Only Mauritius Breweries Ltd. were separating yeast from
the beer they produced, since they were producing clear lagers which
have to be fi1tered, and pasteurized, 1 ess the beer spoils from yeast
autolysis or bacterial infection at tropical temperatures. They used
a small drum drier to break up the yeast cell walls and sold the
yeast, together with the spent grains, to pig rearers, the Ministry of
Agriculture and to Rodrigues at Rs 1.2/kg
Only recently have the distilleries in Mauritius taken any great
interest in yeast recovery. Before the Solitude distillery was closed,
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a double separation process was installed which recovered up to 10 kg
3
dry yeast per m of alcohol produced(18). In the new O.K. Distillery^
at Beau Plan,the yeast is separated using a solids ejecting centri¬
fuge, stored at 5 °C for re-use, and the excess dried for use as
fodder(19).
2.2.^ Vinasse use and abuse.
In this section will be described the approaches to vinasse
disposal current in 1976/7, at the distilleries visited. Detailed dis¬
cussion of other alternatives can be found in the section dealing
with power alcohol distilleries.
Vinasse is the name given to the residue from the distillation
of the products of the alcoholic fermentation of molasses or sugar¬
cane or sugarbeet juice. It is often mixed with the slops from the
fermentation tanks, this mixture being called slops or (mixed)
vinasse. It is acid (as a result of the acid added to maintain a low
pH during fermentation), is highly loaded with organic matter (from
yeast breakdown in the column when not separated, and from unferment-
able organic matter in the molasses). At Panipat distillery the bio¬
logical oxygen demand (BOD) was 35 000 to 45 000 ppm. Some typical
analyses are shown in figure 5.8, while figure 5.9 compares the typi¬
cal polluting characteristics of vinasse and tank slops with the
Reunion standards for disposal in rivers and the sea.
Despite this high polluting load, a very common method of
vinasse "treatment" is to dispose of it in a river or the sea. At
Hawamdieh distillery the vinasse was discharged to a sewer, known to
geographers as the River Nile. One of the Mauritian distilleries put
its vinasse into a volcanic cave, supposedly watertight. (But the
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Figure 5.8 Analyses of vinasse from molasses distilleries.
Sources and countries:
Concentrations Auneau Gloria Branco Chatterjee
in kg/m Reunion Brasil Brasil Brasil India
Dry matter 110.75 - - 81.5 90-110
Organic matter 85.15 42.9 63.4 60.0 -
Reducing subs. - - - 9.5 10-12
COD - - - 65.0 -
BOD - - - 25.0 -
Fixed ash 25.60 - - 21.5 30-40
N 1.42 1.06 1.18 1.2 1.2-2.0
P?°6 0.35 0.11 0.15 0.2 0.2-0.5K?0 10.80 5.42 7.83 7.8 7.0-12.0
cao 1.90 2.29 3.64 3.6 2.0-5.0
MgO - 1.01 0.99 1.0 3.0-4.0
SO - - 6.40 6.4 8.0-8.5
C 4 - - 19.20 18.2 -
NaCl - - - 3.0 4.5-6.0
Si 0„ - - - - 1-1.5
A1 + Feo0„ _ _ _ _ 0.4-0.5
Defrs?ty 2 3 1.044 _ _ - 1.02
°Brix - - - - 8.5-10.5
pH 4.0-4.2 4.0 - 4.5 4.2-5.0
Sources: Auneau(18), Branco(20), Chatterjee(21) quoted in Patil and
Jadhav(22).
Figure 5.9 Vinasse pollution load.
Vinasse Tank Disposal regulations:
slops To the sea Elsewhere
COD/(mg/1)25 000 - 50 000 200 000£750 c 500
BOD/(mg/1 ) 15 000 - 30 000 120 000 £ 300 e 250
Suspended matter/(mg/1) 2500 - 5000 100 000 - 25
pH 3.0 - 4.5 3.2 5. 5 - 9.0
Temperature 98 °C 30 °C
A1cohol/(% v/v) 0.92 - 0.1 5
Source: Auneau(18).
The other Mauritian distilleries use different methods. For,
although they face the common problem of disposing of 8 Ml of vinasse
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each year, they attempt to resolve this independently, without con¬
tacting the other two or even the MSIRI (with one exception).
Solitude distillery used to dilute its vinasse with irrigation
water and put the diluted vinasse through its overhead irrigation
system. The acid solution corroded the pumps (but not the tubes or
water cannon(18) ), especially when the water supply was cut off by
the water authority, resulting in undiluted vinasse passing through
the irrigation pumps(23). So the manager and his chemist had been
trying to find ways of neutralizing it. Lime was tried, but found to
be too expensive(13). A French student working at MSIRI for a short
time, M. Leveque, did some work on growing Candida utilis on vinasse,
including pilot scale experiments at the Solitude distillery(12).
These were carried out in a 200 1 fermenter (see figure 5.9) with an
agitator designed so that its turning would draw in air, through its
hollow shaft, in order to aerate the mixture. The yeast was separated
using a Westfalia SAOH 205 centrifuge (which recovered 70% of the
solids in the suspension, so it was not the most efficient that could
be used for yeast recovery). The pH increased from 4.0 to 7.0 in 18
hours at around 25 °C, using a substrate of vinasse with the addition
of 0.1% ammonium sulphate. The yields obtained were 1.3 and 6.2 kg
dry yeast for an ethanol production of 100 1. The latter yield is a
good one for the process.
When M. Leveque left Mauritius this work stopped, and, as the
O.K. distillery did not express any further interest in this, the
fermenter was in 1977 collecting dust at MSIRI. Although Auneau(18)
claims that:
Les quantites d'air a insufler et I'agitation qui doit etre















PhiC IX Pilot fcrmcnicr components. Left, fermcnter t;ink and cooling coil. Right, air-inducing agitator.
ces essais a l'echelle industrielle a Maurice.*
However, it appears unlikely that such a conscious, planned decision
was made as I never heard this justification mentioned by anyone I
interviewed at the Solitude distillery or MSIRI.
The third Mauritian distillery, at Medine, sprays the vinasse on
to heaps of bagasse piled up to 1-1.5 m. This is continued for
two(24) or three to four(18) months, by which time the material has
formed a fine black compost with little remaining fibrous material.
* The quantities of air which have to be blown and the agita¬
tion which must be carried out do not permit the extrapolation
of these experiments to the industrial scale in Mauritius.
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This compost, at 70% moisture, is spread on the estate's plantations
at a dose of 24-36 t/ha(18). The compost is considered to be a
better fertilizer than the filter mud or farm manure. At Medine
estate, organic matteer is found to be useful as it is in the driest
part of the island, yet the cane is burned before cutting, which
allows higher evaporation and decreases the soil organic matter con¬
tent (24).
This compost compares favourably with bagasse compost made with
bacterial starter cultures but without the addition of nutrients
(such as vinasse). One such starter culture was under test in Mauri¬
tius in 1976. The culture was marketed under the trade name
"Cofuna"**. This, when mixed with 45% bagasse and 45% filter mud pro¬
duced a compost in four months, similar in appearance but with low
levels of inorganic nutrients. It did not do well in trials of sugar¬
cane and potato growth on good soils(25).
At Panipat Cooperative Distilleries, IRs200 000 were being
invested in an effluent treatment plant, using a process developed at
the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur. This is a semi-anaerobic pro¬
cess in which ammonifying bacteria are cultured in lagoons on diluted
(1+2) vinasse. The bacteria produce ammonia from the nitrogenous com¬
pounds in the vinasse, in this way neutralizing the effluent. They
simultaneously reduce the BOD from 15 000 ppm, initially, to 3000 ppm,
after 96 hours. The treated vinasse contains all the nitrogen (as
ammonia), phosphorus and potassium that entered the lagoon, so it is
a good fertiliser. After further dilution, to reduce the BOD to
500 ppm,it is used for irrigating the cane fields(18,26).
** Compagnie des Fumures Naturelles.
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Other Indian distilleries rely on simple 1agooning, with no spe¬
cial bacterial cultures, or any aeration or mixing top accelerate the
biological decomposition of the organic matter in the vinasse. These
require retention times of 35 to 60 days to reduce the BOD to
3000 ppm(6).
The Egyptian distilleries do not treat their vinasse. In 1979
they were studying the possibility of producing fodder yeast on
vi nasse(5).
This completes the comparison of the technologies used in these
five distilleries. Following consideration of the markets available
for alcohol from such distilleries, the appropriateness of these
technologies to the conditions under which the distilleries operated
will be discussed. This involves consideration of the history of how
they arrived at the present technologies, and the present forces act¬
ing for, and against, further technical change.
3. Markets for ethanol.
The simplest market for any fermentation ethanol producer is the
sale of potable spirits. Ethanol produced from petrochemicals cannot
be used for this (except for some Mafia produced Italian wine), the
quality is not too critical as long as the alcohol is distilled to
94% or more*, and the price people will pay for spirits is always
enough to ensure a profit even with a somewhat inefficient process.
For example, in 1976, the Mauritian distillers sold their alcohol at
*In Mozambique "brandies" made by mixing 95% industrial alcohol
with imported flavours are eagerly sought despite their common¬
ly acknowledged awful flavour and a price of more than the
equivalent of US$7.
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Rs3/1 (on a 100% basis) to the bottlers, the government took Rs23 as
tax, and the bottlers diluted the alcohol to 40%, added flavours and
sold the cane spirit at around Rsl0/70 cl bottle (for the cheapest
brands). Naturally, no Mauritian distiller will reveal his production
costs, but estimates have been made of Rs1-1-25/1(27), Rsl-77/1(8)
and Rs2.25(24). Rs3/1 is a reasonable return on any of them, as the
capital equipment was written off years ago.
It is difficult to produce a good matured rum which will sell
internationally. This requires good control of the fermentation con¬
ditions and the use of special mixtures of yeasts, to produce the
impurities or "cogeners" which give rum its distinctive flavour, and
of the disti11ation, to avoid removing these cogeners from the rum.
Also needed is the working capital for keeping the rum in casks for
five to seven years. These casks have to be bought fresh each time;
Gilbeys' distillery in Mauritius uses old sherry casks. A 30 year
old 18 000 1 wooden vat (as used at Medine for producing their "Vieux
Rhum") is no good at all.
Once produced to the required quality, there is no guarantee
that the rum will sell. As consumers and distributers tend to buy
well known brands, it is difficult for new brands to enter the market.
Panipat Cooperative Distilleries manage by selling their long matured
rum to a British company and a German one who sell the rum under
their own brand names ("Tropicana" in the case of the German com-
pany)(26). Are these sales made possible by the well-known brand
names or the marketing organisations of the European company? Well,
even the multinational Gilbeys organisation has difficulties in get¬
ting merchants to stock their unknown Green Island brand,which they
produce at their Mauritian plant. They try to market it in Hong
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Kong, Bahrain, Australia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Bel¬
gium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK - yet they have to rely
rather on the more expensive end of the Mauritian market and the
tourist trade. In 1976 they were only running at one third nominal
capacity**, producing 5.5 Ml/a.
Alternatively, pure 96.5% ethanol can be produced for blending
in drinks which depend on flavours derived from other sources. On
this basis, the OK Distillery in Mauritius has been blending Ricard
and other spirits, using ethanol refined in its third column at the
Solitude distillery, and, more recently, in its new distillery at
Beau Plan. They have also exported some high-grade ethanol for blend¬
ing in such spirits. Of the distilleries studied, only the OK and
Gilbeys distilleries in Mauritius could produce extra fine ethanol to
international standards.
More easily produced is industrial alcohol. However, this market
is still dominated by ethanol synthesised from ethylene. According
to Johnston, the Product Manager for Ethanol for Union Carbide, fer¬
mentation ethanol would not become viable before 1985, except as a
by-product of high fructose corn syrup(28). Other countries produce
a higher proportion of their industrial alcohol by fermentation, such
as Japan (44%(9a)),, Brasil, Egypt and India. These countries do not,
in general, have large resources of natural gas for ethylene produc¬
tion, or the ethanol market to justify a synthetic ethanol plant, or
they produce industrial alcohol as a by-product of other processes
(e.g. from sulphite liquor wastes from pulp mills) or policies (e.g.
** Although some parts of the plant had not been expanded to
the full nominal capacity. The bottle washing machine, bought
secondhand, was running at full capacity and was not to be re¬
placed until the market demand required it.
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from wine surpluses in the EEC). In brief, fermentation industrial
ethanol can be sold at present to specific regional markets, but not
internationally.
Finally, fermentation ethanol is being used as an automotive
fuel, both alone and blended with gasoline. This has already been
discussed in the literature survey. It is mainly countries with
surplus agricultural production (or production potential) which have
invested in fuel alcohol distilleries. Where a tradeable raw material
such as molasses is to be used, and where there is no problem in
transporting the molasses to a port, fuel alcohol production is gen¬
erally uneconomic to the entrepreneur, and will depend on government
subsidies.
4. The rationality of conservatism in the industry.
Few studies have been carried out, in any detail, of small,
traditional, alcohol disti11eriesf. They have either been accepted
without comment, or dismissed without study. Yet, worldwide, such
small-scale distilleries are very common. Why should this be so?
It is best understood by considering the historical development
of particular distilleries. In Mauritius, the Medine, St. Antoine and
Solitude distilleries are the result of a concentration of the cane
spirit industry on the island, after the end of alcohol exports to
the UK, in the early 1950s. Tariff barriers had been erected to pro¬
tect the UK spirit producers, as soon as they managed to regain their
f One exception is a study made some years ago of the distil¬
leries owned by SINAGRA (Sociedade de Industrias Agricolas
Agorianas), in the Azores, by Cross de Chavannes of Booker
Agriculture Ltd. This has not been considered here, as the dis¬
tilleries are based on beet molasses rather than cane molasses.
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prewar production capacity. As there was no possibility of competing
with the inexpensive gasoline of the period, the only market was in
the production of local spirits. Many distilleries were closed,
sometimes with equipment being transferred to those which were still
operating. In return, the former distillers received shares in a dis¬
tillers association, which profited from the operations of the
remaining distilleries. The spirit market was divided between the
three working distilleries, which were run a small adjuncts to their
neighbouring sugar factories, which themselves were part of the
larger groupings of WEAL, Harel Mai lac and Denoncla.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the owners of
the distilleries or the operating companies took little interest in
"modernisation" of the distilleries. For this small, unimportant,
sideline gave good profits without any further investment, as people
are willing to high prices for cane spirit. The owners conservatism
was perfectly rational, resulting in no interest in new technologies.
Indeed, this was the technology appropriate to the purpose of produc¬
ing limited quantities of cane spirit, at prices affordable by a
large proportion of the Mauritian people.
It was not, however, so appropriate to producing high quality
rum or cane spirits for export, or fuel alcohol for blending with
gasoline, or for limiting the pollution caused by the factories.
Such criteria were not those used by the owners. In their own terms,
there was no rationale in investing in the distilleries*. Bald
statements that such conservatism is perfectly rational, or that it
* With the exception of a few small, extremely profitable, in¬
vestments that had been suggested by their managers, such as
perfume compounding.
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is irrational, imply that a set of idealized criteria have been
applied to a situation, without considering the material cir¬
cumstances of the factory within a society and, for privately owned
factories, its possible markets. So the fixed, and limited, criteria
of the owners lead to the conclusion that no new technologies need be
introduced into the distilleries, whereas the different criteria of
the "Engineering men" of We 11s(9b) led them to introduce technology
into their factories which was more capital-intensive than was
economicly necessary. Both decisions are rational under their own
criteria, what can be questioned is the continuing relevance of these
criteria to the reality of the industry, and its interactions with
its physical, economic and social environment.
This reality changes with time. One example of this is the
changing attitude to pollution in India, Egypt and Mauritius, which
has led to recent interest in all three countries (as elsewhere) in
ways of treating vinasse. For example, the increase in tourism in
Mauritius led to a demand for higher quality cane spirits, which was
first met by an outsider, Gil beys, who set up a new distillery capa¬
ble of producing better tasting cane spirits at a higher price. The
criteria that had been used by the Mauritian distillery owners were
no longer relevant. This realisation came as a shock to those in Mau¬
ritius who had supported the conservative line of those in the dis¬
tillers ring. Although their anger was aimed at Gilbeys, rather than
the local distillers, it was from then on less socially acceptable
within the Franco-Mauritian community to take the technical condi¬
tions of the distilleries for granted. Not only the economic but also
the social conditions had changed, leading to a change in the cri¬
teria used by some members of this group which had previously
- 245 -
espoused a rational conservatism. Consequently, when plans were made
to close the Solitude sugar factory, a decision was taken to build a
new distillery at Beau Plan, making use of newer technologies. Such
interactions between a technology and its environment, and the
dynamic nature of the processes involved in the selection, design and
introduction of technologies, are discussed in the conclusions.
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CHAPTER SIX
Pu1p and paper product1 on from bagasse - alternative technologies.
In this chapter is outlined the history of proposals for pulp
and paper production from bagasse in Mauritius, a comparison of two
technologies for this, one medium-scale, one small-scale which shows
that well run Indian mini mills can be more profitable than a pro¬
posed chemimechanical pulp mill for Jamaica. Furthermore, the Indian
data are recalculated at Mauritian prices to see if a mini-mill could
be viable in a higher-wage economy. The purpose of this chapter is
to study the alternatives in a selected use of sugarcane by-products,
as very often unjustified arguments of "overriding economies of
scale" are use to dismiss alternative solutions out of hand.
1. Pulp and paper production in Mauritius
The production of bagasse pulp in Mauritius has long been dis¬
cussed but never undertaken on a commercial scale. The MSIRI report,
"By-products of the sugar industry of Mauritius"(1) recounts the his¬
tory of proposals and occasional experiments, such as the production
of one page of the Revue Agricole of 1889, and specimen sheets of
cardboard shown at the 1887 Colonial and Indian Exhibition in London.
From 1951 to 1955 there was some interest, on the part of Forges
Tardieu Ltd. and some sugar factories, in the production of paper
from bagasse. They retained the Cellulose Development Corporation
Ltd. as consultants. In October 1952,the Cellulose Development Cor¬
poration Ltd. sent Dr. Raimondo to Mauritius. He recommended an
extremely economical plant, at Mon Loisir, producing 500 t/a low
grade wrapping paper by a lime cook of bagasse. This 5 t/d mill would
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have operated only during the crushing season, using sugar factory
steam and electricity. The estimated 1961 cost was Rsl.2 M, including
only Rs50 000 working capital(2). The project was abandoned when the
government turned down a request for a loan of half the capital.
In 1952, Prof. Hisey, of the Sandy Hill Iron and Brass Works,
reported to Blyth Brothers and Co. on the use of bagasse for domestic
fuel, insulation board and hardboard, and pulp and paper. His report
concluded against pulp and paper production, but in favour of insu¬
lating board production(3).
The following year yet another study was commissioned, this time
by the Colonial Office. The consultants, Messrs. Reed and Marsden of
the Pulp and Paper Research Co. Ltd. reported lukewarmly on a
3000 t/a paper and board plant, which they preferred to a pulp mill.
They described this Rs5.5 M project as "somewhat speculative". It
was turned down by the Mauritian colonial government(4).
By October 1956, further visitors were on the island, this time
Col. Magi 11 and three representatives of A. Reed and Co. Ltd. They
studied the possibility of erecting a 30-60 kt/a pulp mill using
bagasse and/or pine ( Pinus eliotti ) planted extensively on Crown
and private forest lands. The main drawbacks were the 0.2-0.5 m^/s of
water required, effluent problems and uncertainties in the bagasse
supply.
Since the MSIRI report was issued in 1961, other consultants
have reported on the possibilities of pulp or paper production. One
of the more detailed was produced by Sandwell and Co. Ltd., in 1969, on
the "Utilisation of bagasse in Mauritius"(5). They estimated a
bagasse surplus by 1975 of 123 kt/a (bone dry basis), on an estimated
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production of 660 kt sugar, 1570 kt wet bagasse or 770 kt dry
bagasse. If the pith (35%) were burned in the furnaces, releasing
more bagasse fibre, the total surplus fibre would be equivalent to
190 kt/a. They suggested a Rs3.1 M, 45 t/d particleboard plant, and a
Rsl2.3 M, 100 t/d pulp mill (for export). At 3.62 t dry bagasse/t
pulp and 1.61 t dry bagasse/t board this would require 140 kt/a dry
bagasse which would be within the surplus production estimate, pro¬
vided that the pith is burned in the sugar factory boilers. On the
basis of water availability they proposed five possible locations for
the pulp mill, as shown in figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1 Water availability for a pulp mill in Mauritius
Location Wate^supply Max. mill size
m /d air dry t/d
Beau Champ 110 000 700
Savannah 18 000 120
Union St.Aubin 18 000 120
St.Felix 18 000 120
F.U.E.L. 25 000 160
Medine 25 000 160
In 1971 the Indian Government Techno-Economic Mission to Mauri¬
tius suggested setting up both a 100 t/d newsprint mill (for export)
and a 2 t/d grey cardboard mill (for local consumption)(6).
According to their "project profile" the newsprint mill would
only have cost Rs117 M, no chemical input would be required (p.140),
6 3
the mill would consume annually 8x10 m water, 28 kt furnace oil,
38 GWh electricity (one quarter of the electricity generated by the
CEB in 1972), 57 250 t bagasse (bone dry basis) and 1570 t of
imported bamboo pulp. This was considered by the Indian team to be
the minimum economic size, in 1971, for a newsprint mill. Their
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market analysis is contained in one sentence: "The market for export
should be studied before taking a decision to implement the
project."(p.137). They stated that the plant should use the Simon-
Cusi process, but their process description does not explain why the
digested bagasse is separated into fully and partially digested
fibres, or why the longer fibres are mechanically refined before
being blended with the shorter fibres.
Their "profile" of grey cardboard manufacture is unusual in as
much as the flow sheet includes a straw cutter. This, together with
the use of lime alone to digest the bagasse (normally NaOH is used to
avoid long digestion times leading to very weak fibres), shows the
attention to detail and professional competence typical of this mis¬
sion.
More recently Sybetra, a Belgian paper company, together with
Simon Engineering considered erecting a Rs600 M, 350 t/d bagasse pulp
mill in Mauritius. They got as far as signing contracts to replace
bagasse by fuel oil, but, at the time of the final feasibility study,
they did not have the money to invest in the plant. During a subse¬
quent European Development Bank visit to Mauritius this plan was put
forward by the private sector there. It was left for the European
Development Bank to contact the Belgian company, but nothing more was
heard of this(7).
The Birla group in India had had discussions about setting up a
small semi-bleached pulp mill to produce cardboard and wrapping
paper(7). Nothing came of this, perhaps because of the establishment
of Packaging Industries Ltd. (see below).
who
An Indian businessman, .has visited Mauritius several times,A
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intended to set up a newsprint mill there to supply the Indian
market. In 1978 the project was to produce 145 kt/a newsprint in a p
9
Cusi process mill which was estimated to cost Rs 1.1x10 . This pro¬
ject was criticised in PROSI Bulletin for the lack of a guaranteed
export market, a shortage of surplus bagasse*, a water shortage, even
3
at Grand Port, where the Ferney dam could not supply 45 m /rnin, and
pollution hazards(8). Many Mauritian businessmen thought that this
Indian entrepreneur was after their money to invest in the project,
and, therefore, kept out of it. In fact, he returned later several
times, most recently, in 1981,with a plan to produce 90 kt/a newsprint
and 40 kt/a writing paper using a Swedish improved depithing technol¬
ogy. The plant is to be on barges sunk off Mahebourg, using water
from the new R. Champagne project and about 670 kt/a of wet bagasse
bought on a coal plus pith fuel replacement basis. Negotiations were
underway, in 1981,with sugar estates on how this should be calculated.
9
The estimated investment was then Rsl.2xl0 (9).
Meanwhile a pulp and paper mill has been built in Mauritius,
although not as yet using bagasse. This is the factory of Packaging
Industries Ltd., set up by M. Lagesse, which produces packaging paper
from paper waste. The waste paper is pulped in a hydropulper, then
passed through a separator to remove plastics and other contaminants,
to a simple paper machine which uses formers and vats rather than the
continuous belt fourdrinier system. The paper is then dried and
sprayed with starch to improve impact properties. M. Lagesse had
started in a small way, with three men and one or two machines, and
built up from that. In 1976, he had a factory producing 1000 t/a
* It is not clear why Beaubois did not consider fuel replace¬
ment for bagasse, instead of just the surplus bagasse availa¬
bility.
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employing 20 people and using mostly (90%) secondhand machinery.
Production of fluting and liner paper was planned to start in January
1978. He was also considering the use of bagasse later, after he was
using all the local waste paper (600 t/a collectable out of 1000-
1200 t/a waste) and imports from Reunion.
Despite all the studies, reports and consultancies only one
pulp/paper mill has been set up in Mauritius. Why is this? What fac¬
tors led to M. Lagesse's success where British and Belgian paper com¬
panies feared to tread? Among the reasons are the following:
i. Packaging Industries Ltd. is a marketing-oriented company. M.
Lagesse studied several hundred possible industries before
choosing to set up a plant producing packaging paper. He studied
the marketing opportunities before choosing his industry, unlike
all the other studies.
ii. Having chosen his market he went and studied existing plants
producing such products, at the scale of the Mauritian market
requirements rather than plants of a reputed "minimum economic
scale". He said he does not think anything of economies of scale
- the market comes first.
iii. He used 90% secondhand equipment, thereby reducing capital
costs.
iv. He used simpler, slower, paper machines which were adequate for
the Mauritian market; formers rather than fourdrinier machines.
v. Before starting operations he had thoroughly studied the busi¬
ness elsewhere and made a point of talking not only to the
managers but also to the workers, who knew exactly what could go
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wrong with any machine. This enabled him to make a good selec¬
tion of secondhand equipment and to maintain it with few unfore¬
seen problems.
vi. He built up production gradually, instead of building a large
plant at once and then trying to find enough waste paper to run
it to full capacity, and large local markets all at once. In
this way he could meet any problem as it occurred.
The dynamics of the establishment of this business show that it
is an appropriate technology not just in its suitability for the
local market conditions, not just in the way the reduced capital
costs took advantage of Mauritian factor costs, but in its social
trait-taking - a dynamic fit to the small entrepreneur in Mauritius.
The other proposals, if implemented, would have been trait-making
rather than trait-taking. Mauritians would have to learn how to
market pulp or paper overseas, to tolerate a lot of pollution in one
place, to change water and electricity supply plans to meet "les exi¬
gences enormes de cette industrie"(8), to convert some sugar fac¬
tories to burn oil or coal, to learn to operate complicated, unfami¬
liar equipment with little hope of applying these skills elsewhere.
But most important of all the traits that would be necessary for
the success of a large pulp mill is the institutional cooperation
required. The plants would be so large that the venture would have to
be undertaken by a foreign company, or by the government and all the
sugar industry. Only when the investment has been directly beneficial
to the sugar industry has this degree of cooperation been achieved in
Mauritius - in the cases of the fertilizer factory and the bulk sugar
terminal. With such institutional difficulties it seems that foreign
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investors could more easily establish a large pulp mill in Mauritius.
Hence the approach of the previously mentioned Indian businessman—
Indian market, Indian investment, Swedish technology—by this means
he can bypass many of these difficulties. Even so, this will take
time. If bagasse pulping in Mauritius had been approached in the same
way M. Lagesse approached packaging paper production, there might
already have been bagasse pulp mills in Mauritius, producing paper
for the local market.
This possibility will be discussed later, when the possibilities
of establishing mini-mills of Indian design in Mauritius is con-
si dered.
2. Pulp and paper production from bagasse in Jamaica and India.
"Sugar by-product utilization in Jamaica" is the title of an
Organization of American States report written in 1977, in which was
attempted an assessment of the techno-economic potential for the
utilization of sugar by-products to produce pulp and paper, animal
feeds and anhydrous alcohol(10).
The terms of reference for the part of their study concerned
with pulp and paper production were to undertake a demand analysis of
anticipated future markets for paper and paperboard in Jamaica and
the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM); a supply analysis of island
and local bagasse availability; to determine the best alternative
project; and to undertake financial and economic benefit analyses of
this project.
The study began by reviewing 13 previous studies on pulp and
paper production in Jamaica or the Greater Caribbean Region. These
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considered the following projects for Jamaica:
i. A 160 t/d or 50 t/d integrated pulp/paper mill to produce corru- '
gating medium from bagasse(ll).
ii. A 200 t/d corrugating medium from bagasse mill, a 10 t/d tissue
mill from waste paper and imported bleached pulp, and a 50 t/d
mill to produce liner, wrapping paper and corrugating medium
from used containers, the waste from a corrugated box plant and
imported waste paper(12).
iii. A 32 kt/a mill for the major paper grades and paperboard for
industrial use and a 9 kt/a creped tissue mill, using 17 kt/a
bagasse (pul p?) (13) A 100 kt/a newsprint mill based on Pi nus
caribaea or alternatively a 30 - 40 kt/a bagasse based newsprint
mill if no corrugating medium mill were bui1t(14).
iv. A thermo-mechanical pulp mill based on _P. caribaea to produce
newsprint and printing and writing grades - at first 16 kt/a
printings and writings or 18.7 kt/a newsprint, later to be
expanded to 35 kt/a, and a 10 kt/a linerboard and corrugating
medium plant based on imported kraft pulp and waste paper(15).
These projects were of two types, large mills, which would have
to export a large proportion of their production, and smaller mills,
which were designed to produce only a small surplus over Jamaica's
consumption of 60 kt/a in 1974 (c.10% newsprint, c.15% printing and
writing paper, most of the remainder packaging paper, especially
banana boxes)(10). To choose between these alternatives an export
market survey is needed. Such a survey was specified in the terms of
reference of the OAS study but was not carried out. Instead the
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authors of this report merely stated that any Jamaican exports would
not be competitive with the production from the Olancho project in
Honduras and the other four projects proposed in the FAO regional
study(15), as these mills would benefit from economies of scale.
thsrt
Such an assertion ignores the fact that the FAO study proposed^a
thermo-mechanical pulp mill be erected in Jamaica concurrently with
these four projects, and other mills be built later, phasing the
plant erection to meet an increasing regional demand for paper. This
demand was 575.7 kt/a in 1972-4 and was estimated at 844 kt/a by 1981
and 1.4 Mt/a by 1991(10,p.91). The FAO proposal to start 400 kt/a of
new pulp mills between 1982 and 1985 is half of the 1981 estimated
consumption, so all these plants should be able to sell their produc¬
tion provided that they could maintain prices below those of imports
from developed countries (USA, Canada, Scandinavia), rather than
needing to compete with each other. This does not mean that Jamaica
would be able to export pulp or paper, merely that the argument used
by Proenza and Collins in the OAS study is false.
So, they decided that any Jamaican mill would have to produce
only for the local market. Logically, this would require the assess¬
ment of the local market and small-scale production systems, and then
designing the most economical plant to fit the local conditions.
Unfortunately, they had already restricted their choice of technology
by a discussion of economies of scale on pages 80-6 of their report.
This they based on a costing of several recent integrated pulp/paper
projects, which they presented in their figure III.l (p.81) which is
presented in figure 6.2 together with capital costs for small-scale
Indian paper mills taken from Western's report, 'Small-Scale Paper-
making '( 16) .
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Figure 6.2 Variation of unit capital costs of integrated pulp/paper
mills against plant size.
Mill capacity
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From their data Proenza and Collins concluded:
From this discussion it will be apparent that a full chemi¬
cal bleached pulp mill, using any fibrous raw material, of
200 tpd production capacity must be considered the very
minimum size in view of today's building costs. To build a
pulp mill of this small (sic) size in any developing coun¬
try can probably be justified only on the basis of national
interests including the savings in foreign exchange. How¬
ever, in many situations, such as in Jamaica, this mill
would be too large for certain products that are needed to
supply the market. A mill of small size would require the
protection of a high import duty or a closed border to make
the project financially viable in providing a modest rate
of return on investment or equity. The local production in
small mills of paper from full chemical pulp produced
locally will, therefore, usually require much higher sales
prices than for paper at the world market prices for such
products.
The reader may be wondering how 200 t/d can be the minimum size
when the unit capital costs of Indian mills producing from 1 t/d to
30 t/d are less than the 200 t/d mills assessed by Proenza et al.*
They do mention this, but dismiss such mills with the following argu¬
ment :
The question may arise as to how it has been possible to
build some small low cost pulp/paper mills in some develop¬
ing countries. It is the case that in India and neighbour¬
ing countries there has been a drive to install cheap units
in the range of 10 to 50 tpd productive capacities. These
mills are often built with secondhand or locally built
equipment of simple design. The product qualities and the
processes would not meet world market requirements or those
of a developed country even in the few cases where the
fibrous raw material would be adequate. Many of these mills
pulp agricultural residues and other nonwood plant fibers
at atmospheric pressure and/or bleach by very antiquated
methods. There is usually no recovery of spent liquor in
these mills, a factor which makes tolerable the very high
per ton costs of chemical inputs. The resultant stream pol¬
lution, however, would not be tolerated in most countries;
and certainly not in Jamaica.
* The capital cost figures are not strictly comparable since
the figures quoted in the OAS study include pollution treat¬
ment, chemical recovery and power generation equipment, whereas
the Indian mills usually buy electricity from the grid, buy in
chemicals and only carry out a primary treatment (if any) of
the effluent.
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Such a hand-waving dismissal is less than adequate. Having
decided that the Jamaican market would not support a large-scale
plant, they should have investigated the economics of such mini-mi lis
rather than depending, like politicians, on hearsay and secondhand
impressions. By so constraining their freedom of choice, they had to
suggest a semi-mechanical pulp mill to be blended with imported
bleached softwood sulphate pulp to produce newsprint and printing and
writing paper. Semi-mechanical (thermomechanical or chemimechanical)
pulping depends on a pre-softening of the lignin in the fibres by
heat or a short chemical treatment, before the cellulose is separated
by mechanical refining. The suggested chemimechanical process is
shown in figure 6.3
Was this choice of chemimechanical pulping technology the
appropriate one for Jamaica? It is interesting to compare the costs
and benefits of producing 25 kt/a of paper in the proposed mill, with
the same production from typical Indian mills studied by Western(16),
namely 5x15 t/d mi11s,A3x25 t/d mills, vmhcj ng
straw pulp together with small quantities of waste paper, rags or
imported pulp. The capital costs of these mills are about half of
the cost of the proposed mill for the same production, as shown in
figure 6.4.
We see from figure 6.4 that the total investment for a series of
mini pulp/paper mills is far less than that of the larger chem¬
imechanical mill. It should also be noted that a 30 t/d plant, dis¬
cussed in Western, required only a total capital investment
equivalent to US$13.7 M for 25 kt/a of paper. Furthermore, it is
evident that these mills need not all be built at the same time, but
can be built when the demand exists for each one. The foreign
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Figure 6.3 Chemimechanical pulping of bagasse.
Source: This is figure V.1 on p.119 of OAS study.
SHEETS ROLLS
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~75 t/d 5x15 t/d 3x25 t/d
Land + site development 700 300 394
Buildings + structures 2940 1475 2205
Total land + civil works 3640 1775 2599
Machinery + equipment 20640 11324 10659
Erection 3480 750
Eng. + tech. services 2248 375 347
Personnel training abroad 212 0 0
Prestart-up expenses 1820 625 713
Spare parts + consumables 2064 213 225
Sundries 0 813 938
Contingencies 3264 782 788
Total of other items 13088 2806 3759
Total fixed capital 37368 15905 17025
Working capital 2438 2813
Total project cost 18344 19838
currency requirements for the smaller plants are also usually less.
The 15 t/d mill uses all Indian made equipment except for a machine
glazing cylinder, whereas the 25 t/d plant saved foreign currency by
importing second hand machinery (two 15 t/d paper machines). Moreover
local suppliers and contractors charge less for erection, engineering
and technical services, and no foreign training is necessary.
It is well known that small-scale plants often have lower capi¬
tal costs but higher running costs. These costs are compared in fig¬
ure 6.5, where the production costs per tonne of paper produced have
been calculated for the OAS proposal, the 15 t/d and 25 t/d mills
outlined in Western, and for a costing for bagasse based mini-mills
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of 15 t/d as proposed by Rao(17).
Figure 6.5 Unit cost of production for small and medium scale mills.
Item Unit costs / US$/t
OAS Western Rao
75 t/d 15 t/d 25 t/d 15 t/d
Fibres 111 103 192 76
Chemicals 49 91 191 80
Energy 120 82 88 73
Packaging 8 12 15 6
Labour 89 58 51 36
Maintenance 20 29 28 18
Insurance 2 - - -
Office & sales 3 * * 17
Contingencies - - - 6
Total 402 375 565 312
Capital charges 298 102 110 70
Total 700 477 675 382
Notes:
* These are included in the office labour costs.
1. The OAS figures have been corrected for a calculation error
(6 111 t of pulp at J$450.80/t cost J$2 754 839, not J$275 484 as
given).
2. The calculations are approximate, in that the capital costs
represent the annual payments over 15 years necessary to pay back the
capital at an assumed rate of interest of 11% annually, assuming pro¬
duction at 100% of capacity. In fact, the 25 t/d Indian plant was
only operating at 70% of full capacity, which figure was used in
reducing the fixed production costs to a per tonne basis. The calcu¬
lations do allow for the greater construction time of the largest
plant (4 years) as opposed to not more than one year for each small
pi ant.
The smaller plants cost less to run, because of cheaper, local,
raw material sources, and because these particular examples produced
some semi-bleached pulp, therefore, saving on the cost of bleaching
compared to the 25 t/d printing and writing papers mill. The chemical
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costs are higher in the three smaller mills since there is no chemi¬
cal recovery. The labour costs in India are lower despite the greater
number of workers employed.(For the production of 25 kt/a the chem-
imechanical mill would employ 329 people, 15 t/d straw based mills
would employ 2840 people and the 25 t/d straw based mills would
employ 1720 people). The reduced wage bill is partly due to the lower
wage rates in India, and partly due to lower requirements for skilled
workers in these simpler mills. Furthermore, the mill proposed in the
OAS study requires foreign 'experts' for the first three years, cost-
ing a total of US$1.8 M.
So we see that the cost of production of small-scale mills need
not be higher than the costs of medium size mills. Therefore, they
should not be dismissed out of hand, as in the OAS report. Of course,
small soda process mills based on Indian design will be less economic
in higher wage economies. Each case has to be considered on its mer¬
its, remembering that the Indian mills are based on the technology of
the 1930s, which is suited to Indian conditions. In other places,
design changes can be made to meet local requirements, with a better
chance of designing a mill appropriate to the local economic condi¬
tions than by scaling down a large-scale plant design.
In their local environments the Indian mini-mi lis are far more
profitable as figure 6.6 shows. This gives the results of a calcula¬
tion of the net present value (NPV) of the production and sale of
25 kt/a paper over 15 years by the different mills, discounted at
11%/a, and the internal rates of return (IRR) of each mill.
Such highly profitable Indian operations reflect high paper
prices, in a sellers market where there is a lack of investment in
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Figure 6.6 Profitability of small and medium scale mills.
OAS Western Rao
75 t/d 5x15 t/d 3x25 t/d 5x15 t/d
NPV/MUS$ 7167 5 2 571 771 lTTl
IRR 3% 35% 18% 27%
paper production, accompanying import restrictions (except for
newsprint)(16,p.52). The selling prices of paper at these four mills
is compared in figure 6.7, where the price of imported paper in
Jamaica before and after import duty is compared with those of the
paper sold by these three Indian mills before and after excise duty.
Figure 6.7 Selling prices of paper in Jamaica and India.
Prices/ OAS Western Rao
US$/t 75 t/d 15 t/d 25 t/d 15 t/d
News. P & W Pack. P & W Mi xed
Basic ex-mi11/c.i.f. 498 647 600 750 460
Rate of duty 20% 20% 37.5% 25% ?
Including duty 598 776 825 938 ?
Rate of rebate 0% 0% 60% 50% ?
Gross sales realisation 598 776 735 844 460
Selling expenses ? ? 45 56 10
Net sales realisation ? ? 690 788 450
(News.= newsprint, P & W = printing and writing, Pack.= packaging)
The Indian prices appear to be around 25% higher than the
corresponding international prices—"appear to be" because they have
been converted at the official exchange rate. The Indian government
import restrictions reflect a shortage of foreign exchange which oth¬
erwise would force a devaluation of the rupee. So, their support of
such mills can be justified in terms of the social costs and benefits
of the local production of paper in small mills. (Although the rea¬
sons for this support are undoubtedly political—employment
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generation and support of small businessmen pays off in votes.)
Proenza et al carried out an 'economic cost benefit analysis' of
their proposed chemimechanical pulp/paper mill under rather dubious
assumptions. They assumed a shadow wage rate as being the actual
wage rate multiplied by the employment rate as a measure of the aver¬
age probability that the workers were employed previously. But the
average is irrelevant, it is the marginal change in the new workers
productivity which is important. A new unskilled post in a new enter¬
prise will be filled by an unemployed worker, not one who had been
employed elsewhere. His shadow wage is a measure of his production
while unemployed (in odd jobs, family agriculture and so on) which
will be lost when he is working in the mill. Also, they assumed that
the special exchange rate of Jamaican $1.25 to US$1 represented the
true cost of foreign exchange (in the two tier exchange rate system
in force at the time), although later devaluations show this to have
been an unwise choice.
Their economic analysis, when corrected for the previously men¬
tioned calculation howler, gave the following results.
Net present value/US$ = -29.5 M
Internal rate of return = -7 %
Obviously a hopeless case under these assumptions.
Similarly correcting for gross distortions in the Indian econ¬
omy, by assuming a shadow wage for unskilled and semi-skilled workers
at 25% of their pay, and a shadow exchange rate at 20% over the offi¬
cial exchange rate (i.e. Rs9.6/US$), and pricing the paper at the
average Mauritian import prices for 1977, the following results are
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obtained.
5x15 t/d Net present value/US$ = +4.2 M
Internal rate of return = +16 %
3x25 t/d Net present value/US$ = +31.1 M
Internal rate of return = +42 %
From this crude analysis we can see the benefits to such an
economy of small scale paper mills. Other advantages of such plants
include their lower impact on the environment, creating less pollu¬
tion in one place, and not placing a great strain on services in
short supply such as water, electricity, or raw materials. In the
case of bagasse based mills, they can often rely on the surplus
bagasse from a large mill, rather than having to buy bagasse on a
fuel replacement basis as do the larger mills.
The experience of many large pulp mills in buying bagasse on a
fuel replacement basis from sugar factories has not been encouraging.
Rao(18) described the fortunes of the larger Indian bagasse pulp
mills. M/s Seshayee Paper and Boards Ltd (Tamil Nadu), a 35 kt/a
paper mill, had a contract with a nearby sugar mill to supply bagasse
on a fuel replacement basis. Of the contracted 15 kt/a bagasse (bone
dry basis) only 3.4 kt/a were supplied, on average, between 1963 and
1970, so they stopped using bagasse. M/s Mandya National Paper Mills
Ltd. (Karnataka), a 21.6 kt/a mill "had considerable difficulties in
obtaining sufficient supplies of bagasse" from a sugar factory, where
the paper company had even installed a multi-fuel boiler
to meet its steam requirements. They had to bring in bagasse
from distant sugar factories(18), before they could reach a
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"satisfactory level of production" in 1964(19).
Other large bagasse mills outside India have had to transport
bagasse over large distances to meet their requirements. For example,
the San Cristobal mill in Mexico has had to transport bagasse for up
to 200 miles. Only where the paper and sugar mills are under common
ownership have there been no bagasse supply difficulties for the
mill, such as the Pingtung mill set up by the Taiwan Sugar Corpora-
tion(20). This makes use of bagasse produced by several mills owned
by the same company.
Smaller mills have avoided such supply difficulties, either
using surplus bagasse from an adjoining mill under common ownership,
or being able to buy the small quantities required from whichever
neighbouring mills have a surplus at any time. Examples of such mills
are Ms. Rajendra Paper Mills Ltd., Hyderabad (4 kt/a); Ms. Venka-
teshwara Paper Mills Ltd., Tamil Nadu (6 kt/a) (18); the Pravara
Cooperative Sugar Factory, Maharashtra (30 t/d), which has been work¬
ing since 1975 manufacturing kraft paper from 60% bagasse, 20% rice
straw and 20% old jute bags, and disposing of the waste liquor as
irrigation water in acidic fields (21); and M/s Dhampur Sugar and
Board Mills Ltd., U.P., which produces cardboard and corrugating
medium. Figure 6.8 shows one of the large bagasse digesters, photo¬
graphed by the author in 1977.
To return to the Jamaican study, Proenza et al doubt the availa¬
bility of surplus bagasse, quoting estimates of 60 kt/a (|0,p. 58),
65 kt/a from Frome sugar mill alone(14), 300 kt/a assuming a 30%
surplus(15), a 10% saving of bagasse usage by adjusting the boiler








boilers were instal1ed(15), but pointing out that,at that time, many
also
mills continued to burn oil and,^at that time,there was only a surplus
of around 230 t/a not used for fuel or particleboard production
(p.99). As they were only interested in medium or large scale plants,
they had to ignore any bagasse surpluses and cost their proposals on
fuel oil substitution for bagasse. Two sugar factories would have had
to be converted to oil and pith burning,to release the needed quanti¬
ties of bagasse for the pulp mill and the existing parti cl eboard
mi 11.
Consider a possible alternative, starting with one mini-mill
making use of surplus bagasse, using a large proportion of locally
made equipment, and producing at low cost until a sufficient market
has been established to build more mini-mills using fuel substituted
bagasse. This might be a soda process mill to produce printing and
writing quality paper with very small or zero additions of longer
fibres, or a chemimechanical mill of Indian design to produce wrap¬
ping paper. (Many such mills of 10-15 t/d exist in India). Among the
advantages of such a progressive introduction of local paper
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production are the following:
i. Each mini -mi 11 can be located next to different sugar mills,
thus reducing transport costs for the bagasse.
ii. The first few mini-mills could use surplus bagasse, allowing
time for the sugar factories to install more efficient boilers
under the stimulus of higher oil and electricity prices (at
least to the extent that Mauritian and Hawaiian factories have
already done), thus producing a greater bagasse surplus.
iii. They are simple to run, involving little or no expatriate sup¬
port in construction and production.
iv. The processes are easily understood, providing a learning oppor¬
tunity for the workers which can be applied in future small or
large scale mills, and in other industries.
v. They are easier to maintain, and provide work for local repair
shops.
vi. Their capital costs are lower per tonne of paper produced (by
avoiding investment in independent power supplies, sophisticated
waste treatment, expensive buildings and high technology
machinery), increasing the financial viability of the mill even
at reduced production levels (cf. Universal Board Co. Ltd. and
Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. for the effects of producing under
capacity).
vii. The total capital costs are lower, so putting the investment
within the reach of the entrepreneur, cooperatives or the single
sugar factory. Larger mills in developing countries usually
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require massive government and international investment.
viii.Mini-mi lis employ more unskilled labour, so reducing unemploy¬
ment, at a lower capital cost per job created.
ix. The commissioning time is reduced from four years to two years,
for each mill, allowing a much closer matching of production
capacity to market demand.
x. The slower paper machines used in mini-mills allow the use of
lower strength pulp, and so a higher proportion of bagasse in
the furnish (provided they have a sufficiently long length sup¬
ported by wire to allow adequate drainage).
Against this must be set the disadvantages of:
i. Higher chemical consumption, except in the larger mini-mi lis of
25-30 t/d which practice chemical recovery.
ii. Higher energy costs, except where integrated with a sugar fac¬
tory.
iii. Variable quality production, if not properly instrumented.
iv. Higher labour costs in high-wage economies.
I would not claim from the foregoing that a series of small
mills would necessarily be an economic proposition for Jamaica, as,
even with the above advantages, the higher wages might make the ven¬
ture financially unprofitable. However, given the advantages of
mini-mills and the high levels of unemployment in Jamaica (24% in
October 1976(10,p. 13)), a design adapted from that current in Indian
mini-mi lis would be more likely to meet Jamaica's needs than one
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based on US technology. To adapt these simple mills along the lines
suggested by Western, in his Appendix IV, and to use machines to
replace some of the most labour intensive practices^such as manually
cutting rags, would be simpler than to try and change a sophisticated
mill.
3. Prospects for pulp and paper production in Mauritius
The chequered history of the attempts to start pulp and/or paper
production from bagasse in Mauritius has been outlined in a previous
chapter. Despite numerous proposals to establish mills of over
100 t/d capacity based on bagasse, the only paper mill actually built
has been a small waste paper based mill, started by M. Lagesse.
What is the best path for the future development of pulp or
paper production in Mauritius? Is it to build large mills for export,
or mini-mills for the local market, or do nothing? In 1977, 13 kt of
paper and paper products were imported into Mauritius, worth in all
Rs52 M(22). These imports are summarised in figure 6.9, in which
they are broken down into the principal grades of paper.
Even though the Mauritian market for paper and paper products is
expanding it could not support a large scale pulp/paper mill. The
total 1977 consumption was less than one quarter of the Jamaican con¬
sumption in 1974(10). If any pulp/paper mills are to be built for
the internal market in Mauritius, they will have to be mini-mi lis, as
is the existing mill at Packaging Industries Ltd. From figure 6.9 can
be deduced the largest size mills which could be built to supply the
internal market. These would be a 25 or 30 t/d packaging paper mill,
a 5 t/d printing and writing paper mill (including some production of
industrial grades and coated papers, as some of the printing and
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Figure 6.9 Imports of paper and paper products into Mauritius, 1976
and 1977
1976 1977
t/a t/d* t/a t/d*
Newsprint 816 3.3 1038 4.2
Printings & Writings 1469 5.9 1622 6.5
Packaging 5196 20.8 7670 30.7
Industrial 181 0.7 260 1.0
Ti ssues 103 0.4 139 0.6
Boards 350 1.4 365 1.5
Coated paper 656 2.6 1322 5.3
Waste paper 408 1.6 502 2.0
Total 9177 36.7 12917 51.7
* Assuming 250 working days per year
Source: Customs and Excise Report for 1977(22)
writings will continue to be imported as finished articles), or
several 1 t/d mills specialising in high quality industrial, printing
and writing, or tissue paper or boards. Newsprint produced from
mechanical woodpulp is so cheap that it would not be worthwhile pro¬
ducing on the island on a small scale from bagasse.
Now consider the possibilities for export. How can the world and
regional markets for pulp and paper be characterised? Recently, many
paper mills in developed countries have been closing, or reducing
production, despite a still increasing market for paper. This
can be considered as the result of the construction of many new pulp
mills in developing countries with government and international sup¬
port, while the market for paper did not grow as fast as anticipated.
An alternative explanation given by Western considers this as the
result of technological determinism(16,pp.26-7).
*
After a lull in the paper machine manufacturing industry
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during World War II, engineering progress was accelerated
and shortly afterwards the race for even more width and
speed was resumed. The inventions previously mentioned in
Chapter 1 assisted and by the early 19601 s widths of 9
metres and speeds of 700 metres/minute were achieved. Then
the consequences of such development began to manifest
themselves. Capacity exceeded consumption and paper prices
slumped. The widths and speeds began to require sophisti¬
cated and expensive controls for efficient operation, still
further adding to already disproportionate machine costs,
which were no longer compensated by increased paper prices
because these were set by the mass of earlier, written-down
machines still in operation. From 1930 to 1975, the
cost/annual tonne of a newspaper machine increased at least
forty fold while the price of newsprint increased less than
twenty fold! A strange progress this. The installation of
new machines became a luxury which could be afforded only
by multi-national giants or the government (sic) of
developing countries, advised by consultants that only
scale to this degree could be economic! For the consul¬
tants it was economic; they were now essential for large
mill design and coordination.
Alternatives could not easily be considered. The enormous
investment in large machine tools locked the major machine
suppliers to the unprofitable giants. The sheer cost of the
money involved for a new mill now exceeds in many cases the
margin between production costs and revenue. The situation
has became (sic) uncontrollable and paradoxical in that,
despite steadily growing demand, paper manufacturers, with
few exceptions, cannot afford to renew their equipment! In
many cases, they have chosen to upgrade it by modifications
producing paper grades with greater margins of profitabil¬
ity, leading to the closures of many smaller mills not
necessarily for price reasons but by market control. No new
machines, except for tissue or speciality papers has been
built in England since 1960 and the decline in production
overall has been met by imports. The same applies to other
developed countries and this outcome should be a lesson to
the developing world.
Whatever the explanation for the current overproduction of
paper, the fact remains that no country can hope to succeed in a new
export pulp or paper mill unless it has abundant supplies of cheap
raw material, energy and chemicals. In this respect Mauritius is
disadvantaged by its high energy prices, as a large scale pulp mill
will require fuel both for the mill and to replace the bagasse in the
sugar factory.
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Add to this the effect of the high cost of transport from Mauri¬
tius, the only prospects for large-scale export of pulp from Mauri¬
tius would be to regional markets. Such markets might be the increas¬
ing paper consumption in East African countries, or India.
Unfortunately, many African countries are establishing large
pulp mills based on their forest reserves and plantation projects,
such as the IFLOMA project in Manica in Mozambique.
The Indian market has great potential, as the present consump¬
tion is one of the lowest in the world at 1.8 kg/a per capita, com¬
pared with 30 kg/a in Britain in 1900 and 100 kg/a for most developed
countries today(16,p.19), or 10 kg/a in China and 20 kg/a in
Malaysia(16,p.52). Western writes, " it seems clear that the present
low levels of paper consumption are indicative more of import res¬
trictions and lack of investment than absence of demand and this view
is supported by evidence In other words, today is a seller's
market."(16,p.52) The official estimates of additional annual capa¬
city requirements, at a conservative 7% annual growth rate in consump¬
tion, are for 1.4 Mt by 1983/4 and 2.4 Mt by 1988/9(16,p. 57).
This promising market has one drawback- no imports of paper are
permitted except for newsprint(16,p.4). So, anyone who intends to
export, to India, any pulp or paper other than newsprint needs good
Indian contacts. In practice,this means that Indian investors would
have to be involved in the establishment of the mill, as they would
be able to put the necessary pressure on the Indian government to
waive import restrictions. Therefore, producing bagasse pulp in Mau¬
ritius for export to India might be an attractive proposition to a
well connected Indian businessman, but an impossibility for Mauritian
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businessmen or the Mauritian government.
To summarise, it would seem very difficult for a Mauritian-owned
large-scale pulp mill to export pulp or paper in sufficient quantity.
It would be possible, however, for Mauritian entrepreneurs or
cooperatives to start mini-mi lis to supply the local market - but
would these be profitable? To check on this, cost-benefit analyses
of two types of Indian mini-mi 11 have been carried out.
3.1. Cost-benefit analyses of Indian mini-mills under Mauritian con¬
ditions.
Appendix 4 gives full details of these calculations; what fol¬
lows is a summary of the method used and the principal results.
Two sizes of mini-mi 11 were considered, a 15 t/d mill, as con¬
sidered previously in this chapter, based on the costings of
Western(16) and Rao(17), and a handmade paper plant of 400-1200 kg/d
capacity based on a project description supplied by Coromandal
Hydraulics, manufacturers of handmade papermaking equipment(23).
The Mauritian prices were taken from the 1977 Customs and Excise
report(22), the Bi-annual Survey of Employment and Earni ngs(24), the
Central Electricity Board report(25), a Development Bank of Mauritius
report(26), and 1977 costs of certain items at factories visited by
the writer. These prices are set out in figure A4.3 in appendix 4.
Where no Mauritian price was available, e.g. for papermaking
machinery, Indian prices were used, with a margin for freight costs
for items that would be imported from India.
As the purpose of these analyses is to determine whether such
mini-mills could be beneficial to the economy of Mauritius, rather
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than just an i nvestor^ these costs were multiplied by accounting
ratios as described by Scott(27). His ratios calculate the
equivalent foreign exchange costs of Mauritian purchases, and allow
for the social benefit of employing previously unemployed workers.
They do, however, assume that the exchange rate reflected the true
value of foreign exchange to the Mauritian economy. Although this was
true in 1972,when he wrote his report, by 1977 the current account
deficit had reached Rs512 M(28), and, in 1979,the rupee was devalued,
so it can be argued that in 1977 the rupee was overvalued, and that a
different shadow exchange rate should be used. Therefore, a second
set of accounting ratios were calculated, based on an accounting
ratio of 1.2 for foreign exchange, i nstead of 1.0 in the original.
These ratios are detailed in figure A4.1 in appendix 4. In the fol¬
lowing tables, results calculated on an accounting ratio of 1.0 for
foreign exchange are indicated by the letter A and those based on a
ratio of 1.2 by the letter B.
For the 15 t/d mini mill, the results of this calculation are
detailed in figure A4.4 to figure A 4J in appendix 4. These are sum¬
marised below in figure 6.10 to figure 6.13.
The range of production costs allow for the possibilities of
using imported pulp or imported textile wastes (cheaper) as a source
of long fibres, and the alternatives of generating steam, all year
round, from an oil-fired package boiler or using steam from a sugar
factory for a third of the year.
Whereas a 15 t/d mini mill would not be as economically reward¬
ing in Mauritius, as some of these mills are in India (with internal
rates of return of 34%(16) ), they are nonetheless interesting at the
# Financial analyses from the investor's viewpoint are given in
appendix 4.
- 277 -
Figure 6.10 Capital cost of a 15 t/d pulp/paper mini mill in Mauri¬
tius at 1977 shadow prices.
(kRs) A B
Bui 1dings 1692 1922
Plant & equipment* 16267 19119
Spares (2% of above) 325 382
Vehicles* 59 69
Office equipment etc.* 146 172




technical fees (2%) 1392 1623
Total capital cost 21278 24802
A - using accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1.
B - using accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
* - from Indian prices.




Fixed costs 479 515
Chemicals 1054 1237
Fibrous raw materials 826 - 722 960 - 837
Services 1122 - 1019 1297 - 1181
Total production cost 3481 - 3273 4009 - 3770
A - using accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1.
B - using accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
discount rates favoured in the Jamaican study(lO), Scott's 1972
report(27), and at the December 1977 commercial bank prime rate(28) -
respectively 1%, 5% and 8%.
Such a mini mill, to produce packaging grades, is worth further
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Figure 6.12 Unit revenues from paper sales at 1977 Mauritian shadow




























A - using accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1.
B - using accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
1 - using steam from an oil-fired boiler and imported textile wastes.
2 - 1/3 of the steam from a sugar factory and using imported pulp.
Figure 6.13 Discounted cash flow analysis for a 15 t/d mini paper







Cash flows - year 0 -21.3 -21.3 -24.8 -24.8
- years 1-13 2.9 3.7 3.7 4.7
NPV at i=5% 5.4 13.0 9.4 18.1
7% 2.6 9.2 5.6 13.3
11% -1.7 3.5 0.1 6.0
IRR 9% 14% 11% 16%
All cash flows and NPVs in millions of Rupees.
study, needing a detailed investigation of the qualities of paper
that can be produced at this scale from bagasse using soda pulping or
chemimechanical pulping (both of which are used in India), and the
production costs of each route. It would pay to place the mini mill
adjacent to a sugar mill, in order to make use of a little of the
factory's steam during the crushing season, and to make an effort to
collect local textile wastes to reduce the imports of long fibres
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needed to increase the paper strength.
Locating the factory next to a sugar mill would also reduce the
cost of bagasse transport. There would be little difficulty in
obtaining surplus bagasse, as the 20 000 t/a required are less than
any estimate of the surplus bagasse availability in Mauritius.
Although these estimates vary greatly, including values of
123 000 ton/annum dry(5), 22 000 ton wet in 1966 and a potential of
120 000 ton wet bagasse in a normal year(l), and 166 000 t/a dry(6),
there should be no problem finding 20 000 t/a wet bagasse for a mini
paper mill.
Similarly the 4500 m^/d required for a 15 t/d plant (at 300 m^/t
paper(17) ) should be available at many sites, including all five
mentioned in the Sandwell report (see figure 6.1).
It would not be worth starting such a mill until the full poten¬
tial of waste paper for packaging paper production is being used, as
waste paper requires less costly plant for its pulping and needs less
chemicals (or none).
The other cost-benefit analysis is of a handmade paper mill.
This is based on a project study provided by Coromandal Hydraulics of
Dindigul, South India, which makes use of their cylinder mould vat.
This is similar to moulds used in paperboard operation, but designed
for hand operation. Its operation is best described in the following
quotation from their report(23).
The vat consists of a cylinder mould rotating in a cement
concrete tank on ball bearings. Pulp at a steady con¬
sistency of 0.25%, to 0.75% is maintained in a cylindrical
tank by a rotating paddle agitator and pumped to an over¬
head box. The level in head box is maintained and pulp
flows to the vat by gravity. The mould is immersed 3/4th
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in a thin solution of pulp. Because of the difference in
the static heads maintained by the pulp outside and white
water inside, the pulp rushes into the cylinder draining
water and forming a thin layer of wet sheet all over the
surface of Cylinder Mould. When the mould rotates the thin
layer of continuous sheet formed is picked up by a woolen
felt, from the couch roll. The wet sheet is carried by
woolen felt over a series of rolls comes to press part and
passes between the top metal roll and rubber roll, when the
sheet is wound over the metal top roll. The sheet is
removed from the metal top roll and sent for drying.
This Vat is manually operated. Two persons rotate the han¬
dle. Alltogether (sic) per shift 6 to 8 persons are needed.
Depending upon the thickness of sheet, 1,500 to 3,000
sheets can be produced in 8 hours shift. Paper of
150 g.s.m. to 1,500 g.s.m. can be made in this Vat. Any
variety of paper, drawing paper, white cards, pulp boards
for file making, grey cards, grey board, mill board etc.
can be produced.
The capacity ranges from 400 Kgs. to 1,500 Kgs. per day of
16 hours working.
The pulp is produced in the usual way of the Indian handmade
paper industry, digestion of agricultural fibres in a batch digester
with Sodium hydroxide, followed by beating together with chopped rags
and waste paper in a Hollander beater. Bagasse is not usually used
in such plants, except sometimes mixed with straw in the production
of strawboard, possibly the result of having tried to digest and pulp
bagasse without depithing and under the same conditions as for pulp¬
ing straw. As bagasse is pulped successfully by batch digestion with
no beating, in mills up to 30 t/d capacity(16,p.87), it should, in
principle, be possible to do the same in batch digesters in 1 t/d
mills. So, the cost-benefit calculations assume this is so, using the
chemical consumption as given by Rao(17) for digesting bagasse, and
adding the cost of digesters to the capital costs in the Coromandal
Hydraulics report.
These calculations are detailed in figure A4.8 to figure A4.ll
in appendix 4, and summarised here in figure 6.14 to figure 6.17.
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Figure 6.14 Capital cost of a 400 kg/d handmade paper project at
1977 Mauritian shadow prices.
Item Cost/kRs
A B
Bui 1dings 225 256
Pulp and paper machinery 154 181
Electric motors,starters
29 34and other industrial equip. )
Office equipment 2 3
Erection 25 25
Total 435 498
A - accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1
B - accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
Figure 6.15 Production costs for a 400 kg/d handmade paper plant at









Misc. expenses 49 49
Total 1639 1794
A - accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1
B - accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
To check the effect of the quality of the paper produced, the
sales calculations have been carried out twice, once for printing and
writing paper, once for packaging paper.
As figure 6.16 shows, the sales price of the paper produced is
critical for the profitability of the plant. The profit is reduced to
3%-13% of the profit when producing printing and writing paper if the
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Figure 6.16 Revenue of a 400 kg/day handmade paper plant at 1977 Mau¬
ritian shadow prices.
Type of paper sold:
Printing and writing Packaging
A B A B
Daily sales (400 kg/d)/Rs 2685 3152 1674 1966
Production cost/Rs 1638 1794 1638 1794
Daily net revenue/Rs 1047 1358 36 172
Annual revenue/kRs 314 408 11 52
A - accounting ratios as in column A of figure A4.1
B - accounting ratios as in column B of figure A4.1
paper has to be sold as packaging paper. This difference is far
greater than the differences in net cash flows resulting from dif¬
ferent accounting ratio assumptions.
Figure 6.17 Net cash flow analysis for a 400 kg/d handmade paper
plant at 1977 Mauritian shadow prices.
(Cash flows Type of paper produced:
in mi 11ions
of rupees) Printing and writing Packaging
A B A B
Capital cost -0.44 -0.50 -0.44 -0.50
Annual revenue 0.31 0.41 0.01 0.05
NPV (1+13 years) at 5% 2.4 3.2 -0.4 -0.01
7% 2.0 2.8 -0.4 -0.06
11% 1.5 2.1 -0.4 -0.14
IRR 72% 94% -14% 5%
A - accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1
B - accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
The effects of this can clearly be seen in figure 6.17, where
for all reasonable discount rates the production of packaging paper
in this 400 kg/d handmade paper plant yields negative net present
- 283 -
values. On the other hand, the internal rates of return of 72% and
94% for the production of printing and writing papers show how pro¬
fitable such very small plants could be.
The most profitable Indian handmade paper plants make high qual¬
ity papers - drawing paper, filter paper, art papers and industrial
grades. These are so profitable that Western remarks about one:(16)
N.B. The price is almost irrelevant. For such paper, with
100% cotton furnish, it is about one tenth of that which
can be obtained in developed countries for equivalent
grades. The whole output can be exported without diffi¬
culty. The manufacturer aims at around 25% profit on
sales.
Such mills contrast with the cottage-type waste based handmade
paper mills which make cheap, sun-dried, boards. Unless run with good
production and quality control these mills often run at a loss. This
is generally the case in the Sri Lankan strawboard industry studied
by de Wi 1de(29). He showed that^on average^the factories operated at
50 ton strawboard annually, making a loss of Rs23 125 annually on "tlie
total capital employed of Rs475 000 (Sri Lankan rupees). They had
production difficulties owing to their reliance on sun-drying, and
the quantities of chemicals and firewood used varied greatly, as dif¬
ferent managers used different process conditions according to their
lack of experience. On the other hand well managed factories were
profitable, such as Maniyangana which was able to make a profit of
Rs46 000 annually.
So, any handmade paper mill in Mauritius would have to aim at
producing high quality printing and writing papers and industrial
grades, such as filter paper. To do this it would have to make full
use of the textile and clothing wastes in Mauritius, and only then
see about how it could use bagasse. An investigation of how bagasse
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is best pulped in small digesters would be needed, using the soda
process or, perhaps,one of the newer processes for digesting agricul¬
tural wastes, such as ammonia pulping(30,31). More important would
be the design of an efficient moist depither for use on a very small
scale, as bagasse paper and board made with the pith included is much
weaker, as shown by the sample attached to this thesis. This was
made in a Khadi and Village Industries Commission handmade paper mill
at Pune, by digesting the bagasse with boiling 2.5% NaOH solution at
atmospheric pressure.
Provided a sufficiently high quality paper could be produced
from bagasse admixtures, the main problems would not be strictly
technical but managerial and social - any potential investor or
cooperative would do well to read de Wilde's account as a cautionary
tale of what not to do. Describing the background of mangers of
strawboard mills set up by the Industrial Development Board of Sri
Lanka, he says:
None had previous experience in management or supervision
or had worked in any form of production-unit or factory.
There (sic) education ranged from 8th grade to 0-level
All of them got a training for 1-1,5 month in the IDB to
learn the process of strawboard making. But how can one
expect people to be managers of straw-board factories if
they only understand the principles (not even the practice)
of strawboard making?
Such a selection of managers might seem unlikely in Mauritius,
but see the chapter on Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. to see a parallel
instance (admittedly at a higher level). How the managers are
selected in Sri Lanka is described by de Wilde:
The most astonishing practice in this respect is the exam¬
ple of Nalanda: as in several other cases, no tender was
put out for the factory, which was undertaken by a friend
- 284a -
of the local M.P. However, his work was certainly not up to
the standards required and the concrete foundation for the
Hollander beater machine broke immediately after the
installation of the equipment. In spite of the fact that
this machine, therefore, was unable to work and the
calander machine not even delivered, so that it was impos¬
sible to produce finished straw-board, the M.P. instructed
in three letters to the G.A. and A.G.A. that more than 18
people who he named be employed in the factory. These
included the manager who he praised as having two year's
experience in management. The management experience, in
fact, consisted of the operation of a small one man
cooperative retail shop in a small village near Nalanda.
It isn't surprising that such practices by an M.P. provoke
reactions. Two days after the elections, with a victory for
the U.N.P., the former opposition party, the factory was
attacked by 10-15 persons. When they didn't find the
manager they ruined parts of the already not working
machinery and electricity wiring. Although the Nalanda case
is an exception, in all cases, even in the private and
semi-private factories there was pressure from the local
M.P. to appoint people who were on his employment list.
Such processes of selection of personnel on a political or per¬
sonal basis are not unique to Sri Lanka, but are evident of the par-
ticularist values found in many small communities.
In the specific Mauritian context, such particularism has been
the norm. This was seen in the choice of personnel for Yeast Produc¬
ers (Mtius) Ltd. (see Chapter 4.1, p.154); in the selective recruit¬
ment of Sugar Technology Diplomates, from the University of Mauri¬
tius; in the queues of people outside the Prime Minister's House,
before the December 1976 elections, waiting to be given jobs in the
Development Works Corporation(32); in others who were offered jobs
loading lorries in return for voting for a particular party; and in
the setting of recruitment qualifications with a particular candidate
in mind.
Nevertheless, if such selection processes could be avoided, it
is likely that a Mauritian mini-mi 11 or handmade paper plant would be
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These conclusions are an attempt to further the understanding of
the design process (or decision-making process or technology transfer
process, depending on viewpoint) which leads to the adoption of
appropriate or inappropriate technologies. It is important not only
to learn what specific mistakes must be avoided in introducing new
technologies to a society, but also what methods can be used to avoid
making mistakes. No idealist list of good versus bad technologies
teaches the latter. Inappropriate technologies do not wear black
hats.
The case studies reported in this thesis can be considered as
accounts of the historical processes of the introduction of new tech¬





v. Initiative or Inertia.
Firstly, some interest has to be aroused in a new technology,
rather than continuing with traditional methods. Then the technology,
market, local economic, political and environmental conditions have
to be investigated. The technology has to be introduced into the
local setting, both embodied (e.g. building a factory) and disembo-
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died (e.g. staff and consumer education). Following its introduction,
the presence of this new technology interacts with its environment
leading to problems (e.g. lack of sales, pollution, machinery wear
and so on). Depending on the reactions of the principle actors asso¬
ciated with the project, these problems are overcome or the problems
overcome the project.*
These are not mutually exclusive steps, nor need they occur in
this sequence every time. This list serves merely to provide a frame¬
work for the following synthesis of the results of the case studies.
1. Interest in new technologies.
For most of the time, most people are quite satisified with a
traditional technology. Examples of this are: cane spirit production
in Mauritius; using low pressure boilers in Mauritian sugar factories
before the 1970s; and importing goods which could be produced locally
(such as boards, yeast, and packaging paper in Mauritius).
When producing cane spirit for local sales on completely depre¬
ciated equipment, and selling at high profit margins, there is no
incentive for owners of distilleries to invest in new equipment or
"to twake
even^modifications to old equipment. In Mauritius this was compounded
by the fact that the groups of companies which run the distilleries
(WEAL, Harel Mallac and Denoncla) have many other interests, conse¬
quently the distilleries are of marginal concern. Also, the ownership
of the distilleries was in the hands of a distillers association,
which included all the former owners of distilleries which have since
been closed. These companies receive their dividends for doing noth¬
ing.
* This is different to the more common analysis of a longer
term cyclical interaction between society and technology, in
which a technological innovation affects the society, which af¬
fects future technological innovations.
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In such circumstances it is not surprising that^when Vogelbusch
representatives came to Mauritius,looking at the possibility of sel¬
ling their equipment to set up a new distillery, and told the Mauri¬
tian distillery owners that they would have to spend money, Vogel-
as
busch were told that the Mauritians did not want to spend money,.they
p<p cLu-ce nric*. ea,uCf>«<e<ib, "
couTd ^ TocaTly. mT Radar even went as far as to publish an arti¬
cle, in "Le Cerneen"^ arguing that Mauritius was better off exporting
molasses(l). Such arguments hold little force, for improvements to
distilleries or new ones cost money whoever builds them, while pot¬
able spirit production was certainly more profitable than exporting
molasses. Rather, these arguments should be seen as justifications
for decisions taken on other grounds, namely that it was not in the
interests of the owners to invest more money to produce the same cane
spirit which they were already selling profitably. Only when Gilbeys
set up their own distillery in Mauritius were they shaken from this
complacency.
On the other hand, the managers of the distilleries were, in
general, innovative and interested in possible improvements to their
distilleries. This was probably a result of the boredom of what is a
routine job. This led to the establishment of profitable sidelines,
such as the production of perfumes from local alcohol and imported
essences, and the preparation of Ricard at O.K. (Solitude) Distil¬
lery. But for any major changes the approval of the directors would
be required, so here was a source of potential conflict. In general
changes were not approved, unless some external factor compelled
this. The planned closure of Solitude sugar factory was one such, as
O.K. Distillery depended on the factory for its steam, and led to the
Hare! Mallac group investing in a new distillery at Beau Plan sugar
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factory.
The effect of this complacency, upon the managers, was that they
investigated problems, such as vinasse disposal, knowing that there
would be little chance of getting any investments approved. Knowing
this, they would investigate the problem less seriously, each on his
own, in ignorance of what the others were doing. Nor would they
involve the University of Mauritius or the MSIRI, as this might pro¬
vide a solution which would cost money to implement. Under these
circumstances it is better to play at researching anaerobic diges¬
tion, pretending to be solving the problem of vinasse pollution, than
invest in commercially available incineration systems, or in the pro¬
duction of fodder yeast.#
A comparable case was that of the plywood importers in Mauri¬
tius. As importers they had good profits, did not need to make any
marketing effort. They could externalise transport and information
costs, as customers would come to them in Port Louis to buy their
building materials, and it was up to the customer to discover how to
use the materials. So, they were not interested in changing from this
traditional activity, and so it was outside this group that interest
in producing board locally arose.
Against a background of a general acceptance of the traditional
industries and traditional technology, certain people and groups of
people become interested in industries, or products, or technologies
hitherto unknown in their location. In pursuing these interests they
become change agents.1" Examples of these change agents are Maxime
Raffray ("Top Board"), Jean Rey (bagasse briquetting in Mauritius),
Daniel Lagesse (Packaging Industries Ltd.), Raymond Raffray (boiler
# This can be compared to the activities of some of the project
managers studied by Hirschman, when they were under pressure
from outside interests.
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improvements at St. Aubin sugar factory), Maurice Paturau, managers
of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation (Pingtung pulp mill), the Anchor
Yeast Co. Ltd. (Beau Champ yeast factory) and Samora Machel.
The roles of Maxime Raffray in the formation of the Universal
Board Co., of Daniel Lagesse in the Mauritian packaging paper from
waste paper factory, of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation management in
the studies which eventually led to the erection of the Pingtung pulp
mill, of Maurice Paturau in the MSIRI committee that reported on the
utilization of sugarcane by-products, and of the Anchor Yeast Co. of
South Africa in leading Beau Champ to set up a bakers yeast factory
have already been discussed. Jean Rey, as Managing Director of the
Mahebourg Lime Co., became interested in finding an alternative fuel
for the lime kiln, due to a shortage of firewood in Mauritius. This
caused him to look at the production of briquettes from bagasse. Ray¬
mond Raffray's interest in the machinery in his factory led him to
the idea of improving the thermal efficiency of the factory by
installing larger, higher pressure boilers and a turboalternator to
generate electricity for factory use and export to the CEB. As this
was seen as a straightforward technical decision, taken every time
equipment is replaced in a traditional industry, there was not the
potential for conflict between management and ownership which there
was in the distilling industry.
It is difficult to find common characteristics in these often
highly individual actors in the drama of industrialization, except
for a negative one—a dissatisfaction with the traditional industries
and technologies, linked to experience outside their country to show
them that things could be otherwise. An awareness of the existence of
alternatives. Samora Machel has emphasised, in many speeches, the
L
f The term change agent, taken from the rural development
literature, is used rather than entrepreneur, as the person who
has the idea need not, necessarily, be the same as the one with
capital, or be involved with more than the first stages of the
introduction of the technology.
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necessity for people to compare Mozambique with the developed coun¬
tries they hope to join by 1990, rather than be satisfied with a
level that is "good enough for Africa".
A possible exception to this is the way interest was aroused in
Mauritius about bakers yeast production. There was no local change
agent, this role fell to a South African company, Anchor Yeast Ltd.
They indeed stimulated the Mauritian sugar factories to think of the
possibilities of using new technologies, in this case to produce
yeast. In this way they acted as change agents. Yet, as actors from
outside the country of application of the techno!ogy? their role was
somewhat different, since they only had to sell their equipment, not
make a success of the whole venture.
The difference between these change agents and the others who
were content with traditional technologies was that they reacted to
the same concrete conditions with a greater awareness of what might
be possible, and a greater confidence in their creative abilities.
2. Investigation
Once an interest has been aroused in technologies other than
those traditional in the location, the principle actors have to
investigate the possibilities. Often this is done poorly, not only
in the accountant's sense of a poor financial appraisal, but also by
not investigating all the possible interactions between the project
and its environment: for example, marketing, the consumers' reactions
to the product, the effects of company structure on decision-making,
taking for granted traditional methods of staff recruitment and
training, effects on food production, cartels and corruption, and,
above all, potential conflicts of interest between interested
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parties.
If the project inaugurators were involved in production in a
traditional industry, they will naturally tend to ignore marketing
operations, and conduct cursory market surveys? In the feasibility
studies for the Universal Board Co. and Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd.,
only the total market demand within Mauritius was studied. Inadequate
attention was paid to the thicknesses of boards sold in Mauritius, or
to their usage, and none at all to the possible consumer reaction to
boards which could not be nailed or screwed together in the same way
as plywood. No survey of end users was undertaken, so the company had
no idea of the users requirements.
The original market survey for Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. was
limited to checking import statistics for Mauritius and some Indian
Ocean countries, for which statistics were available. No attempt was
made to visit these countries to check whether the importing agents
were tied to particular suppliers, on how many agents there were, on
tariff barriers or on specific local prices. Nor were the Mauritian
bakers visited to find out the quality, quantities and price of the
yeast they required. Only in 1977 did they carry out a full market
survey by interviewing every baker on the island to discover the bak¬
ers' opinions of the different yeasts, the quality required and why
the bakers preferred to pay Rs 12/kg at M. A. Cassim rather than
Rs9.50/kg for Mauritian yeast. This delay, and the skimpy initial
market surveys, can be seen as a consequence of the experience and
interests of the Deep River - Beau Champ S. E.'s directors. They were
more experienced in production (as sugar marketing is undertaken by
the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate, not the estates), and were, therefore,
more concerned with the production of yeast and getting the factory
} This is clearer in these Mauritian studies than in many pre¬
vious studies, as Mauritius is an open market economy, in which
efficient marketing would be expected.
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built at their estate, than with the marketing. This attitude was
reinforced by the sales pitch of the Anchor Yeast Co., whose
representatives minimised the difficulties of marketing.
Hirschman(2) might say that the Anchor Yeast Co. were believers
in the "Principle of the Hiding Hand", deliberately compensating for
a Mauritian underestimation of their problem-solving competence by an
underestimation of the difficulties. I would suggest that their
motives were akin to those of the sales engineers described by
Hesch(3):
I remember one plant in the North East of Brasil, where the
managing director of the company purchased the cheapest
installation, which had been quoted to him. He finally got
what he was paying for: cheap, fragile, partly old
fashioned machines, sold be a couple of smart and ruthless
sales engineers. I worked for a while as trouble shooter in
this plant and had to tell to the company that the only
chance to save the project was to replace almost the whole
preparation line for chips up to the gluing machines. After
two years of losses the company was not able to do so any
more and went bankrupt.
Outside Mauritius, the effects of poor market surveys can be
seen in the experiences of the Hulskane particleboard factory in
South Africa, the Kisumu alcohol factory in Kenya (in its projected
sales of citric acid and yeast), and on the market size projections
which caused the Edfu pulp mill to be built with a large recovery
plant for early expansion (see literature survey).
Better approaches to investigating the market were taken by
Lagesse, Rey and the Taiwan Sugar Corporation. Lagesse studied the
market opportunities in Mauritius before choosing his industry, and
then chose to produce the grades of paper in the greatest demand, in
quantities which would not exceed the market demand. Rey had a
guaranteed market for 5000 t/a bagasse briquettes in his lime kiln,
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and in a contract from the Bois Cheri tea estate, before he began. In
fact, the problems in this case were derived from an inadequate study
of the production technology rather than the marketing.
In both this case and that of Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd., the
directors of the Mauritian companies were totally dependent on
foreign suppliers for their technical information, and made no
attempt to evaluate critically this situation by contracting local,
or independent foreign, consultants. Certainly, there were micro¬
biologists* in Mauritius who could have seen the folly of having no
filter on the air intake, or the effects of overheating the yeast in
the drier, and food technologists# who could have pointed out the
alternative of a pressed yeast factory. And, as Rey was dependent on
the Pawert-SPM engineers (as there was no-one in Mauritius had had
experience of high pressure briquetting machine), there was no one to
point out to the Swiss engineers, inexperienced in bagasse use, that
Mauritian bagasse was different to that in Hugot's factory (where SPM
Group Inc. had installed a successful bagasse briquetter).
The absence of any local investigation of the technologies often
leads to uncritical acceptance of whatever is proposed by an equip¬
ment supplier or consultant. This is most evident in Sangster1s(4)
uncritical acceptance of the OAS study on paper, animal feed and
alcohol production in Jamaica(5). As has been shown in this thesis,
there are alternatives available which have not been considered by
Proenza et al, such as Indian mini-mills for the production of chemi¬
cal pulp and paper. Also, it has been shown that, although the Indian
designs are best adapted to Indian conditions, these technologies
* e.g. Gerald de Senneville. # e.g. Thiery Sik Yuen.
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could be potentially profitable even when transferred to higher wage
developing countries such as Mauritius.§
Such uncritical acceptance of received wisdom can lead to the
abandonment of projects when the preordained technology could not be
economic in the conditions of the recipient country, and, conversely,
to the construction of inappropriate plants, such as the dried yeast
factory in Mauritius. In the worst case, this trust of the supplier
can be disastrous, as in the following example, quoted from Hesch's
letter(3):.
In the Caribbean I have been expert for the arbitrage in a
project. Here a rich man who thought he had gathered suffi¬
cient knowledge on this specific field signed a contract,
as I was told, in a bar around midnight, on a project of
about 12 million DM, which turned out to be worth less than
6 million DM. In this case not the slightest chance existed
to save the project.
The point stressed here is that local expertise outside the pro¬
moting group should be used to investigate the technology to be used,
supported by independent foreign expertise where necessary. Such a
procedure was followed by the Taiwan Sugar Corporation when planning
a new pulp mill. Firstly, local consultants were contracted to inves¬
tigate the possibilities, making full use of their knowledge of the
local conditions, following which this report was submitted to
independent foreign consultants for assessment, particularly of the
technical aspects. Subsequently, a project office was set up to
prepare the detailed specification, liase with contractors, and
supervise the construction and testing of the plant (among other
tasks), drawing on local expertise.
In this way a full technical assessment may be made, with a good
idea of how the techniques may be adapted to and applied in local
§ Certainly economically viable at accounting costs, for both
technologies, and potentially profitable to a private en¬
trepreneur, in 1977, for the mini-mills but not the handmade
paper plants.
9- Unfortunately, much of the work of development agencies has
been to carry out their own investigations, or encourage the
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conditions. However, even this process may be limited by the foreign
and local consultants taking a purely technical and/or economic
approach to the investigation.
Examples of such less obvious factors which should have been
studied before starting these projects are:
i. The effect of cartels or dominant suppliers on marketing (Mauri¬
tian yeast) ,•*
ii. consumer reaction to a new product ("Top Board"),
iii. competition between cash crops and food production (Fuel alcohol
from sugarcane),
iv. pollution (Vinasse disposal in Mauritius and Egypt),
v. detailed transport costs (Hulskane, Mauritian yeast—jt is
cheaper to supply yeast to Mombassa from Montreal than from Mau¬
ritius)^
vi. changes in government decisions (Caymanas anhydrous ethanol
plant in Jamaica, Sri Lankan strawboard factories),
vii. potential conflicts of interest between those involved in a pro¬
ject (most of the studies),T
viii.how the company structure can affect future problem-solving
(Universal Board Co.),Tand
ix. whether friends and acquaintances are the best staff for new
industries (Beau Champ yeast and Sri Lankan strawboard fac¬
tories) .t
equipment manufacturers to do so, to design more appropriate
technologies, rather than strengthening the local capabilities
to do this, denying the users of the technologies an opportuni¬
ty,, for learning.
* Clearer in this case than in others previously studied
# Such disadvantages of "sea-locked" economies have not previ¬
ously been been given the attention they deserve, unlike the
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This is an incomplete list, made up of only those factors which
had an effect upon the cases studied here, and which could have been
investigated before the decision to order equipment was taken. As
these were not, the questions to be answered are: Why were they not
investigated? How were the design decisions reached?
In all the Mauritian cases (and possibly elsewhere) the investi¬
gation was carried out by one man, or a small group of men within a
company who, in general, avoided involving other Mauritians in the
investigation phase. As a result, most of the investigations tended
to concentrate on some areas at the expense of others—through their
inexperience in certain matters, through being constrained in nego¬
tiations through technological or financial weaknesses and through
following practices socially acceptable in their Franco-Mauritian
community.
Except for Lagesse, who started by investigating the market con¬
ditions, the other groups had little experience of marketing, and so
ignored market research. Rey had no experience with bagasse compres¬
sion, and little of day-to-day bagasse handling,as neither the Mahe-
bourg Lime Co. nor Gaz Industriel Ltd. had had to deal with either.
As a result, he, perhaps, was less able to anticipate difficulties in
the production of bagasse briquettes, which combined with the chance
that Pawert-SPM had sent an engineer inexperienced in bagasse han¬
dling to design the plant.
Maxime Raffray had no choice about distribution policy for "Top
Board", as he had to raise capital from the plywood importers who, in
return, were appointed distributers. The directors of Beau Champ
S.E. also had no say in the design of the yeast factory, since they
equivalent problems of land-locked regions.
1" Considered by Hirschman and de Wilde, but not given suffi¬
cient attention elsewhere.
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had not the technical knowledge to check the affirmations of Anchor
Yeast Co. Because of this technological dependence they were also
constrained in their financial negotiations, Consequently they had to
import all the equipment which could not be made in Mauritius from
South Africa, even when the equipment was originally manufactured
elsewhere, and they had to pay for this while still waiting for the
Anchor Yeast Co. to put up their share of the equity.
Specifically Mauritian factors (although with possible parallels
elsewhere) were the appointment of staff at Yeast Producers (Mtius)
Ltd. and the behaviour of the "Top Board" distributers. In the
former, a Franco-Mauritian practice has been to appoint staff always
from this community, where possible, and preferably from the same
company.§ For this reason, an agronomist-turned-factory chemist at
Beau Champ, Serge Duverge was appointed manager of the yeast factory,
and not a microbiologist or food technologist. The "Top Board"
wholesalers were primarily importers, and hence sold "Top Board" as
if it were a standard, well known, imported product.
3. Implantation
This refers to the stage from the signing of contracts to the
beginning of operations. Here one has to focus on what is
transferred to the new environment and what is not. Is it just the
machinery (embodied technology) or the complete system of social
relationships which are required to make the project succeed (the
disembodied technology).
§ Shown by the difficulties experienced by non-Franco-Mauritian
diplomates in sugar technology of the University of Mauritius
in obtaining employment in the sugar industry, (except after
some years work elsewhere).
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In none of the cases studied in Mauritius did any of the
machinery fail to arrive, unlike some of the secondhand pulp and
paper machinery imported into India for mini-mills. "Misadventures
of mini mills" reports how several inexperienced Indian entrepreneurs
started frantic searches for missing parts when their equipment
arrived(6). The only secondhand machinery used in any of the Mauri¬
tian projects were a briquetting press from Madagascar and 90% of the
pulping and papermaking machinery in Packaging Industries Ltd.*
Pawert-SPM provided the spares necessary to renovate the briquetting
press, and Lagesse went to see most of the secondhand equipment
before ordering it, so there were no problems in the transfer of
machinery to Mauritius. Indeed, some of the equipment was con¬
structed in Mauritius, such as the growth tanks for the yeast.
At the next level, the staff training must be considered, for
machinery, however good, will not work without trained staff to run
it. Yeast Producers (Mtius) Ltd. provides an excellent example of how
the knowledge of the staff can affect the functioning of a technol¬
ogy.^ For after training by Anchor Yeast staff, the Mauritian factory
produced yeast with poor keeping qualities, yet after training by
engineers from Lallemand Inc., the factory produced yeast with excel¬
lent keeping qualities. The training provided by the two companies
was different in both content and and the method used. The South
Africans taught a technology which was adequate for their own condi¬
tions (where yeast could reach the consumer in a month), but not for
export sales where yeast could be in shipment for four months. The
Canadian company already produced yeast for export, and based their
work on Mauritius on their detailed knowledge of the growth of yeast.
Their approach was to conduct experiments in the Mauritian factory
1 ■ ■
| Indeed, a unique real life experiment which allowed two
training methods to be compared in the same factory and on the
same people.
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together with the local staff, seeking to improve the fermentation
and drying conditions while using the same equipment. In this way the
Mauritian staff learned not only an improved process, but also how to
conduct their own experiments to improve the process (as they did
later to increase the production capacity). They found that after the
experiments they understood better what was happening to the yeast,
rather than blindly following instructions to keep the pH to such a
level, the air flow to this level, and so on.
In contrast to this, the staff at the Universal Board Co. were
well trained (Siempelkamp GmbH engineers), and well qualified (one
was a Diplomate in Sugar Technology from the University of Mauri¬
tius), to the extent that they were able, unaided, to adapt the pro¬
cess to produce 4 mm particleboard after two years of experimenta¬
tion. Similar results were achieved at the Pingtung pulp mill.
Given a working plant with trained personnel, it is not suffi¬
cient to say that the technology has now been transferred. For the
product has to satisfy the consumer, else the factory might as well
not be there. The technology of particleboard production in Europe
exists in a certain environment in which its product has uses. This
environment includes the knowledge and skills of the particleboard
users which has been built up after years of user education by the
manufacturers. It includes the mechanisms by which user requirements
are passed back to the manufacturers via the distributers or directly
by contacting the applications or sales departments of the manufac¬
turers.
When the production of particleboard is transferred to a society
where it has not been used previously, an equivalent environment has
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to be created in this society# As Bassili(7) emphasised:
In certain instances production started and boards were
delivered to the distributors without any measures being
taken to educate the salesmen, let alone the end users, on
the properties, correct applications and limitations of
this new product.
Whereas in the developed countries producers financed
national promotional associations, local mills in the
developing countries very seldom did so. Since neither the
present nor the future users of the product (carpenters and
students in vocational schools) had any idea on this topic,
they assumed (and who can blame them?) that wood based par-
ticleboard was, as its name implies, a new form of wood.
Consequently, they loaded shelves with higher loads than
acceptable and placed screws for hinges in edges, etc.,
leading to the foreseeable consumer resistance to the pro¬
duct, once it had failed to perform as expected.
Another important, yet often neglected, aspect is that the
designs and technical specifications of the locally pro¬
duced items like school and office furniture, kitchen
cabinets, partitions, etc. that hitherto used sawn wood and
plywood, were not modified to allow the use, where
appropriate, of this new product. On similar lines attempts
at modifying the Building Codes—where they exist—to allow
for the use of particleboard have often not been pursued
with enough vigour to assure a successful end result.
Another point worth considering is that only in a few
instances have measures been taken by the industry to
import or produce locally, the special metal and plastic
hardware which have been developed specially for particle-
board in the advanced countries and which have no doubt
greatly contributed to its fantastic growth in these coun-
tries.
As has been shown, in Mauritius none of these points was con¬
sidered. Such "parachuting" of particleboard factories into develop¬
ing countries without any attempt to establish a sympathetic environ¬
ment for the use of the product have been all too common. Occasion¬
ally, after the company has gone bankrupt, it is bought out by
another company which starts marketing and user education from
scratch. Such happened at a factory in Thailand, where the machine
suppliers took the money and ran. When carpenters attempted to use
this product it blunted their saws. With no idea of how to make use
J.
§ The problems of the transfer of a disembodied technology into
a different social environment has been discussed by others.
The dynamics of this, and the dynamics of the establishment of
new social mechanisms to embody this, have not.
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of this strange material they stopped buying. Within six months the
sales collapsed. When the factory was taken over by a new company
(Thai Chipboard), they started a training school, where they gave
short training courses on particleboard applications to all their
customers. They also started producing flush doors in their factory,
as it was easier for them to do the cutting and veneering, and then
leave the assembly of the doors in their frames to the local car¬
penter. There was a good demand for the doors(8).
Similar efforts were undertaken by the United Africa Company to
promote its particleboard production at Sapele, Nigeria. They show
films, arrange meetings and exhibitions and produced a technical
manual, all to show the users how they could best make use of parti-
cleboard(9). The manual gives the technical description and specifi¬
cation of their particleboard, information on storing, machining,
covering the edges and finishing the sides, joints, special fixings,
cutting, painting and varnishing the board, and guides to the design
of furniture, partitions, ceilings and floors for parti cl eboard( 10).
In the opinion of the promoters this parti cl eboard plant is at the
moment 3/4 successful, and all this effort in user education and a
sufficient discount on the plywood price were necessary to get to
this stage(9).
Although the promoters of these projects describe this user edu¬
cation in terms of promotion of a product, in fact the change
required is greater than just persuading people to try a product, for
the work practices of a section of society have to be changed so that
they can use the product. Such "promotion" aims to achieve social
change,^ and, as such, is trait-making in Hirschman's terms. It is
these social relationships between manufacturer and consumer which
V
9- The necessity of social change in consumer attitudes has long
been accepted by advertisers of consumer goods (see
Medawar(15)), but not rarely considered by those studying the
production of durable goods.
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are critical to the success of the technology of particleboard
manufacture, so critical that they can be said to be part of the
technology, as nowhere are particleboard plants successful without
these changes among the users.
4. Interaction and Initiatives
Once production commences, interactions occur with the social,
economic and physical environment where the project has been
implanted. These can lead to unforeseen problems which require some
initiative to solve.
The interactions depend on the society in which the project has
been located, and the previous history of the project. The investi¬
gation phase is carried out just so that as many eventualities as
possible can be foreseen. The implantation is intended to set in
motion all the forces that will be needed to overcome problems which
may arise later - forces such as marketing organisations, user train¬
ing, political lobbying and process development.^
Examples of effects of such interactions are:
i. Volcanic ash and silica in Mauritian bagasse acting on the pres¬
sure seals in the briquetting machine led to rapid wear of the
same,
ii. Wild yeasts growing in cane fields, sucked into the air intake
of a bakers' yeast factory led to infections and low yeast
yields,
iii. Yeast shipments from Mauritian to Indian Ocean countries
interacted with a transport system designed to transport goods
* Or rather, ought to be so. Frequently those involved have a
static view of technological development, and so do not do
this. This is not surprising, as most people who have studied
the introduction of new technologies take an equally static,
and linear, view.
- 306 -
to and from Europe, S.Africa, and Singapore, leading to high
transport costs and long delays,
iv. These long delays interacted with the keeping qualities of yeast
produced to South African standards, leading to inactive yeast
being delivered to the consumer,
v. A market demand for thin 4.5 mm boards was incompatible with the
design of a 2-opening press particleboard plant,
vi. The properties of particleboard interacted with the methods used
by small furniture manufacturers to produce bent boards, screws
pulling out of end grain and worn saws, leading to low sales,
vii. Old distillery designs which ignored pollution, interacted with
more and intensive land and water use and lower tolerances for
pollution to produce a worrying problem for distillery managers
ahd
(in Mauritius r Egypt),
viii.The interactions between Clostridium ^butylicum, molasses sub¬
strate instead of potatoes led to lower yields and increased
risks of infection in the Hawamdieh acetone-butanol distillery
in Egypt,
ix. An inadequate bagasse feeder interacted with a depither at
Pingtung pulp mill to produce irregularities in the feed to the
depither and consequent variations in performance,
x. The interaction between the anhydrous alcohol project in Jamaica
and the political environment (namely a desire to maintain
government revenues), led to the withdrawal of excise duty
guarantees, and
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xi. The interaction between Sri Lankan elections and staffing at
strawboard factories led to substantial changes in personnel
after elections.
What is interesting is not how such interactions occur, but the
reactions of the principle actors involved in the project. Are they
seen as problems? Is the response that of initiative or inertia?
For Hirschman(2) suggests that problems lead to problem-solving ini¬
tiatives (as long as they are not encountered too early in the pro¬
ject life) which give the problem-solvers the confidence to tackle
further problems.
Yet, very often nothing (or very little) is done. This can be
seen with respect to the malfunctioning of the bagasse briquetting
presses on Mauritius, vinasse pollution at St. Antoine sugar factory
(and, to a lesser extent, at the other distilleries studied), export
marketing problems of bakers' yeast and the marketing of "Top Board".
In many cases we come back to the matters focussed under the
heading "Interest" - which groups involved had an interset in taking
initiatives on a problem, and which groups had an interest in doing
nothing.^
It has been shown in the relevant chapter that neither the ply¬
wood wholesalers nor the St. Antoine sugar factory had any interest
in increasing their shareholdings in the Universal Board Co. in order
to finance improved marketing and user education, as long as they
continued to receive more money from the company as fees or margins
than as dividends, and they thought that the company was likely to
fail anyway. Thus, any initiatives taken by Raffray were foredoomed
by the inertia resulting from the conflict of interest between the
# Even Hirschman did not consider the important effect of group
interests upon problem-solving activity, as opposed to the
creation of the problems themselves. Certainly no one else has.
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different shareholders.
Similar conflicts of interest, between the Savannah Sugar Estates
and Mahebourg Lime Co., hindered the resolution of problems in the
Southern Bagasse Co.# When the briquetter started to operate for the
first full season in 1980, it had maintenance problems (particularly
wear on the oil seals, putting oil on the bagasse), problems with the
drier, as the flue gas temperature when delivered to the drier was
only 200 °C instead of 248 °C so that the bagasse moisture was not
reduced to below 12% as needed for the consolidation of the bri¬
quettes, and problems with the screw feeder not adapted to coarse
Mauritian bagasse. The maintenance was entrusted to the technicians
of the Savannah sugar factory, who wished to know whether they were
working for the Southern Bagasse Co. or Savannah S.E(11,12).
It seems that the maintenance contract did not cover modifying
the briquetter, and the investment by Savannah was so small in com¬
parison with their own interests in the sugar factory that they pre¬
ferred their technicians to work on the sugar factory. So no initia¬
tive was taken to resolve the problems, until the manufacturers
agreed to take back the plant to sell it elsewhere(13)*.
The relative inertia of the alcohol distilleries when faced with
a vinasse pollution problem has already been discussed.
There is one example of inertia when faced with problems which
cannot be put down to conflict of interests. This was Yeast Produc¬
ers (Mtius) Ltd. In this case, faced with the absence of sufficient
# The company set up to produce bagasse briquettes with bagasse
from Savannah sugar factory.
* This is not to say that the Mauritian technicians would have
got the press working, merely that no-one tried.
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in-company knowledge of how to solve their marketing problems, they
sought a foreign company to do it for them. The factory was unaware
of any yeast quality problems until the Lallemand engineers arrived.
Although calling in Lallemand can be called taking an initiative
fend was as successful as it could be under the circumstances), it was
a somewhat passive initiative compared to the effort of, for example,
the marketing consultant who turned round Floreal Knitwear. In other
words, the actors involved did not try to take any initiative which
made use of Mauritian expertise, nor even to search for independent
consultants who could help—their vision was limited to finding
another yeast company to bail them out after Anchor Yeast Ltd. had
left them with the problems.
Considering now the initiatives that were taken: the modifica¬
tions to the Pingtung pulp mill by Taiwan Sugar Corporation engineers
to make the depither function at 100% of capacity; the adaptation of
the Siempelkamp pressing line to produce 4mm particleboard at the
Gjjgifir
Universal Board Co.; the cultivation of strains of Clostridium .butyl-
A -—
icum better adapted to molasses substrates by the staff at the Hawam-
dieh acetone-butanol distillery; the user education initiatives at
Thai Chipboard after the factory had already shut down once for lack
of sales; the Mauritian yeast market survey carried out in 1977; and
the compositing of bagasse with vinasse at Medine distillery: show
that local initiatives can be successful, provided that the innova¬
tors are given the freedom to follow through their ideas, without
being held back by other interests.
5. Synthesis
This division of the introduction of a technology into a social
- 310 -
environment where it is new, into five phases, is a convenient
descriptive device. But, it must not be thought that they are
independent. The historical events which occur within each phase pro¬
foundly affect and constrain all subsequent phases. _It i_s the dynam¬
ics of the process of the introduction of _a technoloqy which are
important to its success or fai1ure, its costs and benefits, not a
particular snapshot at one instant, called "choice of technology",
"feasibility study", "project appraisal", "economic review", or, in
the chilling words of the title of Raffray's PROSI Bulletin inter¬
view, "post mortem"(14).'t
The interest phase is important, since it is at this stage that
the coalition of interests which will promote the technology is
formed. If there are potential conflicts of interest within this
group, they will become actual if any problems arise, and hinder
problem-solving initiative in the last phase. The particular
interests of each actor may also limit the choices available to be
considered in the investigation and the measures which can be taken
to ensure the implantation of the technology within the society.
Finally, the interactions between the project and the other interests
of the promoters may actually hinder the success of the project.^
So any technology, considered as a means to provide a real, felt
need, common to many people, has a better chance of success than one
which is only clear to one man who has gathered a varied group of
interested parties to support the project. Only if it is small enough
to be run by a single interest, such as Daniel Lagesse's paper fac¬
tory, can a single vision stand a good chance of survival.
Here is a limitation to the role of the change agent. Where this
T The point is fundamental, and distinguishes this analysis,,
from all others.
} Directly by creating problems, or indirectly by affecting the
response of the actors to the problem. <
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is one person, who has had an idea, he is limited in his ability to
implement it, except on a small scale, by how much it can fulfill the
material interests of a larger group of people. The case studies in
this thesis show just how much the change agent can be limited in his
decisions, in his freedom of initiative, by the interests of others.§
Indeed, it can be argued that in certain circumstances it is better
to introduce a technology on a small scale to avoid these problems,
which have been shown to be able to cripple the flexibility of larger
scale ventures, irrespective of the economies of scale which may
apply to the industry.
The investigation phase, in many of the cases studied, has been
incomplete or superficial. Any inadequacies in the investigation have
consequences for the design of the technology to be implemented^and
for the interactions of the technology designed on incomplete infor¬
mation with an inadequately understood social and economic environ¬
ment.* This leads to the kinds of unforseen effects and problems
which, with hindsight, could have been avoided.
But, change agents rarely have the precognitive ability to for-
see all eventualities, so the idealist admonition to take more care
with the project analysis has no practical use. Instead, I shall try
and draw from these case studies some indication on the methodology
which can be used to avoid forgetting to investigate the less obvious,
but often crucial, effects. Hirschman talks of side effects as essen¬
tial requirements(2,p.161). In the particleboard factory case study
this is most clear, as user education was not investigated, but was
central to the failure of the venture. It was the failure to consider
the technological and social forward linkages of the project, in the
use of the product, which proved to be the blindest spot in the
§ This is a fundamental problem for development theories which
depend on the identification of change agents, and demonstra¬
tion through them.
9- Discussed frequently in the literature. * Not discussed elsewhere.
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investigation. In this case, as in some of the others, it was the
society which was incompletely investigated, rather than the techni¬
cal details of production. In Hirschman's terms, no attempt was made
to analyse in what ways the technology of particleboard production
was trait-making or trait-taking.
Considering the methods of investigation used by the successful
projects, and contrasting them with those used in the less successful
introductions of technology, certain common factors can be identi¬
fied. Firstly, in order to analyse successfully the potential
interactions of the society and the technology, the investigation
must be initiated by, and at least partially carried out by, local
people. This may be achieved in different ways. Lagesse personally
investigated many market opportunities before he started his personal
investigation into the technology of paper production by visiting
working plants and talking to both workers and management. The Taiwan
Sugar Corporation first contracted a local consulting firm to study
the production of export pulp from bagasse. Whatever method is used
to ensure a local involvement in the investigation, it protects those
involved against complete dependence on equipment suppliers for all
their technical information, and the serious consequences of this
discovered by Deep River - Beau Champ S.E.*
Secondly, this investigation should be open to as many different
opinions as possible, with reports from one source being submitted to
others for comments. In this way, the chances of systematic bias, or
of failure to investigate crucial factors, are reduced. For these
reasons, the Taiwan Sugar Corporation submitted the report of local
* Unfortunately this mistake is being repeated incessantly
around the world.
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consultants to foreign ones for comment, as the latter would be more
up-to-date on the technology, although less familiar with Taiwanese
conditions. Many companies do not do this, but keep their studies
secret to avoid potential competitors setting up before them. This
carries the risk that, in the narrow investigation which is likely to
result, crucial factors will be ignored, and later lead to the
failure of the venture. This is a far more serious outcome than the
possible establishment of competitors. If Beau Champ had consulted
local microbiologists, food technologists and marketing profession¬
als, they might never have accepted the deal offered by Anchor Yeast
or, if they had, had a better chance of success.
The implantation of a technology in a society is considered here
as the introduction of the machinery and equipment, and the creation
of the institutions and social relationships necessary for the tech¬
nology to take local roots. More frequently, technology introduction
is rather more akin to a parachute drop, without a survival kit or
map, on to an island isolated from the workers, consumers of its pro¬
duct and the interests of its promoters. Certain technologies are
implicitly trait-making : particleboard, for example, needs a change
in the traditional working practices of the users. To achieve this, a
number of institutions are needed, such as training schools, a furni¬
ture, veneering and door-making factory, salesmen training, exhibi¬
tions, and an advisory service.
A corollary to this is that the design of an appropriate tech¬
nology must simultaneously consider both the embodied and disembodied
aspects of technology. Particleboard production is an inappropriate
technology where small furniture manufacturers try to use it like
pTywoocl, it can be appropriate when all these small producers
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know how to join it with dowels, do their own engineering, and can
buy semi-finished articles (e.g. doors) more cheaply than the timber
or plywood equivalents.
The interaction of a technology with its environment is the
traditional concern of Appropriate Technology practitioners. Such
concerns as the environmental and social effects of large projects
have been studied, and often classified as inappropriate technolo¬
gies, as have capital intensive technologies in countries with
underemployed labour. As the case studies here were small, they had
little impact on their societies, rather the societies impacted upon
them.
The impacts in both senses, i.e. the interaction between each
technology and its society, were not constant throughout time, but
suffered historical changes resulting from the previous decisions in
the implantation phase, and from initiatives to modify some of these
interactions^6 It is the dynamics of these changes which needs to be
studied, for the very introduction of a technology is a commitment
to some change; it is the relationship between the technology and its
society, and that between these and human actors in these dramas that
determines the direction of change.
In the cases studied, these interactions presented themselves as
problems to the principal actors. Their responses to the situation
depended upon how well they had solved such problems previously, and
to the constraints imposed by the other actors involved. So, in the
case of the yeast factory, initiatives were only taken in one limited
sense—to find an external source of initiative, just as the very
idea to build the factory had come from outside Mauritius. As at no
# It is the changing nature of these impacts, the dynamic na¬
ture of the interaction, which distinguishes these cases, and
this analysis from those traditional in the appropriate tech¬
nology literature.
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point had the Mauritian staff or directors been involved in the
design of the plant, they had had no opportunity to take any initia¬
tive themselves. Cast into a mould of dependence, they did not find
themselves able to think sufficiently independently to resolve their
own problems. Only when the Lallemand engineers carried out experi¬
ments together with the staff of the factory was their creativity
liberated, so that later they could take further initiatives (in
changing the process conditions to increase the plant capacity).
It is on this point of creativity that I disagree with
Hirschman's "Hiding Hand". He claims that, "Creativity always comes
as a surprise to us; therefore we can never count on it and we dare
not believe in it until it has happened." This may be true for
economists, but certainly to the technical staff who made 4 mm parti-
cleboard in a press designed to press thicker board, to the Egyptian
microbiologists who reduced the risk of infection in their acetone-
butanol distillery, to whoever at Medine distillery discovered that
bagasse could be composted with vinasse, this creativity was no
surprise. It was necessary in the circumstances. Such creativity is
learnt through research; by solving small and then bigger problems.
In the case of the introduction of a new technology, it is in the
investigation phase that those involved can first practise their
creativity, so if this phase is left to outsiders, by the time prob¬
lems arise there is no-one there who has even thought of how to solve
problems in the venture. Also, the implantation is important. If the
staff are trained to understand the process and why they do their
jobs, and to continually modify it to achieve better performance,
they will be able to take their own initiatives when new situations
arise. Such was the situation at Beau Champ after the Lallemand
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engineers had trained the staff in this way.'f
One of Hirschman's formulations of his "Principle of the Hiding
Hand" is the initial underestimation of the project, so that the
actors are faced with these when the project is underway, have to
solve them, and do so. Not only is it dangerous because (as he says)
if they fail they will be less confident in their abilities to solve
future problems, but it is false. It is based on the implicit
assumption that creativity is unpredictable and cannot be prepared.
Yet, in the cases mentioned, the people involved were able to exercise
creativity because of their previous training. And hiding difficul¬
ties from those involved in projects misses the opportunities of such
training : in the investigation, by practising research, and in the
implantation, through training programmes deliberately planned to
equip the workers with the ability to use their initiative. Further¬
more, his assertion that once a project is well underway the princi¬
pal actors are committed to it, and have to solve the problems, is
not true for directors of private companies who have other interests
outside the company. If a promoter hides difficulties from them when
getting their support, they may react to the first problems by men¬
tally abandoning the venture—neither pulling out their capital, nor
putting in any more to solve the problems, just doing nothing.
To summarise, the introduction of a new technology into a
society requires the setting up of a process which will facilitate
this. Such a process, to succeed, requires a full investigation of
alternative technologies and the society; carried out by local people
(but can be aided by specific foreign advice). Through this investi¬
gation the technology is designed—both its purely technical aspects,
and also all the institutions necessary to make the traits required
| The necessity of creativity in the introduction of technolo¬
gies new to a society has not been stressed sufficiently in the
literature on technology transfer.
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for the project's success. It is at this stage that all objectives
must be explicitly included in the design, not choosing one and then
later trying to modify the designed technology to meet objectives of
income distribution, for example. The implantation of the technology
must be carried out in such a way that all these trait-making insti¬
tutions are established, including the trait of staff creativity. If
the process of technology introduction is so established, then the
ability of the actors to deal with the unforseen is enhanced.$
A technology developed by means of such a conscious process is
more likely to be appropriate to the circumstances than one merely
chosen on the basis of a list of criteria and then left to develop as
it may. How appropriate it is will depend on the depth of the inves¬
tigation and the explicit objectives of the project. This process
does not guarantee that the objectives will be chosen wisely, it
merely attempts to improve the flexibility of the project, and reduce
the number of unexpected interactions through its detailed analysis
of the technology-in-society.
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Small scale Pulp Production in India
CHAPTER S
PROCESSES ADOPTED IN SMALL HILLS
5.1. P'JLPING
5.1.1. Stmw Pulp (Writings and Printings, bleached grade)
The straw is first chopped into small pieces, 35~ to
5CT- long, by a mechanical chopper. Dusting is included
with chopping or should follow it. The chopped and
dusted straw is then taken by conveyer to the digester
section for cooking. The digesters are normally of
rotary spherical type, 12.5 ft. in diameter, with a
capacity cf 25 cubic metres and the numers of digesters
employed varies according to the output required. Caustic
liquor in the ratio 4:1, liquor : straw is added with the
caustic concentration such as to represent S°S to 12%
on Pone-dry straw. Occasionally cylindrical rotating
digesters are used but the spherical type is more common,
practically standard, in India. The steam pressure is
between 6 to 8 atmospheres and the cycle as follows:-
Charging, straw and liquor





Total Cycle 6 hours
The cooked pulp discharges tc a blew tank where the
pressure is released and it is then diluted and screened,
usually over a vibrating, Johnson type screen with
perforations around XZ dia. Rejects amount to about
}%. The stock is then washed and at this stage is known
as brown stock. The washer is normally a single, vacuum,
drum type unit and the wash liquor is sent to drain cr,
if a recovery plant is included, to evaporators. The
washed pulp is then diluted and screened again through
a rotary cutward-flcw or Cowan type screen, and cleaned
through centrifugal cleaners before passing over a
decker, or thickener, to storage at 3C<» tc 5°o in the
chlonnation tower.
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Bleaching is the standard, 3 stage C.E.H. system
vChlonne-caustic extraction and calcium hypochlorite).
Chlorine around 3.5% of pulp is added in gaseous form
upwards through the chlorination tower. A vacuum
washer follows and the pulp then passes at 4% - 5°«
consistency to the extraction tower where caustic
soda to the extent of 2% of pulp is added. The pulp
is diluted and washed again in a vacuum washer before
passing to the hypochlorite tower where 3-5% by weight
of chlorine is added as calcium hypochlorite.
The pulp is now bleached and has brightness around
73°GE. It is then diluted and cleaned again through
2 or 3 stage centricleaners before passing over a
thickener to storage for paper-mill use. The inherent
ash, chiefly silica, can be as high as 10% and the
freeness around 215 Canadian. Overall yield is
30% to 35%. Corresponding characteristics from bagasse
would be, from the same process brightness, 80 - 85° GE,
freeness, 450 to 500 Canadian, ash 1.0 - 1.7% and yield
40% - 45%, indicating its superiority as a raw material.
The cooking time would be shorter but cooking chemical
greater. The latter is not important if recovery is
included. Bagasse, when available only in small
quantity is sometimes added to the straw to improve
the pulp quality.
The foregoing is illustrated in Figure 3 diagramatically.
There can be variations according to scale and quality.
The blow tank is sometimes omitted and pulp emptied on
to a drainage floor or directly to washer troughs.
Vacuum washers may be replaced by simple breaker type
drum washers. Single stage hypo-bleaching may be used
where standards are lower, and only one stage of
centricleaners. The flowsheet and description above,
however, are typical of what would be installed for
straw pulp manufacture in the new mills under construct¬
ion. The variations mentioned above are representative
"■>ore of the older operating mills of lower capacity,
below 15 T.P.0.
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5.1.2. Bagasse Pulp (Writings and Printings,-
Up to 30 T.P.D., the bagasse pulping system is virtually
the same as described above for straw, except that
de-pithing replaces the chopping and dusting preparation
because pith in the sugar cane is undersirable. It does
not contribute to the paper-making fibre but absorbs
chemicals and reduces the pulp freeness so that the paper-
making process is slower and drying more difficult.
Bagasse requires more caustic for cooking, up to 21%
on pulp produced but, the cooking time is shorter.
Above 30 T.P.O. bagasse pulping (and straw) is usually
continuous because one continuous, screw-type digester
is less expensive in capital cost and space requirements
than a miltiplicity of spherical digesters; it still
further reduces cooking time, down to 12-15 minutes,
and ensures more uniform pulp quality. The elementary
system outlined above normally becomes more sophisticated,
with increasing scale for operating cost reduction or
qualitative reasons. Three stage, counterflow Drown stock
washing gives cleaner pulp, washes out more chemical
for recovery and concentrates the extracted black liquor,
reducing the evaporator burden for recovery. Heat
exchangers are incorporated to provide hot washing
water, more effective than cold water.
5.1.3. Rag or Cotton Waste Pulp
The scale is usually smaller than for straw or bagasse
because rag pulp is normally used as a long-fibre blend
to impart strength and quality, seldom exceeding 20co
of the total furnish, or, in higher proportion for hand
made papers where total output is very small.
The cotton waste or rags are first cut to s'mall pieces,
using a rag-chopper, are dusted and then charged into a
single spherical digester. It is customary today to
sort mixed rags to eliminate synthetic material which
will not pulp and this necessary function is presenting
an ever-increasing problem. The chopped and dusted
rags are cooked for around 3 hours in the digester with
4fo of caustic soda using steam at 4 to 6 atmospheres
pressure. The resultant pulp is then dump ted into a
drainage chest where the cooking liquor drains off
_ 32 5" -
5.1.5. Other Processes Used in Snail Mills
5.1.5.1. Neutral Sulphite Semi-Chemical
This process uses sodium sulphite ^0-j) arid
sodium carbonate (Na^ CO^) as the cooking chemicals but
the same digester ana washing plant are utilised.
The cook is harder, the yield higher, bleaching more
difficult and chemical-consuming so its use is confined
mainly to pulp for packaging papers, particularly-
corrugating medium. Chemical recovery is not
practical.
5.1.5.2. Chemi-'-lechanical (Mechano-Chemical) Process
This process has the merits of lower capital costs,
higher yields and lower chemical consumption, at the
expense of some quality but for many of the smaller
mills around 10-15 T.P.D. the economies outweigh the
quality considerations. For wrapping grades of
paper the quality is not impaired to any significant
degree, and may in fact be improved.
The chopped fibre is fed with water intb open
vessels, normally the Indian version of the
Hydrapulper, and steam is injected to raise the
temperature to 100°C, atmospheric boiling point.
The pulp consistency is about 105o and the cooking
time 30-60 minutes. From 5°S to 10^ of caustic is
added. Bleaching can follow, single stage or 3-
stage, as required and the overall yield is around
45°o to 50S. The fibre is less well cooked and
harder, but washes better on this account. More
mechanical treatment subsequenly is required
than for fully-cooked pulps of similar materials,
hence the name, but this is not serious for the
small mill. Chemical recovery is not normally
incorporated because the relatively small quantity
of chemical used would not justify the plant
required anJ the effluent burden can be tolerated.
The system is shown diagramatically in Figure 4A.
In recent times more attention is being paid to
this process by the larger mills because of the yield
and other attractions, it can be adapted using batch
or continuous digesters*and hot-stock refiners*of
larqe capacity, fulfil the mechanical requirements.
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Appendix 3.
Financial data and calculations for the Universa! Board Co.
case study.
1. Production costs
Luc Lam(l) calculated the production cost of 19 mm board at this
factory at full production capacity (15 t/d or 3750 t/a) and at one
third capacity (125 days production, 1250 t/a). However, the company
never managed to sell even 1250 t in one year. The sales of Top
Board, broken down by the board thickness, are given in figure A3.1.
Figure A3.1 Annual sales of Top Board in tonnes.
Financial Normal sal es Special
year Order






1-6/1976 26.48 47.35 111.7 4.14 83.29 0 16.55 289.51
1976/77 77.15 139.65 181.13 2.29 129.27 0 14.80 544.29 19.05
1977/78 43.33 66.18 135.93 47.52 98.89 0 9.40 401.25 343.96
1978/79 30.40 65.88 123.98 1.89 97.31 9.44 5.38 334.28 86.96
7-12/1979 11.32 5.49 59.06 5.00 29.79 3.56 9.85 124.07
Note: The special order was for the new Registry House in Port Louis,
and was mostly special 49 mm particleboard.
Sources: Interview with M. Raffray(2), and information provided by
his secretary(3).
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The annual sales are presented in figure 3.1.
As figure A3.1 shows, not only were the total sales lower than
the production capacity of the plant, but much of the board sold was
thinner than the 19 mm standard in particleboard plant cost-
ings(l,4,5). This can be more clearly seen in figure A3.2, in which
the sales of each thickness are presented as percentages of the total
sales.




4 mm 6 mm 13 mm 16 mm 19 mm 25 mm 30 mm
Jan.-June 1976 9.1% 16.4% 38.6% 1.4% 28.8% 0% 5.7%
1976/77 14.2% 25.7 % 33.3% 0.4% 23.8% 0% 2.7%
1977/78 10.8% 16.5% 33.9% 11.8% 24.6% 0% 2.3%
1978/79 9.1% 19.7% 37.1% 0.6% 29.1% 2.8% 1.6%
July-Dec.1979 9.1% 4.4% 47.6% 4.0% 24% 2.9% 7.9%
1976-9 11.1% 19.2% 36.1% 3.6% 25.9% 0.8% 3.3%
Note: these are percentages of the total sales in each period. The
special order was for the new Regi stry House in Port Louis, and was
mostly special 49 mm particleboard.
The proportions of the different thicknesses sold appear to have
remained constant over the years. To check on this a one-way analysis
of variance was performed on this data. The result was a variance
ratio of 47.28 for 6 degrees of freedom of the numerator and 28
degrees of freedom of the denominator, which result is highly signi¬
ficant (pee0.1%). As the sales and thicknesses were so closely asso¬
ciated, the average sales breakdown (the last line in figure A3.2) is
used in all further calculations.
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The board thickness affects the production cost in several ways:
i. less weight of thin board can be pressed per hour,
ii. boards of different thicknesses have a differing proportion
between the surface layers (fine particles, more glue and less
hardener) and the core (coarse particles, less glue and more
hardener),
iii. and 1.2 mm is sanded off every board, regardless of thickness -
this is a greater proportion wasted on thin boards.
The differences between boards of differing thickness are sum¬
marised in figure A3.3. Using these values, the quantities of raw
materials needed to produce one tonne of board of each thickness can
be calculated. This has been done for 19 mm board by Lam(l), A sample
calculation from this is shown in figure A3.4. The quantities of raw
materials required to produce one tonne of each of the other princi¬
pal thicknesses of board have been calculated by the author, and are
shown in figure A3.5, together with weighted averages based on the
proportions sold in 1976-9.
Other inputs were related to the production time, notably the
fuel needed to heat the press, the electricity used and labour costs.
The average production rate when producing the mixture of thicknesses
sold by this factory has been calculated, and is shown in figure
A3.3. This is 660 kg board/hr, which is a 15% reduction in capacity
compared to that achieved when producing only 19 mm particleboard.
Because of this these time-related costs were higher than estimated
by Lam. Applying this figure for the production rate to Lam's figures
for hourly fuel oil, electricity and labour usage(l), the following
APPENDIXI
CALCULATIONFORPR DUCTIONP C11-1AIUh'B
1,TypoofBosrd Dimensionsoffini hedBoar=•3,05x1 22m DimensionsofuntrimmedB ar-3,10x1 27m Specificwe ght=COOkg/m3 Thicknessofthefinishedboard=19mm Thicknessofthu sandedbo r=■20,2mm
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Figure A3.3 Characteristics of boards of different thicknesses.
Thickness/mm 4 6 13 16 19 30 Average
100 100 40 40 40 33*
5.2 7.2 14.2 17.2 20.2 31.2
750 675 600 600 600 450
3.00 4.05 7.80 9.60 11.40 18.00
333 247 128 104 88 56 159
11.2 15.0 29.0 35.7 42.4 50.2 23.2
2.5 3.5 4.5 5. 5 6.5 10.0
48 34 26 22 18 12









* Estimated from the density
Source for the densities, pressing cycles, and the proportion of sur¬
face to core layers: Raffray(2)
The board weight was calculated from the thickness, density and the
standard finished board length and width (3.05 m x 1.22 m(l) ). Hence
the production capacity.
The average is weighted according to the quantities of each thickness
sold in 1976-9.
Figure A3.5 Raw materials required to produce 1 t of board.
Board thickness/mm
Raw materials
kg 4 6 13 16 19 30 Aver.
Dry bagasse 1248 1152 1060 1043 1031 1010 1088
Dry resin 133 122 99.2 97.7 96.6 92.8 106.3
Paraffin wax 5.96 5.50 4.47 4.40 4.35 4.20 4.79
Emulsifier 0.65 0.60 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.52
Ammonia 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10
NH .CI 2.68 2.47 3.10 3.05 3.02 3.04 2.91
Urea 6.63 6.12 4.96 4.88 4.83 4.76 5.32
Xyligen 30F 17.0 15.7 14.3 14.1 13.9 13.6 14.7
Process water 220 203 127 125 124 115 151
The averages are weighted according to the 1976-9 sales,
are obtained:
Fuel oil for press = 17.5 kg/hr = 26.5 kg/t board
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Electricity 472 kW 715 kW hr/t board
Labour: skilled 8 men/shift 12.1 man hr/t board
semi-ski 1 led 11 men/shift = 16.7 man hr/t board
Other fuel oil is used for drying bagasse. Lam calculates the
usage assuming all the heat of combustion of the oil is used to eva¬
porate water from the bagasse. On this basis he calculated a fuel oil
consumption for drying bagasse of 62.7 kg/hr, which was reduced to
24.3 kg/hr with mixed fuel oil and bagasse dust firing. This was to
dry 808 kg/hr dry weight of bagasse(l). As the factory always pro¬
duced well below capacity, it rarely ran on three shifts, so more
fuel oil had to be used as no bagasse dust could be fired until the
furnace temperature reached 600 °C(1) - say for 45 mi n in a double
shift of 14 hr 40 min (22 hr x 2/3), or 5% of the operating time.
Assuming this, the average fuel oil consumption for drying bagasse
would have been 26.2 kg/hr = 32.5 kg/t bagasse = 35.3 kg/t board (at
1.088 t bagasse/t board; see figure A3.3).
Hence the total fuel oil consumption = 61.8 kg/t board.
Sanding costs depended on the number of boards produced. For
19 mm board this was 23.6 boards/t(l). For the mix as sold this came
to 42.1 boards/t.
A further variable production cost was that of handling baled
bagasse. According to Raffray(6) and Lam(l) in the first years of
operation the factory was operated at the same time as the St.
Antoine sugar factory, and took its bagasse directly from the sugar
factory. From 1975/76 on the particleboard factory had to use a large
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proportion of baled bagasse purchased from other factories, as St.
Antoine was burning more bagasse, leaving a greatly reduced surplus.
This was claimed to be due to the cyclone Gervaise in 1975 and cane
harvesting difficulties in the subsequent years leading to more fre¬
quent factory shutdowns, needing bagasse to restart the boilers more
often(6). It should be pointed out, however, that the total number
of crushing hours per day for St. Antoine before and after 1975 were
much the same, i.e. 20.72, 21.00, 19.41, 15.91, 19.94, 19.13, and
19.94 hr for 1972 to 1978 respectively(7).
Assuming that from 1975/76 onwards 80% of the bagasse was pur¬
chased in bales. This had to be stacked, unstacked, and fed to the
factory, requiring 2.1, 8 and 6.4 man hr/t dry bagasse respectively
of semi-skilled labour. In all this came to 15.5 man hr/t baled
bagasse or 13.2 man hr/t total bagasse.
.'. labour for unbaling = 14.4 man hr/t board.
Total labour: skilled = 12.1 man hr/t board.
semi-skilled = 31.1 man hr/t board.
Given these physical relationships and the unit costs of the
different inputs, the variable production cost can be calculated.
This has been done for four different periods: 1974 (when Lam wrote
his report(l) ), 1975/76, 1976/77 and 1979. The unit costs of the
inputs, and the quantities required to produce one tonne of particle
board (at the average mix of thicknesses) are shown in figure A3.6.
Figure 3.14 shows the relative importance of the different inputs in
the variable cost, and figure A3.7 compares the total costs with the
actual production costs from the accounts for several financial
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years.
Figure A3.6 Inputs per tonne board produced, and unit costs.
Input Quantity/t board Unit costs (Rs) in: % increase
over 5
Ledune UBC 1974 1975/761976/77 1979 year:
Raw material s
Bagasse/t - 1.088 0 43.00 43.00 70.00 (if
Chemicals/kg:
Resi n 87.00 106.3 3.10 3.04 3.50 4.04 30
Paraffin wax
) 5.00 4.79 2.50 2.50 2.62 3.68 47Emulsifier 0.52 15.00 17.90 17.60 18.44 23
Ammonia 1.54 0.10 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 0
NH.C1 2.00 2.91 1.85 2.13 2.75 3.57 93
Urea 0 5.32 0.85 2.00 2.50 1.75 106
Fungicide 0 14.7 11.00 12.57 13.85 16.65 51
Sandpaper
cost/board ? 43.1 0.35 0.43 0.48 0.54 54
Fuel oil/kg 37 61.8 0.67 0.83 0.92* 1.92® 187
Elect./kWh 480 715 0.195 0.217 0.26 0.42 115
Labour/man hr
Ski lied 23.2 12.1 2.50 3.00 3.73 4.69 87
Semi -ski 11 ed 10.4 31.1 1.875 2.25 2.80 3.51 87
Unski11ed 49.5 0 - - - - -
Sources:
Electricity cost from the CEB Annual Reports(8,9,10,ll,12).
Labour costs from Lam(l) for 1974 and increased according to the in¬
dex of wages of sugar factory workers in Leung Shing(13).
Fuel oil costs assume a specific gravity of 0.87 except for that for
1974 which was given on a weight basis. $ - from the CEB Annual Re¬
port for 1979, the basis of the fuel cost electricity price adjust¬
ment clause(12). * - Lam's price inflated at the same rate as the
increase in diesel prices according to Dinan(14).
All other prices were taken from Lam(l) (for 1974), Raffray(2) (for
1975-77), and a list provided by Raffray's secretary in 1980(3) (for
1979).
The quantities required per tonne board are for the Universal Board
Co. (UBC) as calculated above, and for a proposed 12 t/d wood-based
plant in a case study for FA0(5).
Comparing the results of applying Lam's production cost model to
the actual mixture of thicknesses sold in several years of operation
and the production costings used for the cost of sales calculations
in the company's accounts(15), it can be seen that the raw materials
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Figure A3.7 Comparison of predicted and actual production costs.
Rs/t Raw material Fuel oi 1 Electricity Labour Man. fee
board (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1973/74 426 86 194 91
1974 536 41 181 89
1974/75 376 85 132 196
1975/76 612 638 51 102 155 210 106 321
1976/77 686 653 57 127 186 338 132 769
1977/78 1144 193 344 385
1979 821 119 300 166
(1) Calculated from figure A3.6.
(2) From the Universal Board Company accounts.
The electricity costs under (1) are only for the kWh used. Those
under (2) include the maximum demand charge as well.
The management fee included labour, factory management, water, lubri¬
cating oil and grease, insurance of bagasse and transport.
costs are similar. Differences arise from small differences in the
thicknesses of the boards sold and the fact that the stocks of raw
materials fluctuated, so in some years board was made from old,
cheaper, stocks of raw material. The prices used here in the calcula¬
tions (in figure A3.6) were current during the indicated years,
therefore, the calculations assume that all production was from new
stock. The differences in fuel oil costs can be attributed to the
shorter working periods of the particleboard factory, which limited
the extent of bagasse dust burning, and to Lam's assumption of per¬
fect heat transfer and zero losses in his calculation of the fuel oil
requirements for drying. On the other hand he assumed that the fac¬
tory electricity consumption was continuously 80% of the rated capa¬
city (in kVA), which resulted in an overestimate of the direct elec¬
tricity cost. There should have been a greater difference between the
two columns for electricity cost, as that derived from the accounts
includes the high maximum demand charge which had to be paid whether
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or not the factory was operating. It appears that the management fee
only covered the cost of labour in 1973/74, but rose in 1974/75 to
cover the labour cost plus supervision (Rs60 k for production of
3750 t/a or Rs 80k for production of 1250 t/a according to Lam(l) ),
plus the bagasse insurance cost (estimated as the difference between
Lam's figure of Rs45 k and the figure for insurance paid directly by
the Universal Board Company of Rsl7 k(15) ). Afterwards the manage¬
ment fee increased to an approximately constant annual charge, sug¬
gesting that the wages were charged to the particleboard factory
whether or not it was in production, although the workers and factory
management were employed in the sugar factory when the particleboard
plant was not operating.
2- Selling prices
Figure A3.8 gives the selling prices of the different
thicknesses of "Top Board" from 1973 to 1978. The average selling
price per square metre has been calculated for the mixture of board
thicknesses sold so that these can be compared with the average ply¬
wood import prices (see figure 3.21).
3. Sensitivity analysis calculations.
These are based on the accounts for 1978(15) and on the rela¬
tionships already calculated in figures A3.1, A3.6, 3.14, 3.16 and
3.26. The results are given in figure 3.27. From figure A3.1 we have:
Sales in 1973/74 = 697 t, and in 1977/78 = 745.21 t (1)
From figure A3.6:
Electricity use = 715 kWh/t board (2)
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19 mm 30 mm Aver.
Ju ly /3 4.20 6.60 11.60 12.70 14.50 20.90 8.96
Mar. '74 4.60 7.20 12.80 14.00 16.00 23.00 9.86
July '74 5.20 7.90 14.10 15.30 17.50 25.20 10.86
Mar. '75 5.50 8.48 15.40 16.80 21.20 27.70 12.07
Oct. '76 6.20 9.50 17.20 20.30 23.70 31.00 13.55
Jan. '77 6.20 10.30 18.90 22.30 26.00 34.00 14.69
July '77 6.50 11.30 20.80 24.40 28.60 37.40 16.08
Jan. '78 6.50 12.40 22.80 26.90 31.40 41.10 17.50
June '78 7.10 12.90 23.90 29.60 34.40 43.00 18.62
Proportion
of sales/%
23.2 29.7 29.0 2.4 14.2 1.4 100
2
Calculated from selling prices in Rs/ft provided by Raffray in 1977
and 1980(2,3).
Selling prices at the wholesalers were the above plus 18.5%.
The averages are weighted according to the area! proportions of the
different thicknesses sold, as calculated in figure A3.3.
From figure 3.14:
Bagasse _ 5.4




Raw materials 215.2 215.2
Variable costs " 418.1-9.0-72.4 ~ 336.7
Electricity _ 64.8
Variable costs ~ 336.7
Management fee _ 72.4
Fixed costs ~ 81.4
1973/74 Prodn. cost(excl. depn.) _ 100.0








1977/78 rent = Rs 48 k (9)
From these relationships were calculated the profits under dif¬
ferent conditions. For example, the cost of fungicide was calculated
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thus:
Fungicide = (4) x (5)x(Variable costs)
174 PIS?
=
yyy x -fff^yxRs 1376 k = Rs 259k
.'.Variable cost (B) = Rs 1117
The variable cost when the bagasse is free was calculated in an
identical manner.
For the cost with electricity at Rs0.04/kWh, the variable cost
excluding electricity was calculated as above, and then the electri¬
city cost was estimated as follows:
Electricity cost = 715 kWh/t x 745.21 txRs 0.04/t
= Rs 21 k
The fixed and variable production costs at 1973/74 prices were
calculated as follows:
Fixed + variable production cost = (8) x (Fixed + variable cost)
= 4^q°4 x (Rs 361 k+Rs 1376k)
= Rs 415 k
The income at 1973/74 selling prices was calculated from the sales
income in the accounts for 1973/74 and 1977/78, and the quantities
sold in these years, thus:
Sales income at 1973/74 prices = x 745.21t = Rs 1312 k
The rent was taken from (9), halved and subtracted from the
administration costs, and the management fee was calculated as fol-
1 ows:
y x Management fee = (7)x(Fixed costs)
4 x ¥r4xRs 361 k = Rs 161k
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The calculation of the effect of an increase in the unit selling
price is self evident. The effects of changing the sales volume is
less so. For these, the sales income and variable production costs
are either doubled or halved, while the other costs remain constant,
except for the selling costs. It is assumed that either a salesman is
employed all year round to increase the sales or no advertising is
done and the sales volume is allowed to fall; hence the selling
costs.
The currency loss on the DM loan affected the profitability in
two ways. It increased the debt burden by Rs0.9 M, and the fixed
assets were revalued to take account of this. So, both the deprecia¬
tion and interest payments were higher. The savings if no such
foreign loan had been taken were calculated assuming a 10% interest
rate (the same as the later special loans, see figure 3.23) and the
depreciation rate at 8.7% of the machinery and equipment.
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APPENDIX 4
Cost-benefit analysis of Indian mini -mi 11 paper technology
applied to Mauritian conditions.
This follows the methodology of Little and Mirrlees(l), as used
by Scott in his report "Estimates of accounting prices for Mauri¬
tius"^). The accounting ratios used were taken from Scott's report
and appendix IV. Some of these were recalculated on a c.i.f. price
basis, rather than the Mauritian purchase price basis used by Scott
so that import prices in the Customs and Excise report(3) could be
used. The ratios used are summarised in figure A4.1.
Figure A4.1 Accounting ratios for goods and services used in paper
production.
Item A B
Commercial vehicles 0.764 0.899
Gas/diesel oil 0.759 0.859
Machinery & equipment:
Industrial & Agricultural 0.892 1.048
Ditto (c.i.f. basis) 1.141 1.341
Office etc. 0.763 0.894
Misc. building materials 0.838 0.985
Unweighted average of tradables 0.809 0.950
Ditto (c.i.f. basis) 1.149 1.349
Bui 1dings 0.818 0.929
Industrial electricity 1.704 1.995
Misc. office services 0.703 0.742
Foreign exchange 1.0 1.2
Taxes etc. 0 0
"Surplus" men 0.4 0.4
"Surplus" women 0.5 0.5
Skilled labour 0.8 0.8
Misc. costs 0.8 0.8
Notes - A are accounting ratios according to Scott(2).
B are changed to allow for an assumed 20% overvaluation of
the Mauritian rupee in 1977.
As Scott's paper was written in 1972, the accounting ratios may
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well have changed by 1977, which is the date used for these calcula¬
tions. In particular, the shadow wage rates may have changed, and the
assumption that the exchange rate of the Mauritian rupee reflected
the true value of foreign exchange may no longer have been valid in
1977. The unemployment rate, as far as it can be estimated, decreased
from 1972 to 1974, accompanying the sugar boom, and then started to
increase again. An idea of the changes in unemployment can be
obtained by adding together the numbers of relief workers and
Development Works Corporation employees. One source gives figures of
19.0, 16.8 and 17.6 thousands for the years 1972, 1974 and 1975
respectively(4). From the Bank of Mauritius report(5) and the Mauri¬
tius Economic Reviews(6,7) it is possible to calculate totals of
18.9, 16.5 and 17.3 thousands for the same years.
As a lower but increasing level of unemployment can be as seri¬
ous as the high rate of unemployment in 1972, the accounting ratios
for "surplus" labour have been left as calculated by Scott.
However, in view of the two devaluations of the Mauritian rupee
in 1979 and 1981, it would be a brave man who asserted that the 1977
exchange rate reflected the true value of foreign currency to Mauri¬
tius. The increases in the balance of payments current account start
before 1977, not just in 1979. This is shown in figure A4.2.
Figure A4.2 Mauritius. Balance of payments - current account (goods,
services and transfers)
(Rs x 106) 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Credit 2 311 127 - - -
Deficit - - 243 512 735
Source: Bank of Mauritius Report for 1979, p.91(5)
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To take account of this, column B has been calculated in figure
A4.1, assuming a shadow exchange rate such that the accounting ratio
for foreign currency is 1.2 instead of 1.0 (equivalent to dividing
all local inputs by 1.2). Both sets of accounting ratios are used in
the cost-benefit analysis, so that the effects of any undervaluation
of foreign currency can be identified.
These ratios were applied to 1977 Mauritian prices (where avail¬
able) so that they can be compared with the Indian and Jamaican stu¬
dies. figure A4.3 shows the Mauritian prices used in these calcula¬
tions, and their sources. When no Mauritian prices were easily avail¬
able to the writer, the Indian prices were used, converted at the
1977 exchange rate of Indian Rs 1 = Mauritian Rs 0.768(8). Machinery
specially for papermaking was assumed imported into Mauritius from
India including a 20% margin to cover freight costs.
The shadow prices have then been calculated by multiplying these
prices by the accounting ratios given in figure A4.1. For example,
for bagasse,
Shadow price = (labour cost x ratio for "surplus" men) + (binding
cost x ratio for miscellaneous building materials) ; i.e.
Shadow price A = (30 x 0.4) + (20 x 0.838) = 28.8 Rs/t, and
Shadow price B = (30 x 0.4) + (20 x 0.985) = 31.7 Rs/t.
Applying these prices to the figures given in Western for a
15 t/d mill(15), except for the chemical usages which were taken from
Rao(16), the following shadow costs and benefits are obtained. Figure
A4.4 shows the capital costs, figure A4.5 the production costs, and
figure A4.6 the revenues obtained.J
f All figures in this section also give an estimate of the
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Figure A4.3 1977 Mauritian prices.
Item Cost/Rs Note S.I.T.C.
9
c.i.f. local
Bui 1dings/ft0 39.06 1
(/m 3.629)
Waste paper/kg 1.208 1.716 2 251.11
Cotton waste/kg 3.141 4.462 2 263.30





Sodium hydroxide 1.680 2.386 2 513.62
Chiorine 5.740 8.153 2 513.21
A1 urn 2.966 4.213 4
Resins 8.45 12.00 2 292.20
Clay 1.618 2.298 2,5 276.21
Dyes 13.633 19.365 2 532.10
Metallic oxides 7.081 10.058 2 513.50
Laundry blue 7.954 11.298 2 531.01(10)




Oil-fired boiler 50 7
Sugar factory 4 7
Wages:
Daily paid/day 16.17 8
Monthly paid/month 1225 8
Paper/kg:
Printing & writing 5.842 8.298 2 641.21
Packaging - kraft 4.345 6.172 2 641.32
- other 3.643 5.175 2 641.52
Corrugated 5.205 7.393 2 641.93(20)
Newsprint 3.520 5.000 2 641.10
1. Cost of Plaine Lauzun Estate construction, from DBM report 1976.
p.6(8) 2. C.i.f. import prices 1977 from Customs and Excise report
for the S.I.T.C. quoted(3). Local prices by dividing by 0.704 (ra¬
tio of direct import cost to local price, average for non-consumer
goods from Scott(2)). 3. Cost at Universal Board Co(9). 4. Clay
price x Indian ratio of alum to clay prices. 5. Average price of
imports from UK (presumably containing a large proportion of china
clay). 6. CEB Report 1977(10) 7. Cost at Yeast Producers (Mtius)
Ltd(ll). 8. Average wages for the paper products industry in Sep¬
tember 1978(12), deflated to 1977 by the cost of living index(13),
plus 30% fringe benefits.
financial cost to a private entrepreneur. This will be dis¬
cussed in the second addendum to this appendix.
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Figure A4.4 Capital cost of a 15 t/d pulp/paper mini mill in Mauri¬
tius at 1977 shadow prices.
(kRs) A B Fin.
Bui 1dings 1692 1922 2069
Plant & equipment* 16267 19119 19035
Spares (2% of above) 325 382 381
Vehicles* 59 69 77
Office equipment etc.* 146 172 192
Pre-operation costs# 694 775 781
Sundries* 702 741 998
19886 23180 23532
Contingencies (5%) and
technical fees (2%) 1392 1623 1647
Total capital cost 21278 24802 25179
A - using accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1.
B - using accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
* - from Indian prices calculated as explained above.
# - from Indian prices, but calculated using the ratios of Mauritian
shadow unit production costs to the Indian unit production cost.
In the production costing there are alternative values for the
steam cost. One assumes that all the steam is generated in an oil-
fired package boiler, the other that a third of the steam comes from
a neighbouring sugar factory which can spare 135 t/d of steam. There
are also alternative costs for fibrous raw materials, assuming that
of the 200kg rags/cotton waste/1inters specified by Rao(16) 20kg
can be found locally as wastes of the Mauritian textile and clothing
industries (see the addendum to this appendix). The rest would have
to be imported, perhaps as long-fibre pulp or as textile wastes.
Because of these alternative costs, there are upper and lower esti¬
mates (1 and 2 respectively) of the production cost under each set of
accounting ratios (A and B).
The paper is assumed to be sold as non-kraft packaging paper, as
- 3^-
Figure A4.5 Unit production costs for a 15 t/d mini mill at 1977
Mauritian shadow costs.








Maint., consumables,) IRs 335 208 244 258
packing & dispatch
Chemicals:
Sodium hydroxide 250 kg 483 567 596
A1 urn 60 kg 204 240 253
Rosin 15 kg 146 171 180
Clay 100 kg 186 218 230
Dyes IRs 40 35 41 31
Fibrous raw materials:
Bagasse 4.8 t 138 152 240
Waste paper 120 kg 167 196 206
Cotton waste, local 20 kg 1 1 1
Imported pulp* 200 kg 520 611 643
or imp. textile wastes 180 kg 416 488 514
Services:
Steam - oi1-fired or 9 t 342 387 450
- 1/3 from sugar mi 11 9 t 239 271 312
Electricity 1.3 MWh 780 910 455
Total production cost 3481 3273 4009 3770 4038 3771
A - using accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1.
B - using accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
* - pulp at 10% water, costing US$ 360/t (the price paid by Pondi-
cherry Papers Ltd. for unbleached sulphite pulp(15) ).
produced by the 15 t/d mill described in Western(15). The unit net
revenues are then calculated,by taking away the different production
costs, and then multiplied by the actual production of Western's typ¬
ical 15 t/d plant (70% of capacity) to obtain the annual net cash
fl ow.
From the annual revenues and the capital costs have been calcu¬
lated the net present values (NPV) of the cash flow, discounted over
13 years of operation plus one of construction, at various discount
- 348 -
Figure A4.6 Unit revenues from paper sales at 1977 Mauritian shadow
prices, for a 15 t/d mini-mill.
Accounting ratios - A B Financial
Production cost - 1 2 1 2 1 2
Selling price/Rs/t 4186 4186 4914 4914 5175 5175
Prodn. cost/Rs/t 3481 3273 4009 3770 4038 3771
Net revenue/Rs/t 705 913 905 1145 1137 1404
Annual revenues at
4075 t/a /kRs 2873 3721 3689 4664 4632 5721
A - using accounting ratios from column A i n figure A4. 1.
B - using accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
1 - using steam from an oil-fired boiler and imported textile wastes.
2 - 1/3 of the steam from a sugar factory and using imported pulp.
rates and the internal rate of return (IRR), i.e. that discount rate
which produces a NPV of zero. This has been summarised in figure
A4.7.
Figure A4.7 Discounted cash flow analysis for a 15 t/d mini paper
plant at 1977 Mauritian shadow prices.
Accounting ratios - A B Financial
Production cost - 1 2 1 2 1 2
Cash flows - year 0 -21.3 -21.3 -24.8 -24.8 -25.2 -25.2
- years 1-13 2.9 3.7 3.7 4.7 4.6 5.7
NPV at i=5% 5.4 13.0 9.4 18.1 18.3 28.7
7% 2.6 9.2 5.6 13.3 13.5 22.7
11% -1.7 3.5 0.1 6.0 6.2 13.5
IRR 9% 14% 11% 16% 16% 21%
All cash flows and NPVs in millions of Rupees.
A similar calculation was made for a much smal1er handmade paper
plant, based on a costing provided by Coromandal Hydraulics(17).
This was a project report produced by an Indian equipment supplier to
the handmade paper industry, who used a cylinder mould vat rather
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than a hand lifted frame. This hand operated mould is similar in con¬
cept to the machine driven moulds used in some paperboard plants.
They quoted accurate capital cost figures (as they were selling), and
calculated the returns for certain paper products: pulp board, white
card, grey card sheets and grey boards.
As their calculations do not envisage the use of bagasse, cer¬
tain modifications had to be made to arrive at an approximate costing
of such a plant based on bagasse. The raw material usage was taken
from Rao's paper(16) but with additional chemicals., as specified in
Coromandal Hydraulics1 project study(17), needed to produce higher
quality paper. To the capital cost in the report was added the cost
of mini-digesters for the bagasse. Bagasse was also substituted for
firewood as a fuel for heating the digesters. The 24 t/a of cotton
waste needed should be available in Mauritius.
Since such a small mill would only be considered in Mauritius
for the production of premium grades of paper, and not be expected to
compete with Packaging Industries Ltd. for the packaging paper
market, the calculation has been based on the production of white
card, at 400 kg/d in two shifts.
Otherwise the same assumptions were made as in the previous
cost-benefit calculation. The results are shown in figure A4.8 (capi¬
tal cost), figure A4.9 (production cost), figure A4.10 (revenue) and
figure A4.ll (cash flow analysis).
The production cost figures are somewhat less certain than in
the previous study, as the quantities of bagasse and chemicals needed
to digest the bagasse are taken from a study of a 15 t/d plant,
whereas a 400 kg/d to 1 t/d plant might require different quantities.
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Figure A4.8 Capital cost of 400 kg/d handmade paper project at 1977
Mauritian shadow prices.
Item ~ Quantity ' Cost/kRs
A B Fin.
Bui 1dings 654 trT 225 ~T5F 2/b
Pulp and paper machinery 154 181 180
(project report IRs 138600 )
(+ 2 mini digesters IRs 7800*)
(+ freight 20%)
Electric motors,starters )
and other industrial equip.
IRs 42800 29 34 33
Office equipment IRs 4000 2 3 3
Erection IRs 40000 25 25 43
Total 435 498 534
A - accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1
B - accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
* - From an invoice sent to the writer by Coromandal Hydraulics(18).
Furthermore, little handmade paper is made in India from bagasse, as
they have had difficulties producing high quality writing paper at
this scale. Here it is assumed that bagasse pulping at this scale is
not too different from its pulping in 15 t/d(16) or 10 t/d(15) mills.
As bagasse has rarely been used to produce high quality printing
and writing papers in handmade plants, although often used for this
in mini-mills of 15 t/d capacity, the sales have been calculated both
as sales of printing and writing paper and alternatively as sales of
packaging paper, in case the plant cannot at first produce printing
and writing paper.
1. Addendum - Cotton waste availability in Mauritius.
This was calculated from the 1977 import statistics for cotton
fibres, yarn and thread, and woven fabrics(3), as shown in figure
A4.12.
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Figure A4.9 Production costs for a 400 kg/d handmade paper plant at
1977 Mauritian shadow prices.




Fibrous raw materia 1
Bagasse as fibre 1920 kg
Bagasse as fuel 1920 kg - 113 124 196
Cotton waste/cuttings 80 kg
Waste paper 48 67 78 82
180 202 278
Chemicals
Sodium hydroxide 100 kg 193 227 239
Chiorine 16 kg 106 124 130
A1 urn 27 kg 92 108 114
Rosin 13.5 kg 131 154 162
Titanium dioxide 4.5 kg 37 43 45
Daicol 11.25 kg 17 19 21
Optical bleach 0.45 kg 4 5 5
579 680 716
Labour
Workers 56 364 364 906
Supervisi on 7 274 274 343
638 638 1249
Electricity 320 kWh 192 224 112
Misc. expenses IRs 80 49 49 61
Total 1639 1794 2416
A - accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1
B - accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
2The area of woven fabrics was converted to a weight at 6 m /kg*.
The assumptions of wastage in the textile and clothing industries are
conservative. Clothing production is necessarily wasteful as non-
rectangular garments are cut out of rectangular pieces of cloth. Tex¬
tile factories waste less, and some of this will be as mixed natural
and artificial fibres, which are difficult to separate for pulping so
the estimate of wastage has been reduced to 2 %.
* Based on the weight of four cotton shirts.
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Figure A4.10 Revenue of a 400 kg/day handmade paper plant at 1977
Mauritian shadow prices.
Type of paper sold:
Printing and writing Packaging
A B Fi n. A B Fi n.
Daily sales (400 kg/d)/Rs 2685 3152 3319 1674 1966 2070
Production cost/Rs 1638 1794 2416 1638 1794 2416
Daily net revenue/Rs 1047 1358 903 36 172 -346
Annual revenue/kRs 314 408 271 11 52 -104
A - accounting ratios as in column A of figure A4.1
B - accounting ratios as in column B of figure A4.1
Figure A4.ll Net cash flow analysis for a 400 kg/d handmade paper
plant at 1977 Mauritian shadow prices.
(Cash flows Type of paper produced:
in mi 11 ions
of rupees) Printing and writing Packaging
A B Fi n. A B Fi n.
Capital cost -0.44 -0.50 -0.53 -0.44 -0.50 -0.53
Annual revenue 0.31 0.41 0.27 0.01 0.05 -0.10
NPV (1+13 years) at 5% 2.4 3.2 2.0 -0.4 -0.01 -1.5
7% 2.0 2.8 1.7 -0.4 -0.06 -1.4
11% 1.5 2.1 1.3 -0.4 -0.14 -1.2
IRR 72% 94% 50% -14% 5% -00
A - accounting ratios from column A in figure A4.1
B - accounting ratios from column B in figure A4.1
Note that another approximately 1926 t of flax, hemp and jute
fibres, yarn and fabric were imported in 1977 (SITC nos. 264, 265.80,
651.5, 651.92, 651.99, 653.3 and 653.4 in(3) ), the wastes from which
can also be used to make paper. So} the estimate of 90 t/a of long fibre
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Figure A4.12 Estimate of cotton wastes in Mauritius.
SITC Cotton ^ Quantity Wastes
imported as: m kg % t
263 Fibres - 442 352
651.40 Yarn & thread - 1 119 585
1 641 937 2 33
652 Woven fabrics 8 982 131 ~1 497 022 10 150
Total wastes 183
Available wastes (if 50% collected) 90
wastes available for paper production is a conservative one.
2. Addendum - Financial costs and benefits.
The main purpose of the previous calculations has been to check
whether mini-mill technologies would be economic to the Mauritian
economy from the viewpoint of the Government, by applying to the
costs and benefits accounting ratios used in the "Harbour Mater Plan
for Port Louis"(2). However, a project beneficial to the Mauritian
economy as a whole may not necessarily be profitable for a private
entrepreneur. Therefore, a check is needed on the financial costs and
benefits under Mauritian conditions, to see whether the venture would
be profitable on its own, or need support from the Government (in the
form of subsidies or tax conditions, for example).
The financial costs and benefits have already been given in
columns of the tables in this appendix. They were calculated by
methods similar to those used in the social cost-benefit analyses,
but with the following modifications:
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i. When actual Mauritian costs were available, they were used.
ii. When only c.i.f. prices were available, they were divided by the
ratios of import content to local price given in Scott(2), to
arrive at an approximation of the local price including import
duties, taxes, and distribution costs.
iii. These ratios were also applied to the costs of equipment
imported from India.
As the actual rates of import duties were not available when
this calculation was made, the financial analyses are less certain
than the social cost-benefit analyses. It can be seen, however, that
a 15 t/d mini-mill would be as profitable financially as socially,
whereas the 400 kg/d handmade paper plant would be less profitable to
a private entrepreneur, and critically dependent on the quality of
paper produced. Writing paper production might yield a internal rate
of return of around 50%/a, whereas packaging paper production would
loose money every year.
It would appear that the most useful way a government might sup¬
port such a handmade paper plant, in order to increase employment,
would be to fund research and development work to ensure that a good
quality product could be produced from these raw materials. It might
also guarantee to purchase poorer quality output for a time (until
high quality paper could be produced), in return for shares
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Appendi x _5
Bagasse briquetting - the Southern Bagasse Co. Ltd.
and a_ note of the use of second-hand equipment.
1. History of the Southern Bagasse Co. Ltd.
Around 1974, Jean Rey of the Mahebourg Lime Co., started looking
for alternative fuels for the companies lime kilns, as firewood was
becoming more scarce and costly on Mauritius. Since coal or oil would
have to be imported, bagasse was the obvious fuel. This presented a
technical problem, in that the lime kilns were of the vertical shaft
type, in which the firewood supported the weight of the unburnt
material, and provided channels through which gases could pass. When
more than a small proportion of bagasse is added to such a kiln, it
clogs these channels, while near the bottom of the kiln the unsup¬
ported limestone (or coral) crumbles.
Because of this, M. Rey considered briquetting the bagasse. He
studied various briquetting machines, and decided upon a machine
which produced high density briquettes under high pressure, since he
needed them to support the weight above them in the lime kilns. Lower
pressure designs, such as those used to reduce transport costs of
bagasse to paper mills, or to produce animal feed pellets, were
rejected.
The type chosen was that designed by the SPM Group Inc. in the
USA, and sold by their Swiss associates, Pawert A.G. This produced
pressures up to 240 MPa, using a 100 HP (75 kW) motor driving
hydraulicly a 75 mm or 90 mm piston. Such a press was rated at 1.6-
2.4 t/hr capacity when using medium weight sawdust at 10-15% mois-
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ture(l). The bagasse was first to be dried to 7-10% moisture using
sugar factory flue gases, then blown to a screw prepress which would
force the bagasse into the hydraulic press(2).
Requiring a source of bagasse, M. Rey arranged this with Savan¬
nah Sugar Estates. They set up a company, the Southern Bagasse Co.
Ltd., with 51% of the shares owned by Savannah Sugar Estate, and 49%
by the Mahebourg Lime Co. This company was to set up the briquetting
equipment alongside Savannah sugar factory, using its bagasse to pro¬
duce briquettes for sale to the Mahebourg Lime Co.(up to 4000 t/a),
Bois Cheri tea factory (1000 t/a*), and bakeries in the south of the
island (100 t/a)(2). The total investment in the plant was about
Rs2.5 M, all of which was put up by the shareholders, except for a
three year suppliers credit of 25% of the 400 000 SF cost of the
Pawert-supplied equipment(3).
The Southern Bagasse Co. arranged to buy two presses from Pawert
A.G.: a new one from Switzerland, and one secondhand from Nossi-Be in
Madagascar. According to Ruckstuhl, the chairman of the SPM Group,
the plant in Madagascar closed down because of difficulties in
obtaining spare parts under a new governrnent(4). Together with these
two presses, the Mauritian company bought pre-presses, feeding rolls,
control equipment, a fan, a rotary valve, and some conveyor parts
from Pawert A.G., and arranged for the local construction of all
other parts to plans supplied by Pawert A.G(l). The design was car¬
ried out by Swiss engineers unfamiliar with bagasse, as SPM's bagasse
experts were busy on two other projects, and no on-site study of
local conditions was carried out before preparing the quotation and
* The tea factory was using baled bagasse from Union St. Aubin
sugar factory for fuel , and hoped to save on transport costs.
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accepting the order(4).
The presses arrived in their crates in 1976, where they stayed
until 1979 while a new boiler was installed in Savannah sugar fac¬
tory. Finally, in 1979 the presses and bagasse drier were erected,
and a Swiss engineer arrived in December 1979 to get the plant work¬
ing. The sugar factory closed down a few days after he had left, so
only a few tonnes of briquettes were produced. 300 t were burned in
the lime kiln, and were found to be better than firewood, but some
technical problems had already arisen. The bagasse was not being
dried sufficiently, as the flue gas was at a lower temperature than
required for the design of drier (200 °C instead of 248 °C), and the
seals around the pistons were wearing badly, as a result of abrasive
ash in the bagasse (from rocks loaded into the mill with the
cane)(3,5).
The following season these problems continued. Also the pre¬
press did not function correctly, leading to uneven feeding of the
briquetting press, and breaks in the briquettes. It appears that the
Swiss designer had been unfamiliar with bagasse, and specified a
pre-press which would work with sawdust but not with bagasse. This
designer also assumed that the Mauritian bagasse was as fine as that
at Emil Hugot's factory in Reunion, where SPM had supplied their
first bagasse briquetting plant(4). As finer particles dry quicker
than larger ones(6), the drier was underspecified for Mauritian
bagasse, as prepared at Savannah sugar factory.
These design faults were of a kind that Mauritian engineers and
technicians, experienced in the handling of bagasse, might have been
able to overcome. Ruckstuhl suggested screening the bagasse to
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remove the largest fibres and the volcanic dust(4), and there were
certainly people in Mauritius experienced in the design of bagasse
feeders who should have been able to replace the screw pre-press by
something that worked.
Vet, nothing was done. The reaction was of inertia, rather than
initiative. Jean Rey asked the technicians at Savannah sugar factory
to try and get the presses working, but both the technicians and the
Savannah sugar estate management had little interest in this. Rey
claimed that they wanted to know if they were going to be paid by the
factory or the Southern Bagasse Co.(5). Although the Savannah Sugar
Estate owned 51% of the Southern Bagasse Co., the Tatter's success or
failure was of little importance relative to sugar production#. This
was far more important to the Mahebourg Lime Co., but its technicians
had not, in general, had much experience of handling bagasse. So a
potential conflict of interest existed, which was resolved by doing
nothing.
Later, a Swiss engineer, with experience of bagasse briquetting,
visited the plant. He wrote a report directly to the American company
about this, and told the Mauritians that there had been fundamental
mistakes in the conception of the plant(5). The American company
then agreed to buy back the equipment to be installed elsewhere. As
Mr. Ruckstuhl said, in a letter to the author(4):
... I must frankly admit that the briquetting plant
which has been supplied by our Swiss associates to Jean
Rey's group was a sad mistake and turned out to be a
# Furthermore, Savannah sugar factory had the alternative of
burning its surplus bagasse to produce electricity for sale to
the CEB. This might not have been as profitable, but was
fashionable, and within the experience of the factory manage¬
ment.
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failure policy that we would rather lose an order if we are
not given the opportunity to make a professional study
prior to submitting a binding proposal and/or accept an
order ... I feel we are at the crossroads of new and
exciting developments in bagasse densification, as soon as
we have had the opportunity to sell a new plant into an
area where local conditions are favorable.
2. The use of secondhand equipment in Mauritius.
In many countries, Rey's criticism of the Savannah factory tech¬
nicians, for their failure to attempt modifications to the equipment
to make it work, would seem unusual and unjustified. For in many
places even the repair of imported equipment can be beyond the capa¬
bilities of the technicians in the firm which uses the equipment.
Witness the numbers of buses and lorries abandoned in workshop yards
around Mozambique, in Transportos Publicos Urbanos, ROMOS and other
companies.f
However, in Mauritius, many sugar factory managers spend time
outwith the crushing season, in selecting, examining, ordering and
installing second-hand equipment for their factories. Some, would
cast gear wheels from scrap, and design and manufacture parts for the
factory. The installation is carried out by the sugar factory techni¬
cians, after renovation in the workshops (or an outside machine shop
or forge, for more complicated equipment).
Once installed, the performance of the equipment (new or
second-hand) is monitored, and the settings adjusted to optimum per¬
formance under the conditions in a particular factory. Where neces¬
sary, modifications are made, either on the initiative of the factory
T Although many vehicles remained unrepaired owing to a lack of
spare parts, the workshops limitations in fabricating spare
parts, beyond a certain complexity, also was responsible for
this situation.
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staff, or in collaboration with MSIRI, where the Sugar Technology
Division undertakes advisory work on specific factory problems, and
studies on problems of general interest to the industry.f
The careful selection of second-hand equipment, and the pool of
technical knowledge available to the Mauritian factory managers,
helped them overcome the difficulties mentioned by Cooper and Kaplin-
sky(8). There was no such readily available expertise on equipment
outwith that regularly used in the sugar industry. M. Lagesse had to
build up his own knowledge on pulp and paper-making machines by
visiting working factories overseas, studying the machinery, and
talking to the users (see chapter 6.1, pp.251-3). M. Rey had to rely
on a study of the different manufacturers literature on the use of
their plants, as the briquetter in Madagascar had not been used for
some years. So he could not get the information on the productivity
of this press when in use, that a second-hand dealer would have about
equipment that was for sale in the dealers' area.
Under these circumstances, there is a higher risk in buying
secondhand equipment, although in this case many of the problems were
the result of design faults. Both the new and second-hand presses
wore, although the second-hand press suffered more. What he criti¬
cised, and what is surprising only in a Mauritian context, it the
lack of any attempt to modify the drier and prepress to enable the
briquetter to function more efficiently.
} For example, the MSIRI staff investigated the poor perfor¬
mance of a vacuum filter at Mon Desert Alma factory, converted
to operate according to the "Rapidfloc" system, to the effect
that 1 . . . eventually an improvement in the de-sweetening of
the cake resulted when, for the final month of the crop, the
cloth lining was removed whilst the filter station was still
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